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INTRODUCTION: IT WOULD NOT ABSORB A SINGLE TEAR 
Eva Söderberg and Sara Nyhlén 
 
In May 2014, a two-day workshop called ‘Challenging the role of emotions in 
normalization/individualization’ was arranged by Mid Sweden University’s 
Forum for Gender Studies. This volume, part of the Forum for Gender Studies’ 
publication series, is a result of that workshop, which brought together scholars 
from six countries and three continents in Sundsvall. One of the speakers, Ann 
Cvetkovich, talked about a writing workshop on public feelings and showed us a 
number of interesting pictures, many of them reflecting her work with artists. One 
piece—Hungry Purse: The Vagina Dentata in Late Capitalism (2006), an installation by 
Allyson Mitchell1—was made from second-hand crocheted afghans; Cvetkovich 
told us that on the question of affect, materiality, textiles, and so on, Mitchell had 
commented on the fact that the afghans, although they were supposed to provide 
both emotional and material comfort, ‘would not absorb a single tear’ because they 
were made of synthetic yarn. 
Those words stayed with us, actualizing questions—literal and metaphorical—
about feelings, affect, and the academy. What sort of ‘yarn’ is the academy made 
of? Is it wholly synthetic or is it able to absorb tears? It transpired that the theme of 
the workshop was in a way an answer to that question. In twenty-first-century 
research, feelings, affect, and the emotions have increasingly been hived off into a 
separate field, with its own terminology, workshops, conferences, and periodicals. 
The workshop in Sundsvall should be seen against the background of an 
increasing awareness of affect’s potential in unlocking insights in a wide range of 
areas and with a variety of methodological approaches.2 
                                                          
1
 Hungry Purse is featured on the cover of Cvetkovich’s Depression—a public feeling. 
Durham: Duke University Press (2012). 
2
 See, for example, Ann Cvetkovich, An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and 
Lesbian Public Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press (2003); Sara Ahmed, The 
Cultural Politics of Emotions. New York: Routledge (2004); Patricia Ticineto Clough and 
Jean Halley (eds.), The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social. Durham: Duke University 
Press (2007); Annelie Bränström Öhman, Maria Jönsson and Ingeborg Svensson (eds.), Att 
känna sig fram. Känslor i humanistisk genusforskning. Umeå: h:ström—Text & Kultur 
(2011). 
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The Sundsvall workshop focused on feelings and emotions, but—and this is 
important—it also resulted in a number of emotional responses from the 
participants. Joy, fear, and tears: it inspired hope, it empowered. Over the course of 
the workshop, it became evident just how much the welfare state is on the retreat, 
but the glimmer of hope in this is that it allows for new types of collectivities and 
spaces of power. As Gabriele Griffin put it in the end of the second day of the 
workshop, ‘There are possibilities, beyond civil society, which the state has turned 
to as a substitute for itself for offering something different than what was 
imagined, and at the same time change how we think about that society as a 
resource for ourselves’. The workshop thus also homed in on questions about 
normalization, how neo-liberalism is normalized, and the sort of stickiness that 
characterizes neo-liberalism, for while many people try to resist its practices there 
is also something attractive about it—it’s a ‘sticky killjoy’. 
It was natural enough for the workshop to consider normalization as it was held 
under the aegis of ‘Normalization and the neoliberal welfare state: Challenges of 
and for gender theory’3, a research project that also looks at the notion that neo-
liberal individualism and the corresponding re(de)formation of the welfare state 
and new approaches to political struggle have remapped society and thus also the 
feminist agenda. These changes have profound consequences for people’s 
understanding of gender and for the possibilities of feminist theory to drive social 
change. 
The aim of this project is to explore the challenges feminist theory faces in a neo-
liberal welfare state, but also to explore the ways in which feminist theory might 
overcome these challenges. The project is built on a step-by-step thematic process 
where the first is ‘Understanding and challenging the way normalization processes make 
power, values, and responsibility invisible’ and the second is ‘Challenging the role of 
emotions in normalization/individualization’. The workshop was arranged within the 
framework of this second aim. The third, final theme is ‘How to deal with differences 
in an ethical way? The possibility of developing a more sustainable gender theory in a neo-
liberal time.’ 
In the research project, normalization is the tool used to analyse the processes that 
define and produce what is considered ‘normal’, ‘natural’, or ‘right’ at a specific 
                                                          
3
 Funded by the Swedish Research Council (2012–2015) as part of the programme of ‘long-
term funding for theory and concept development’ (Diarienummer 344-2011-5104). 
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time and place, and at the same time to exclude certain meanings, practices, and—
in the shape of ‘the other’—groups of people. Thus, inclusions and privileges are 
produced in parallel with exclusions, structural inequalities, and discrimination in 
terms of sexuality, gender, class, and ethnicity—normalization processes always 
take place within the ordering of power structures. 
In the post-Second World War era, a societal normalization process of sorts was 
part of the inclusive welfare societies of many European countries. In today’s 
advanced neo-liberal programmes, we see new types of techniques of governing. 
The responsibility for achieving normalization no longer falls to the state or to 
collective political movements. Normality has become a matter of economics, with 
regulated individual choice re-signified as individuals exercising their freedom, 
while at the same time they are shaped to be whatever ‘the market’ wants them to 
be. These changes have far-reaching consequences for the understanding of gender 
as a structurally based concept, and for the possibilities for gender and feminist 
theory to produce knowledge for social change. The aim of this project is therefore 
to further develop the theoretical understanding of normalization from a gender 
perspective within the context of the neo-liberal welfare state. 
Given that this volume stems from a workshop based on the second theme, 
‘Challenging the role of emotions in normalization/individualization’, its focus is 
the fluidity of the boundary between belonging and not belonging, positioned as 
‘the other’, and how it varies according to time, place, gender, ethnicity, and class. 
As social beings, we are all risk of being treated as ‘the other’, or indeed of 
becoming ‘at risk’. This idea of vulnerability is closely connected to a sense of fear, 
anger, grief, shame, or disgust. Maintaining this vulnerability and uncertainty is an 
important part of normalization’s power. A key research question here is the way 
in which neo-liberalism’s governmentality is created in a regime of fear. 
The workshop was multidisciplinary, the mix of disciplines and researchers being 
evident right from the start when Annelie Bränström Öhman opened a session on 
‘Emotional encounters in feminist academic writing and fiction’ by interviewing 
Mia Franck and Maria Margareta Österholm on the question of emotional 
epistemologies, interstices, and translation in various genres of feminist writing 
and thinking. Both Franck and Österholm started their careers in literary studies 
intertwined with gender studies. Quoting bel hooks –‘All academics write, but not 
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all see themselves as writers’4—Bränström Öhman raised the question of writing, 
especially considering the fact that she and Franck write both academic and 
literary genres. For Franck, ‘the researcher’ and ‘the author’ are equally active in 
her literary work, but not at the same time;5 she uses the two perspectives for 
different purposes. For Österholm, writing in different genres emerges from ‘the 
same place’ and the same interest—girl, girlhood, and so on. In all her endeavours, 
the term gurlesque—evoking girl, grotesque, and burlesque in equal measure—has 
been very important,6 offering her other ways of thinking about—and beyond—
girlhood proper. She sees gurlesque as a mix of feminism, femininity, cuteness, 
disgusting, and the grotesque. Thus in its assorted literary and artistic 
manifestations, the gurlesque and its norm-breaking dimensions may provoke a 
great deal of emotion and affect. In a later presentation at the workshop, Mia 
Österlund used the term gurlesque to analyse the character Liten Skär (‘Little 
Pink’) in a controversial series of books for toddlers by Stina Wirsén.7 
Other questions raised by Bränström Öhman were whether it is possible to see 
reading, writing, and doing research as having no sharp limits between them. Is it 
possible for an academic to imagine a reader who is both an academic and a 
writer? According to Bränström Öhman, something gets inevitably lost ‘when you 
draw the line between facts and fiction, academic writing and literary writing, too 
tight.’ 
The session with Bränström Öhman, Franck, and Österholm, with its inclusive 
atmosphere, in many ways set the tone for the workshop. For those of us more 
familiar with political-science perspectives, the workshop was a new experience 
                                                          
4 bel hooks, Remembered Rapture: the writer at work. London: Women’s Press (1999). 
5 Mia Franck, Frigjord oskuld: Heterosexuellt mognadsimperativ i svensk ungdomsroman. 
Turku: Åbo Akademis förlag (2009); and Martrådar. Helsinki: Schildts & Söderströms 
(2013). 
6 For Gurlesque, see Lara Glenum and Arielle Greenberg (eds.), Gurlesque: the new grrly, 
grotesque, burlesque poetics. Philadelphia: Saturnalias Books (2010); Maria Margareta 
Österholm, Den unga F:s bekännelser. Stockholm: X:publishing (2011); and her Ett 
flicklaboratorium i valda bitar. Skeva flickor I svenskspråkig prosa från 1980 till 2005. 
Stockholm: Rosenlarv Förlag (2012). 
7
 Mia Österlund, ‘Att formge en flicka: Flickskapets transformationer hos Pija Lindenbaum 
och Stina Wirsén’, in Eva Söderberg, Mia Österlund and Bodil Formark (eds.), Flicktion: 
Perspektiv på flickan i fiktionen. Malmö: Universus Academic Press (2013), 168–87.  
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because it not only elaborated on the emotions, but also allowed for emotional 
responses from the participants. The multidisciplinary setting opened up for 
various discussions where the participants often prefaced their ideas with ‘This is 
just a thought’, ‘Perhaps’, ‘What if—?’ and ‘I haven’t thought this through, but—’, 
and in this sense the participants were not afraid of ‘feeling like frauds’.8 
In many ways, the workshop revolved around a sense of refusal—a refusal to 
accept the neo-liberalization of the academy, not to mention of society at large. 
With so many personal experiences in life, academia, and research shared among 
the participants, a notion of action space took shape. The starting point for the 
workshop was Patricia Ticineto Clough who talked about the experience of 
measurement and how places such as schools and care facilities are given over to 
control rather than care. And the constant measurement of what we call feelings in 
the neo-liberal society. 
 
The workshop also raised questions about working conditions, with Gunilla 
Olofsdotter, Angelika Sjöstedt-Landén, and Magnus Granberg focusing on the 
‘workfare’ policy so dominant in Sweden today, where the fear of losing one’s job 
is so strong that it creates subordinate, obedient subject-employees. 
 
The various sessions of the workshop came together to make a single thread, with 
a core multidisciplinary strength. The various sessions’ themes were woven 
together into a fabric that did indeed have the ability to absorb tears. But this also 
raised the question of privilege. What of the workshop participants’ privileged 
positions, and how could the weave of the fabric be extended to include others? 
Perhaps ‘walking beside’ as a research practice is a part of that answer. Much of 
the workshop was given over to the main themes discussed in terms of art, art-
space methods, and creative non-fiction, and the focus on creativity, the emotions, 
methodology, and neo-liberalism made for a unique event. The essays that resulted 
are published here, organized into four sections. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The quotation refers to Peggy McIntosh, ‘Feeling Like a Fraud’, Work In Progress, No. 
12, Stone Center Working Papers Series, Wellesley, MA (1985); see also Maria Jönsson & 
Anna Rådström and Peggy McIntosh in this volume. 
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Neo-liberalism and emotion 
‘How do members of dominant groups establish and maintain who will count as 
being “normal” and thus “insiders”?’ is the opening question in the first essay. The 
answer is the emotions. In ‘Emotions and normalization’, Siv Fahlgren starts from 
a personal memory of meeting an alcoholic on the morning bus to work. Seeking 
out the generally applicable in her memory, she uses it to discuss the place of 
emotion in processes in which some people will be accounted normal and worthy 
of inclusion, and others to be excluded as abnormal. In her conclusion, she 
wonders whether emotions could be mobilized for resistance, working for change 
instead of reproduction, justification, and normalization. 
Fahlgren’s essay centres on a piece of memory work reflecting an everyday 
experience: going to work by bus. ‘Everyday’ is also the word for E in an alphabet 
created by Ann Cvetkovich ‘because feeling bad is a very ordinary and Everyday 
experience’. In ‘Writing with The Alphabet of Feeling Bad’, Cvetkovich presents a 
collaborative project in which scholarship and art are combined in interesting and 
fruitful ways. Her essay presents reflections on the various iterations of her 
collaborative abecediary project. To her mind, the project has been a way both to 
create theory by performing it and to teach theory. The genre of the abecediary also 
enhances the use of keywords, another pedagogical genre for theory. During a 
writing workshop run by Cvetkovich at the Sundsvall meeting, participants were 
invited to see keywords as portals and to explore their associative power and 
capacity to open the mind to new ideas. 
In the Alphabet of Feeling Bad, A is for anxiety, while one word for F could have 
been fear. In ‘A regime of fear?’ Gabriele Griffin examines the articulation of fear in 
popular culture, more specifically two works of crime fiction from 1991 and 2001 
by the Swedish author Henning Mankell. These novels, Griffin suggests, act as 
cultural barometers for the normalization of certain regimes of fear associated with 
immigration in the Swedish context. Using the novels and the theoretical writings 
of Arjun Appadurai on the ‘Fear of Small Numbers’ (2006, 2009), Griffin considers 
regimes of fear as a technology employed by neo-liberalism. She concludes by 
raising a question that could carry us beyond neo-liberalism. 
Privilege and emotion 
One important keyword in the next three essays is privilege. The first, ‘The politics 
of men’s emotions’ by Bob Pease, addresses male privilege and interrogates men’s 
emotional investment in male supremacy and violence. Pease sets out to explore 
educational strategies that use emotion to challenge men’s resistance to 
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acknowledging and addressing male privilege and its abuse. It is essential that 
care-giving and caring masculinities are fostered, for, according to Pease, they are 
both an essential part of promoting gender equality and a way for men to 
transform negative emotions into positive ones. 
In the second essay, ‘Investigating privileging in relation to asylum seekers’, Jonny 
Bergman argues that Swedish Immigration Service staff have to deal daily with the 
dilemma of enjoying a privileged position in relation to the asylum seekers, while 
being challenged both by asylum seekers and the public sphere in general. 
Bergman argues that to understand this twofold position it is necessary to 
investigate the role played by emotions in reproducing privilege and, further, in 
investigating and challenging it. Such an investigation promises to shed light on 
how discourses, structures, and practices sustain and normalize certain ways of 
privileging. 
The third essay, ‘On being a race traitor’, has a personal point of departure: Ulrika 
Schmauch, a white ‘Swedish’ woman, announces her race treachery due to her 
marriage to a black practising Muslim from Somalia. In light of her own 
experiences—visible in the essay in the shape of personal narratives—she discusses 
this position. Without denying her own privilege, she notices how it can heighten 
one’s sensibility of racism and how much it helps to look at the world from two 
perspectives at once. Her aim is to problematize the dichotomy of ‘victim of 
racism’ versus ’not victim of racism’, which she suggests should be understood as 
more complex and contradictory. She advocates an understanding of racism that 
takes into account its dual nature. 
Neo-liberalism, fear, and fraudulence 
The essays in this section deal with different types of fears in the context of neo-
liberal governmentality, and also what the emotional effects of neo-liberalism 
might be—‘feeling like a fraud’, for example. The first essay, ‘A regime of fear?’, is 
based on four narratives that resulted from collective memory work by Siv 
Fahlgren, Katarina Giritli Nygren, Anders Johansson, and Eva Söderberg, who 
wrote down key moments of fear: fear of losing control, of insecurity, of 
(in)visibility, of becoming an affect alien. After a collective process of reading, 
listening, and rewriting, the narratives were analysed, again in a collective process. 
Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s work, Fahlgren, Giritli Nygren, Johansson, and 
Söderberg see human emotion as expressing historical, cultural, and social 
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practices that form individual as well as collective bodies. In their epilogue, they 
question the way they embarked on their memory work with almost prearranged 
feelings. One explanation is the key concepts they had been working on in the 
project—normalization, discipline, and governmentalities. Like Griffin, they 
conclude that their memories are examples of how neo-liberalism is upheld by a 
regime of fear. 
In the second essay in this section, ‘Still feeling like a fraud?’, Maria Jönsson and 
Anna Rådström start with McIntosh’s eponymous paper from 1985,9 in which 
McIntosh dissected the feeling of fraudulence within the academy and other 
spheres in the US. She took a ‘double look’ at the phenomenon, and suggested that 
a feeling of fraudulence is something to avoid and to embrace at the same time. 
Jönsson and Rådström apply McIntosh’s critical thinking to today’s neo-liberal 
academic in Sweden to see what it reveals. Is it possible, they wonder, to articulate 
a language of failure within the academy today? What does it mean, and how 
should one react toward people who actually do so? 
Jönsson and Rådström consider ‘Feeling like a fraud’ to be ‘one of the gems in the 
archive of feminist critical thinking’. Peggy McIntosh is still active in the field, and 
after the workshop in Sundsvall she was invited to comment on Jönsson and 
Rådström’s essay. In ‘Feeling like a fraud: a joyful re-meeting at the Möbius 
crossroads’ she reacts to the fact that academic life in the US and Sweden shows so 
many parallels. She states that she shares with Jönsson and Rådström ‘alternative 
views that could bring better balance to institutions that claim to be in search of 
knowledge, for the betterment of human life’. In the essay, she makes the 
connection to her other work about America’s problems seen through the prism of 
fraudulence. Indeed, like ‘Feeling like a fraud’, this essay serves to reveal the 
discourses and structures in Swedish society today. 
From the youngest to the oldest 
In the fourth section, the essays span from picture books and women’s wardrobes 
to rural places, exploring different fictitious and real conditions, tracking a wide 
range of feelings and using various methods. In ‘Death in Swedish Picture Books’, 
Eva Söderberg discusses how death, grief, and mourning are dealt with in 
Nordic picture books published in the last fifty years. Children’s literature 
mirrors society, but is also part of the discourses that can influence the world 
outside the books. Söderberg shows how picture books carry over old patterns 
                                                          
9
 McIntosh 1985. 
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and motifs, and also how they challenge literary taboos. In conclusion, she 
problematizes the way children’s literature is thought of as a mere reflection 
of society and its complexities. Is it possible, she asks, to see in picture books 
about death a reciprocal connection between rituals and ceremonies on the one 
hand and on the other a neo-liberal society where individualism is an ideal?  
The next essay is part of Karin Lövgren’s ongoing research exploring the cultural 
meanings of ageing. ‘ “Fun” as a resource’ uses wardrobe interviews with women 
aged between 62 and 94, and using garments as prompts when discussion 
transitions, continuances, and ageing. Up to now, the wardrobe interview as a 
method has not been extended to the elderly, which makes Lövgren a pioneer. One 
thing that caught her attention is that several women, when describing their 
thinking about their clothing, used the emotive term ‘fun’. Lövgren examines the 
word, its Swedish translations and their connotations, and those aspects that earn 
certain items of clothing a label as ‘fun’, discussing how these terms are used as 
strategies by the interviewees, who are all members of a culture that renders 
ageing women invisible. 
Ageing is the subject of the last essay too: ‘Emotional aspects of growing old in 
rural places’ by Sara Nyhlén, Beverly Leipert, and Katja Gillander Gådin. Their 
thesis is that growing old in a rural area is for many reasons rather different than 
growing old in a built–up area. The study of ageing, emotion, and rurality 
warrants serious investigation if the health of the rural elderly is to be effectively 
supported. How, for example, can different aspects of the emotional layers of 
growing old in rural places be captured by the use of different kinds of methods? 
The methods discussed are quantitative surveys, in-depth interviews, and a 
photovoice project, with studies conducted in Sweden and Canada. To conclude, 
Nyhlén, Leipert, and Gillander Gådin endorse the use of multiple research 
methods in order to deepen our understanding of ageing and emotions in rural 
contexts. 
Walking beside 
The final essay by Nyhlén, Leipert, and Gillander Gådin raises the sort of questions 
about research, emotions, and ethics that were touched on by other participants. 
The workshop followed up on these in the final session: a discussion of ‘The 
normality of emotions’ by Gabriele Griffin, Ann Cvetkovich, and Patricia Ticineto 
Clough. The questions enumerated by Griffin include handling vulnerable 
subjects, dealing with difference in an ethical manner, and the interrelation of the 
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everyday and normalization. Clough’s and Cvetkovich’s responses are examples of 
how they, by being sensitive and receptive in their encounters with artists, 
students, and young adults in multi-ethnic areas, had developed new methods and 
transformed existing methods. Clough, for example, had walked around her old 
neighbourhood, whereupon one young person after another from the area joined 
her, and the result of their walking, talking, and joint creativity was an interacting 
autobiography with music, dance, video, and photography presented at a remix 
festival as a performance of shared experiences. This led her to reflect on the 
quality of the relationships we as researchers maintain in what we think of as 
research. Unlike if it had been a therapeutic situation, Clough and these young 
adults had, in her words, been ‘walking side by side’. 
This actual ‘walking side by side’ offered an image that was picked up on, 
developed by the collective, and duly questioned by the workshop participants. 
This discussion turned on research methods, specifically in relation to ethics, 
access, privilege, (in)visibility, normalization, and the academy in a neo-liberal age. 
How can walking beside someone be used in research practice? Is it really possible 
to walk side by side instead of ‘looking at’ them? Does it presume some sort of 
equality in a structural relationship that does not exist? How do walking beside 
and other experimental methods go together with neo-liberalism? 
The metaphors ‘side by side’ or ‘walking beside’ capture many of the themes 
discussed during the workshop—and equally they indicate the important issues to 
come in the larger project. That third theme concerns ‘How to deal with differences in 
an ethical way? The possibility of developing a more sustainable gender theory in a neo-
liberal time’, and will be the focus of the project’s efforts during the autumn of 2014 
and spring of 2015. The importance of the metaphor on different levels, both 
during the workshop and for the last year of the project, is therefore highlighted in 
the title of this anthology, Walking Beside: Challenging the Role of Emotions in 
Normalization. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
EMOTIONS AND NORMALIZATION: ANALYSING AND 
SUBVERTING THE PROCESSES OF NORMALIZATION 
Siv Fahlgren 
 
How do members of dominant groups establish and maintain who will count as 
being ‘normal’ and thus ‘included’? In Fahlgren (2011; 2013) and Fahlgren et al. 
(2011) I have analysed, in the Swedish context, the way dominant groups secure 
power by creating ‘outsiders’ whom they categorize as being not-normal, 
subjecting them to different normalizing practices.10 In this essay, in thinking 
through emotion’s contribution to such normalization processes, I want to focus on 
how emotions matter in the power and politics of normalization. My focus, 
though, is not how emotions draw us into subordination or the creation of ‘the 
other’—or ‘outsiderhood’, a much-used political concept in Sweden in recent 
years—but the very condition of ‘normality’ or privileged position. Central to the 
analysis is the creation of ‘the other’, but only as it ties in with the emotional work 
done by members of dominant groups in relation to themselves and others, in 
order to accomplish their own normality. As part of a larger Swedish project on 
normalization (Fahlgren et al. 2011; Fahlgren 2013) I argue that all members of 
dominant groups are engaged in similar normalization processes, and one way to 
reconsider such processes is to analyse them in relation to emotions. 
My analysis centres on a piece of memory work I have done following Frigga 
Haug (1999) and Karin Widerberg (1995), telling a story where I meet an alcoholic 
on the morning bus, from the perspective of an unnamed ‘she’. This is in order to 
create a degree of distance, but also to be able to see what about the story is more 
generally applicable. The story I have chosen is a personal memory of taking the 
bus to work on a cold, dark Swedish winter’s morning. One of the reasons why I 
do remember it is that afterwards I could not really understand my own reaction, 
since I was once a social worker, used to interacting with alcoholics. In this 
analysis, I accord emotion a central position. 
                                                          
10
 I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Professor Bronwyn Davies for many 
thought-provoking discussions on emotions and normalization, and for taking the time to 
read and comment on my work to such beneficial effect. I would also like to thank my dear 
colleagues at the Forum for Gender Studies and in various normalization projects for so 
many inspiring seminars and, specifically, their invaluable comments on this essay. 
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Survey of the field 
Davies et al. (2001) and Søndergaard (2012) have shown that belonging to any 
social group as a normal member is not something that can be made permanent. It 
requires constant vigilance. Work must be done, and continue to be done, to secure 
recognition as a normal member of one’s group. Normality has a slippery status 
that can be lost very quickly. It is both tightly regulated and unstable (Foucault 
1990), and something that the individual both strives to hold onto and, at the same 
time and to some extent, distances themselves from. To be ‘just like everyone else’ 
may ensure one’s inclusion, but it may also bring derision or contempt for not 
being original, not having a ‘mind of one’s own’, and for not being recognizable as 
this person and no-one else. This complex dynamic is usually implicit and is not 
readily opened up for inspection. 
The securing of group membership, in Butler’s analysis (1997a), is established 
through repeated, habitual recitations of the normative order as both ubiquitous 
and morally correct. This recitation establishes the conditions of intelligibility, and 
it bestows power on those who are deemed to be intelligible at the expense of those 
who are not. Those who are deemed to be unintelligible are taken to threaten the 
way the world is and ought to be (Davies 2008)—that is, they are perceived to 
threaten the stability of life-as-usual and so disrupt the moral order. If each 
individual is potentially an outcast, the maintenance of the conditions of 
intelligibility is important work for survival (Fahlgren 2005). 
Yet habitual recitation and the acts of power it legitimates are not necessarily open 
to reflexive inspection or strategic manipulation. Accomplishing oneself as an 
original individual involves a disavowal of dependence on the discourses through 
which one is spoken into existence (Butler 1997b). And further, as Butler points 
out, it is the very illegibility of the conditions of intelligibility that secures their 
continuity: 
the conditions of intelligibility are themselves formulated in and by power, and this 
normative exercise of power is rarely acknowledged as an operation of power at all. 
Indeed we may classify it among the most implicit forms of power, one that works 
through its illegibility: it escapes the terms of legibility that it occasions. That power 
continues to act in illegible ways is one source of its relative invulnerability. … The 
one who speaks according to the norms that govern speakability is not necessarily 
following a rule in a conscious way. One speaks according to a tacit set of norms 
that are not always explicitly coded as rules. (Butler 1997a, 134, my emphasis) 
The ‘normal’, as it is embedded in the conditions of intelligibility, thus appears 
self-evident to those who read the world in those terms. The normal is 
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unexpressed, uncategorized, colourless, genderless. It is implicit, not explicit, in the 
processes of normalization (Fahlgren et al. 2011; Hacking 1990; Pease 2010; 2011). 
The role of emotions 
In this essay I am interested in the role that emotions play in those normalization 
processes. I will follow Sarah Ahmed (2004) in describing emotions as historical, 
cultural, and social practices that form individual and collective bodies alike. 
Emotions in this sense are not something ‘I’ have, located in my individual body, 
but movements in time and place, movements between individuals that form their 
bodies. It is through emotions, or how we respond to subjects and objects, that ‘I’ 
and ‘we’ are shaped in the same movement as one and ‘the other’. We are one 
another’s precondition for what kind of life we will live, what identities are 
possible. Thus our social location is integral to our emotions; emotions are 
constituted and conditioned, experienced and expressed through/in a social 
location that makes them (im)possible (Ahmed 2004, 4–12; Bränström Öhman et al. 
2011). 
I am particularly interested in the way emotions work to produce the position of 
the legitimate subject, the ‘I’ or ‘we’ position, while simultaneously generating the 
‘not me’ or ‘the other’ position. I am interested in how our emotions are 
normalized within social contexts so as to fit into and (re)produce power relations 
and hierarchies between subjects. But I will also ask how emotions might be 
engaged in subversive challenges to normalizing practices. 
It is central to the analysis that ‘doing normal’ be understood as a multivalent and 
ambivalent movement. Securing a place in a dominant group is only ever 
temporarily accomplished. But what will be counted as doing normal is always 
subject to change (Foucault 1990; Søndergaard 2012). Normality is not an entity but 
a process. There are ways in which passing as normal is a requirement for gaining 
access to various forms of power and privilege. Nevertheless, we become attached 
to the predictability that recitation and repetition afford us. Our safe place in the 
social fold, always at risk of being lost (Søndergaard 2012; Davies et al. 2001), is 
secured through recitation and repetition, but also through the creative invention of 
the new (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). 
In this article I situate the analysis in the space in between self and other, beginning 
with the emotions that characterize the forces of normalization. The conceptual 
model I develop here is one that offers an insight into how normativity works on 
and through the bodies of members of dominant groups. In what way does 
normalization contain emotions? I hope to make the subjective processes of 
establishing and maintaining normality more legible, but also to discuss other 
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possibilities that might expand the conditions of intelligibility beyond their current 
illegible certainties. Finally, I will suggest that members of dominant groups, who 
routinely hold onto their ascendancy by casting others as not-normal, have an 
ethical responsibility to question their ascendant position, asking what it 
accomplishes—and what is made to matter in their judgement (Barad 2007; Davies 
2008). 
Doing ‘normality’—the story of a bus journey 
She is sitting on the bus and, as is her habit, is watching people as they get on. She 
feels such warmth for all these people who are struggling on with daily life in the 
darkness, cold, and snow. When they reach that notorious part of town, a drunk man 
gets on. His trousers are hanging low and he has a problem getting his wallet out to 
pay. Finally he has managed to pay and is looking for a seat. For a fraction of a 
second she thinks of the empty seat beside her—then he’s sitting there. But if there’s 
one thing she should be able to handle after all her years as a social worker, it’s 
drunks. He starts to talk to her, loud but unclear. She looks out of the window, but 
he continues insistently. She gives curt answers to his questions. He smells bad, of 
alcohol, sweat, urine—God knows what. The people around them look at him—and 
at her. She wishes she’d reached her stop—continuing looking out the window, 
pretending she does not hear. 
The storyteller describes herself comfortably watching people as they get on the 
early bus to work. As she usually does, she sits there experiencing a loving 
openness to the other workers in their daily struggles in the cold winter morning. 
But her emotions seem to change as the drunken man moves toward the empty 
seat beside her. What is this change about? Is she worried about him? Not really, as 
she is actually very used to alcoholics. Rather she becomes intensely aware of the 
eyes of the other passengers looking at him—and at her. No longer gazing at them 
benignly, she feels herself to be the one being gazed at, with the drunk’s identity, 
his otherness, invading her own sense of self (Davies 2006). 
The love she feels for the other bus passengers is of the sort that secures the 
subject’s relation to the world. It is an inclusive emotion, and she is herself 
included in that loving feeling. But the problem with love is that it can be taken 
away, Ahmed (2004) writes. The anxiety she feels as the drunk approaches may 
stem from that possibility of loss. It seems to spill over into fearful anticipation of 
what might come—and not really from him, but from the others on the bus. It is 
rarely possible to relax completely into a taken-for-granted condition of normality; 
being normal must be constantly guarded. Is it her normality that is threatened, 
and is that what evokes an emotion of fear? 
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The emotion of fear 
She is not afraid of an old alcoholic; after all, she used to be a social worker. Rather, 
fear works here by establishing the other as unnerving, not in himself, but insofar 
as his difference threatens to envelop the storyteller as he moves towards her. She 
recoils in fear that involves a turning towards a ‘fellow feeling’ of life as it should be 
(Ahmed 2004, 64–74), a life where she numbers, with dignity, among the bus 
passengers on their way to work, and not someone who is at risk of being looked 
down on contemptuously. 
It may be that fear brings the woman on the bus closer to the object of her love, the 
community of passengers, at the same time as it transforms the man who is 
approaching her into an object of fear; fear and the expressions of contempt create 
‘that which I am not’. In this way, fear at the same time brings their bodies together 
and moves them apart. Securing the subject is not only about securing a border 
that already exists, nor is fear only fear of what we are ‘not’; rather fear and anxiety 
create the effects of borders, defining that which we are ‘not’ (Ahmed 2004, 62–76). 
This performativity, in Butler’s sense of the word (2004), is integral to the processes 
of normalization. The fear and anxiety experienced by the woman on the bus are 
not an invention, but a reiteration. 
The fear of degeneration or disintegration thus comes to be associated with some 
bodies more than others. In Ahmed’s terms, the narratives that seek to preserve the 
present through anxiety and fear lodge that which is fearful in those bodies, which 
take on fetishistic qualities as objects of fear (2004, 78–9). In this sense it is not the 
particular man on the bus who is fearsome, but what he has come to represent. 
 
In her study of bullying, Søndergaard describes how the ever-present possibility of 
losing secure membership can create a generalized anxiety, which she argues is a 
complex relation between social exclusion anxiety and practices of contempt and 
worthiness production, where bullying is not the product of individual pathologies 
but a feature of social groups and the necessity for individuals to belong to 
groups—to exist in relation to others (2012, 361–362). In Søndergaard’s analysis, 
the practices of bullying are integral to the desire for continuing existence, since 
one’s continuing existence necessarily involves group membership. People’s 
practices of contempt towards others are a way of securing their own group 
membership. 
Further, Davies (2011a) has shown how bullying, far from being the work of 
pathological individuals, may be driven by an intense desire to maintain the moral 
order—or the rigid striations of the group. What will count as normal and 
acceptable fluctuates through these practices as individuals strive for their own 
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survival within the conditions of possibility that are integral to their group’s life. 
The bus incident is not really an instance of bullying, of course, but it does display 
a similar attempt to survive within a threatened ‘normality’ that never is a stable 
entity, since its meaning shifts with the context. The ‘normality’ on a morning bus 
in the north of Sweden, a very specific place and time, is to sit quietly in your seat 
and perhaps surreptitiously watch one’s fellow bus passengers or speak in a low 
voice to someone you know. Reading the story this way, I would say that it is not 
really the objection of the other but the inclusion of the subject that creates the 
norm. 
Normalization, power, and the emotion of disgust 
When the drunk sits down next to the woman on the bus, she cannot help being 
filled with sense of offence and disgust, shrinking from him as if he might 
contaminate her with his smell and his drunkenness and his voice, which is much 
too loud. And acting on this impulse, she gives him the cold shoulder, turning 
away from him to look out of the bus window. But he is not easy to shake off. She 
finds herself abjecting him, actively constituting (and making visible) the boundary 
that assigns him to otherness, consigning him to the category this-is-what-I-am-not 
and even this-is-what-we-on-the-bus-are-not—we normal working people who 
know how to behave—opening up the space between her and the rest of the bus 
passengers. She is a little surprised at her emotional reaction, since she used to 
work with men like him in the past. 
The movement away from him, looking out of the window instead of at him, is the 
work of disgust; this is what disgust does. Disgust pulls us away from the object in 
a way that feels involuntary, as if our bodies were thinking for us; distancing, 
rejecting, affected by what one has rejected. It is as if the object of disgust threatens 
her by the possibility that what is ‘me’ or ‘us’ might slide into ‘not-me’ or ‘not-us’. 
We each want to protect ourselves, through practices of abjection, from all that is 
‘not-me/not-us’ (Kristeva 1982; Ahmed 2004). In the same movement, the object of 
disgust is materialized as a drunken body. In this embodied disapproval, she 
expresses what she feels, but at the same time it is an example of how normalized 
behaviour is performed, and thus how emotions play a vital part in normalization 
processes. 
Ahmed asks, ‘Does disgust work to maintain power relations through how it 
maintains bodily boundaries?’ (2004, 88). In her analysis, disgust is not only about 
threatened boundaries, but also about objects that to the subject seem ‘lower’, or 
beneath them. This is intensified in relation to the lower regions of the body—the 
smell of ‘sweat, urine—God knows what’: ‘Disgust at “that which is below” 
functions to maintain the power relation between above and below, through which 
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“aboveness” and “belowness” become properties of particular bodies, objects and 
spaces.’ But this position of ‘aboveness’ is maintained only at the cost of a certain 
vulnerability—an openness to being affected by those who are felt to be below 
(Ahmed 2004, 89). 
Though the threat to her normality is not only a classed threat (in terms of class), 
but very much class intersecting gender. His smell, his bodily presence, the 
drawing of attention to the lower regions of his body, becomes a reminder of his—
and her—sexuality. In a heteronormative cultural context such as Sweden this 
woman is already positioned as the other (sex), a vulnerably unequal position that 
she brings with her onto the bus. Also, in the case of disgust, something more than 
a subject and an object is generated on the bus; there is also a community of shared 
witnessing if the disgust is to have its effect. In pulling away in disgust, the woman 
on the bus calls upon others to witness and share her condemnation of the 
disgusting object. According to Nussbaum (2004, 14), disgust has been used 
throughout history to exclude and marginalize groups of people who come to 
embody a dominant group’s fear of its own animality. In doing so, it also embodies 
the dominant group in its ‘normal’ and privileged position—it also work as 
inclusion. Thus it could be said that emotion has a very central place in these 
normalization processes. With all the emotions present between the people on the 
bus, you could say this woman, from her vulnerable position, is engaged in the 
normalization process of doing herself as an honourable middle-class woman —at 
the same time as doing ‘the others’ other’. But exclusion at the same time tends to 
become invisible; we should all be included, we do not want to see ‘the other’. 
The naturalness and invisibility of normalcy 
The processes by which an individual secures group membership are multivalent. 
Recognition as a normal member of one’s group is necessary. Yet too enthusiastic 
or earnest a claim to normalcy is suspect in those cultural settings where normality 
is understood as a natural quality of individual subjects, and, as such, reflecting 
their essence. In such a reading of normality, rigorous training in normality, and 
governmental forces demanding normal performances, are made invisible. 
This is the paradox that lies at the heart of the normalization process. Normality 
must appear to be natural, and the forces brought to bear on any individual to 
conform to the norms, both historically and in the present, must be invisible. The 
forces exerted on the ‘abnormal’ individual are extreme, although they are at work 
on and through the so-called normal individual and abnormal individual alike. At 
the same time, the status of those who are read as being normal is understood as 
having been accomplished naturally, effortlessly, unselfconsciously, even though 
in fact it takes enormous effort to pass as normal—washing every day, ensuring 
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one is not emitting unpleasant odours or sounds in public, moving your body in a 
acceptable way, engaging in appropriate forms of deference and dominance, and 
so on and so on. 
In a further twist, in such a system of thought, one’s own adherence to any of the 
tenets of ‘normality’ should be open to reflexive scrutiny. It is not enough to follow 
what is right or correct, one must engage with it critically and thoughtfully, and 
even with humour. Television programmes, for example, which capture the 
(extreme) essence of normality and hold it up for ridicule, often become 
compulsive and compulsory viewing.11 They portray an exaggerated normality in 
which viewers can both empathically find themselves and laugh at themselves. 
The role of emotions in the normalization process 
So far I have argued that normality is not fixed since its meaning shifts with the 
intra-active space and with categorizations and their cultural histories (Barad 
2007). We all have to do ‘normal’ if we are to pass as normal (Fahlgren 2005), even 
while we should not desire it too much or cling to it too tightly. Applied in a social 
situation—witness the episode on the bus—the meaning of ‘normal’ easily shifts 
from something ordinary and neutral (‘we’ ordinary bus passengers) to become 
something desirable or ideal (‘we’ who are not drunk in the early morning, but are 
responsible working people who know how to behave) (Hacking 1990; Piuva 
2005). ‘Normality’ is thus in danger of slipping away from this storyteller on the 
bus. The habitual recitations of herself that create the stable illusion of normality, 
are interfered with by the presence of the drunk man beside her. Her identity and 
sense of belonging become insecure. She is not known to everyone on the bus, and 
so she cannot trust them to continue to treat her as if she is normal. 
A similar emotion is recounted in an interview by Peter the social worker in 
Fahlgren (2011). He works at the Family House, a social work centre for families 
whose children are considered to be at extreme risk. Families who are found not to 
be coping adequately with child care (that is, not doing normal parenting) can be 
required to live in this institutionalized setting for a period of time, while their 
behaviour is monitored and corrected by social workers. Peter recognizes in 
himself the familiar moment of panic that he says they all experience when out 
with one of the families who do not yet know ‘how to behave’ in public places: 
We usually say when we come back from one of those intense experiences: Oh, 
today I wish I’d had a Family House hat on. You know, a hat with a little streamer 
                                                          
11
 For example, in Sweden Svensson, Svensson; in Australia, Kath & Kim and Summer 
Heights High; in the US, The Simpsons; and in the UK, Creature Comforts. 
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on it that says ‘the Family House’ [laughs]. That’s when you’ve had to deal with 
someone who’s really crazy, who can’t function socially. (Fahlgren 2011, 32) 
This familiar emotion arises because there is nothing that makes his difference 
from the family he works with visible or legible to passers-by. He jokes about his 
desire to signal to the community of ‘ordinary’ people that he is not part of this 
family, not one of ‘them’, by fantasizing about a hat that would show he was a 
social worker on duty, working with the family. In other studies, the desire to 
signal one’s membership of the category of normal people has been shown to be 
invoked by being associated with something less than flattering or even openly 
pathological (Jacobsson 2007), or in the face of an assertion that one does not 
belong to, say, the dominant ethnic group (Lundström 2007). 
The fantasy hat with the streamer would serve as the same kind of signal as the 
woman on the bus bodily turning away from the drunk. The ‘crazy’ family and the 
drunk are sticky signs to be abjected through dissociation; the drunk and the 
family become ‘the other’ in the same movement, the emotion through which the 
woman, or Peter, become ‘normal’. Strong emotions of fear and disgust are 
movements that push the other away, and literally put them in their place (Ahmed 
2004). But in the same movement, the normal subject is produced through 
inclusion. 
Conflicting emotions at the very centre of normalization 
The conflicting emotions, or the growing conflict, described in the memory of the 
bus journey between the feelings of failing to live up to her own obligations (she 
should not be that disturbed, she knows how to handle the situation) and fearing 
her own position being called into question, demonstrate how normalization is 
enacted. As an example of how normalized behaviour is performed, she expresses 
what she feels by how she reacts, by the emotional responses of her embodied 
disapproval. At the same time and in the same movement, that which is 
constituted as lying ‘outside the normal’ is itself constitutive of the inside, holding 
it together. As Butler (1997a, 180) explains: 
This ‘outside’ is the defining limit or exteriority to a given symbolic universe, one 
which, were it imported into that universe, would destroy its integrity and 
coherence. In other words, what is set outside, or repudiated from the symbolic 
universe in question is precisely what binds that universe together through its 
exclusion. 
This story enables us to glimpse the ways in which these processes are part of 
everyday life. Each of us, I would argue, is caught up in the practices of 
normalization, in asserting the rightness of our accepted moral framework, in 
establishing hierarchies and values concerning good and evil, morality and 
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immorality, gender, class, and ethnicity. Normalization practices privilege 
‘sameness’. Cultural images and practices are created according to a constructed or 
proposed homogeneity; one’s co-participants in life are identified as like-minded, 
physically similar, from similar families and similar to ‘us’, secured through 
recitations and repetitions. All of this is designed to secure social privileges for 
dominant groups (Essed 2004). 
What this analysis shows is that it is not the exclusion or abjection per se, but 
rather inclusion that creates the norm. We should all be included, we should all be 
normal. In a way, the exclusion is made invisible: she gives the drunk man the cold 
shoulder, we do not want to see ‘the other’. I would argue that the very meaning of 
normalization thus has an emotional content—one that is masked by most theories 
of ‘the normal’, for example by talking about statistical normality or the normal as 
the common, the ordinary (Hacking 1990), not at all something that forces you to 
deal with difficult emotions. 
Challenging normalization processes: from emotions to ethics 
The story about the bus journey shows how emotions work to repeatedly 
differentiate between subjects and between lives. Differentiation serves to secure 
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate lives, securing (for some) 
membership of dominant groups (Butler 1997). Emotional responses work as forms 
of judgements; they invest in social norms, norms that bear the cost of injustice and 
pain (Ahmed 2004). Emotions stick to morality and justice, and thus become 
central investments in the normalization process. By analysing this process and the 
habitual recitation of the normal order that is implicit in it (Butler 1997), I seek to 
challenge the normative exercise of power it consists of. 
To read normalization processes in this way is to make visible the violence, pain, 
and cost that the processes generate for the one who is ‘othered’. So far my focus 
has been the emotions of the (dominant) storyteller. Clearly we must ask, with a 
nod to ethics involved, about the emotions of the one who is othered. And we must 
ask how else the storyteller might have reacted—what other emotions might she 
have mobilized? Could she have included the drunk in her love of the bus 
passengers as they got on with the day, without repeating the violence inherent in 
the emotions of fear and disgust? Could she act in the name of love—without that 
love becoming a conditional love, requiring the other to live up to the (imagined) 
ideals of the community of early morning bus passengers? 
Given the way I have described love, nothing much would change, since to love 
the abject verges on the liberal politics of charity (Ahmed 2004, 141). Such love 
would make the loving subject (here the woman on the bus) feel better for having 
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extended love to someone who is presumed to be unloved, but at the same time it 
would sustain the power relationships that compel people to show charitable love 
in this way. Sympathy and compassion may work in the same way, elevating some 
subjects over others in terms of what one can give to another. Is there a possibility 
of recognition that does not re-establish the hierarchy of power? Is there a way to 
be moved by the other that does not include moving away from them; that is not 
about moving on, but being moved as a form of work (Ahmed 2004, 201)? 
There is violence in the dual act of recognition and judgement in this story. The 
role of emotions in the normalization process seems to block the possibility of 
being open to the other in a way that does not place the other in a lesser or even 
abject position. To me, feminism is about making the effort to see or read the world 
from a different angle, taking nothing for granted—not a normalized point of view. 
It is about asking questions (‘What can we do?’) rather than taking the normalized 
line (‘That’s just the way it is’); it is about taking on the ‘the pain of others’ (Ahmed 
2004, 174). 
Based on Williams’ discussion (2003) of finger-pointing and those singled out for it, 
I am able to conclude that, regardless of whether we point the finger or are 
bystanders, we all have a responsibility for the (discriminating) discourses and 
practices that are maintained historically and culturally. There are no exceptions 
from this responsibility. Nor does individualization, nor the neo-liberal way of 
giving the individual responsibility for her so-called ‘free choices’, cancel out such 
a collective responsibility, although it does conceal it and makes mobilization for 
change and resistance even more difficult. A much more complicated question is 
how to shoulder a more justifiable responsibility? Thus the next question will be 
whether emotions can be mobilized for resistance and to work for change instead 
of reproduction, justification, and normalization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WRITING WITH THE ALPHABET OF FEELING BAD 
Ann Cvetkovich 
 
A is for Anxiety and for Alienation. 
A is also for Acedia, a medieval word 
for the lethargy of spiritual despair. 
 
B is for Backward, as in Feeling Backward. 
Or left out or like a misfit. 
Feeling Backward can also mean 
looking to the past to make connections 
with people from other times 
who might have been queer and 
who can become our fellow travelers. 
 
C is for Capitalism, as in 
‘You might be suffering from Capitalism.’ 
But saying that capitalism is the problem 
doesn’t always help me get up in the morning. 
 
D is for Depression, 
for Despair, for Doubt, for Disappointment 
and for Dread. 
 
E is for the Everyday 
because feeling bad is a very 
ordinary and Everyday experience. 
 
F is for Failure, 
which is not always a bad thing 
since the Failure to be normal can be good. 
 
F is also for Feeling Bad. 
The Alphabet of Feeling Bad is about creating new vocabularies 
but sometimes very simple statements like ‘I feel bad’ 
are the best way to describe our feelings. 
We don’t always need new words. 
Sometimes we just need to acknowledge Feeling Bad.
12
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 This excerpt is from The Alphabet of Feeling Bad, the full text of which was written for a 
video installation for the ‘Words Needed’ exhibit in Umeå, Sweden, in early 2014. A 
written version of the text was distributed as part of its installation in ‘Counterparts’, 
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Behind the scenes 
This is the opening of an abecediary that derives from my video collaboration with 
the Berlin-based artist Karin Michalski, the first version of which was produced for 
a group show called ‘A Burnt-Out Case?’ at nGbK gallery in Berlin in 2012 (see Fig. 
1). Karin was interested in the work of the collectives with which I have been 
associated, Public Feelings and Feel Tank, including the concept of ‘political 
depression’, and I had previously worked with her on an interview for a zine she 
made called ‘Feeling Bad—Queer Pleasures, Art & Politics’. For the present 
project—a collaboration that also included the artist Renate Lorenz—she proposed 
that I help her write an ‘alphabet of feeling bad’, an abecediary of key terms from 
‘A is for Anxiety’ to ‘Z is for Zest’ that would extend the inquiry into the political 
depression and negative affect that had brought us together. 
Although we did some initial brainstorming via email to generate words for each 
of the letters of the alphabet, the project was mostly finalized during a trip I made 
to Berlin for a one-day shoot in which I ‘performed’ the alphabet by reciting the list 
along with brief explanations of each of the terms. I did not fully realize until I got 
to the studio (where a queer version of Tracey Emin’s My Bed was set up as my 
stage) that Karin wanted me to explain the words, not just recite them, and the 
resulting live/filmed performance is a combination of script and improvisation, 
which was filmed while I recited slightly different versions of the alphabet three 
times in one long take of 45 minutes! It was unexpectedly gruelling to make the 
jump from skeletal script to performance while the camera was running—if it had 
just been a live performance whose results were ephemeral, I would likely have 
been more relaxed. 
As what Karin describes as an ‘experimental interview’, The Alphabet of Feeling Bad 
has been a good way to combine scholarship and art, not least because it carries my 
work and those of my fellow queer affect theorists into different venues—the 
gallery and the street rather than the university, and Europe rather than the US—
and without my having to be present. The video has been screened as a continuous 
loop composed of two of the different versions, and it has now been shown in 
exhibitions in London (in ‘Visualising Affect’ at Lewisham Arthouse in conjunction 
with Goldsmiths College), Zurich (at Les Complices), Karlsruhe (at Badischer 
Kunstverein for an exhibition called ‘An Unhappy Archive’), and other locations 
around Europe (see Fig. 2). I have been able to use it in some of my own 
presentations, starting with an abridged live performance for Allyson Mitchell and 
                                                                                                                                                   
curated by the Institute for Contemporary Ideas and Arts, Gothenburg, Sweden, in the 
summer of 2014. 
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Deirdre Logue’s ‘Axe-Grinding workshop’ at the Tate Modern in London, and as a 
point of departure for writing workshops in Sydney, Australia, and Sundsvall, 
Sweden. Thus far, however, Karin and I have only had one chance to co-present 
the film—at the conference ‘Art Affects’ in Freiburg, Germany. 
I also collaborated with Karin on a second version of the abecediary for a video 
installation project called ‘Words Needed’ curated by Anna Linder in Umeå, 
Sweden, which was European Capital of Culture for 2014. For that version we 
turned the script into a text (white words on a black background) which was 
projected on a wall of snow in the middle of one of the city streets—right next to a 
shopping mall called Utopia!—as part of the festival’s opening ceremonies (see Fig. 
3.) This second version has also been exhibited in Gothenburg as part of 
‘Counterparts’ (curated by Anna van der Vliet), an exhibition designed to 
transform public space during the Swedish general elections in the autumn of 2014. 
For that installation, the video was projected onto the ceiling of a hotel room, and 
spectators could lie on the bed to watch it, thus echoing the location of my own 
performance/interview and creating a more intimate public space for shared 
feelings (see Figs. 4 and 5). 
The academic workshop in Sundsvall, which prompted the present volume, was 
fortuitous because it gave me a chance to visit the location of the ‘Words Needed’ 
installation in Umeå and to discuss it with people who had seen it. I incorporated 
the film into my workshop presentation in order to describe my interest in 
embodied theory and queer affect, and used it as provocation in a writing 
workshop that became another version of the alternative public spaces the film 
seeks to create. This essay presents some reflections on the various iterations of the 
project, which has been generative for my thinking despite the fact that I have not 
been able to see any of its formal exhibitions! 
The abecediary as theory pedagogy 
The abecediary has been a way to create theory by performing it. And since the 
actual performance was impromptu and thus improvisatory, the results are less 
deliberate than many forms of writing, or even academic public performance, 
where the thinking is so often planned. It is also a way of teaching theory, and the 
genre of the abecediary enhances the use of the keyword, another pedagogical 
genre for theory. Theory often takes the form of vocabularies and conceptual terms 
that provide tools for thinking, whether the classic Marxist keywords, such as base, 
superstructure, and structure of feeling, as defined by Raymond Williams; terms to 
describe the shifting state of the political economy such as postmodernism, late 
capitalism, or neoliberalism; or, in the current moment of the affective turn, 
distinctions between emotion and affect (which have sometimes generated anxious 
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discussion) or the new significance attached to words such as mood and atmosphere. 
Keywords morph and change in significance, and new theories (and theorists) can 
be known by the vocabulary (or sometimes even buzzwords) they generate. 
Disparaged as jargon by their detractors, theoretical terms often call out for 
definition. The abecediary is thus a way to bring people in—an adaptation of the 
children’s genre to make the technical language of theory accessible and to forge 
new public cultures. Karin also cites The Alphabet of Feeling Bad’s sources in 
abecediaries in classic videos from the experimental tradition such as John 
Baldessari’s Teaching a Plant the Alphabet (1972) and Martha Rosler’s Semiotics of the 
Kitchen (1975), which explored the arbitrary and oppressive process of language 
acquisition and the lesson as a form of negative pedagogy. Acknowledging this 
critique, our version explores the abecediary’s potential as an activist or grassroots 
educational form, seeking to craft a lecture or a lesson that can be transmitted to 
and absorbed by anyone (not just remaining in the hands of the experts). I write 
not only as an academic, but as someone whose knowledge of feeling bad comes 
from experience and who is creating a vocabulary that provides strategies for 
living. As part of the exhibition ‘An Unhappy Archive’ (a term used by Sara 
Ahmed in The Promise of Happiness) at the Badischer Kunstverein in Karlsruhe, The 
Alphabet of Feeling Bad screened alongside books by me, Ahmed, and other queer 
affect theorists such as José Muñoz, Lauren Berlant, and Heather Love, making 
even more explicit the film’s intellectual sources and enhancing its pedagogical 
and political functions. 
In our rendering of the abecediary, theory’s keywords also become more accessible 
because they are offered up through forms of instruction that are attuned to 
affective modes of instruction (as indicated by the bed that replaces the classroom 
or lecture hall to offer a more intimate space of learning where feelings are 
encouraged). It was important for me that the list include not just the technical 
vocabulary associated with particular theorists, whether old guard or new queer 
theorists, but that it also endorse everyday language as a form of theoretical 
vocabulary. Some words are, of course, major theoretical concepts from fellow 
travellers in queer affect theory—Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, Lauren Berlant’s 
Slow Death, and Sara Ahmed’s Killjoy and her critical account of Happiness—but the 
explanations are brief enough to remain accessible and circulate in the public 
sphere without becoming a full-on lecture. But other words, such as Vulnerability, 
Loneliness, Rage, and, of course, Feeling Bad, are more ordinary or vernacular terms. 
The resulting list is thus quite varied—from high to low, from common to obscure. 
Indeed the process of finding words for each of the twenty-six letters of the English 
alphabet suggests that the vocabulary of feeling bad is infinite—that there are 
many ways to feel bad and many ways to describe feeling bad. And it also suggests 
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that negative feelings need to be named, and a way found to make that naming a 
public process. The Alphabet of Feeling Bad makes public both experience and its 
vocabulary that might be private or stigmatized—and suggests that there is no 
feeling too shameful or private—or inarticulate—not to be shared with others. 
Keyword as magic portal 
In our public feelings work, we have used the term portal to describe the 
keyword—to indicate its associative powers and its capacity to open up to new 
ideas and new worlds or to facilitate a crossing from one world to another.13 Used 
in the context of the Internet to describe the rapid transfer from one source of 
information to another, portal also has psychoanalytic connotations of an 
unconscious logic at work in defining the terms’ meaning. I sometimes think of 
keywords as talismans or fetishes that have magic powers; we can get attached to 
our favourite theoretical terminology in the same way that a child learning the 
alphabet may fixate on a beloved word, especially when it is associated with an 
image, although usually the word is a proper name or noun, not an abstract 
concept. 
Thus, when I reflect on the improvised nature of the original performance of The 
Alphabet, I can see my own predilections at work. There are, for example, some 
words, such as Grief, Shame, and Trauma, that are so obvious or so common to me 
(Cvetkovich 2003, 2012) that I do not offer much explanation for them; they belong 
to vast critical and theoretical bibliographies that I did not have the energy or 
patience to unpack in the moment of performance. So I say, for example, ‘Grief—I 
don’t think that needs an explanation.’ In other cases, with terms such as 
Vulnerability and Precarity that have also drawn a lot of theoretical attention, I said 
a bit more because of my investment in vulnerability’s centrality to social and 
political life. There is also a difference between the keywords that many theorists 
share, such as Melancholy or Utopia, and ones that are identified with particular 
people. I did my best with concepts such as Slow Death or Killjoy, but felt myself 
pausing slightly to ventriloquize Lauren Berlant and Sara Ahmed, not quite certain 
what it meant to take on their vocabulary without acknowledging them by name, 
but also wanting to declare a shared sensibility. (And The Alphabet is also a way of 
signalling their relevance for a public discussion of feeling bad.) 
Some terms were also more personal. Dread, one of my favourite affect words from 
George Eliot; Melodrama, in recognition of my work on nineteenth-century popular 
genres (Cvetkovich, 1992); Numbness, always a point of reference for me in 
                                                          
13
 My thanks to Randy Lewis, my ‘Public Feelings’ colleague at the University of Texas, 
for providing this term. 
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thinking about affect as force or energy (Cvetkovich, 2012): my favourite moments 
are the ones where the keywords are a way of encoding my own intellectual and 
affective histories. For example, the words Yell/Yawn and Zest (which I linked with 
vitality) come from my experience with co-counselling (also known as re-
evaluation counselling), which prioritizes the physical discharge of feelings; their 
inclusion represents my secret nod to other ways of sharing bad feelings besides 
talking about them as I do in the video. And Karin requested that we include the 
word Jealousy, and I liked our invocation of the challenges of the feminist collective 
process by defining it as ‘political disappointment, the failure of feminist dreams of 
sisterhood.’ These are not universal definitions, but ones that suggest particular 
experiences and collectives. They are not meant to be binding for others, but 
instead serve as an invitation to create other vocabularies or to define terms in 
other ways so that everyone can have their own alphabet of feeling bad. 
Feeling bad as negative affect 
Uniting the list and central to all of the terms is the interest in ‘negative affects’ 
indicated by the rubric of feeling bad, which in English at least is a colloquial term 
whose meaning derives in part from its lack of precision. Bad is close to sad but not 
quite the same, and it also carries the hint of bad as wrong, as though feeling bad is a 
sign of deviance or non-normativity. Feeling bad is also ambiguous with respect to 
distinctions between the physical and the psychic, since saying ‘I feel bad’ can 
apply to either, and can mean that one feels sick in a way that cannot be diagnosed 
or pinned down. This lack of specificity feels transgressive with respect to both 
scholarship, which depends on precision, and good writing, where the vague and 
the colloquial are to be avoided. 
As something one cannot quite name, feeling bad also conveys the increasingly 
important sense of affect as mood, atmosphere, or sensibility. Karin’s adoption of 
feeling bad as a category was an important affirmation of my own enduring desire 
for a category that is more capacious than technical or historical terms with 
complex genealogies such as melancholy or depression.14 Feeling bad is the vernacular 
counterpart to negative affect, which has become ubiquitous of late in discussions of 
queer affect and which, even as it seeks to challenge norms, has far more 
legitimacy and respectability as a theoretical concept. And even as the abecediary 
proliferates specific terms for feeling bad, the generic term remains central. 
When I went back over my own transcript to compose the written version, I was 
also struck by how often I had repeated the words ‘making room for’ or ‘making 
space for’ various versions of feeling bad. These phrases indicate our desire to 
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 Heather Love (2010) also discusses ‘feeling bad’ in her essay ‘Feeling Bad in 1963’. 
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create conceptual space for those feelings and their terminology. But the process 
whereby The Alphabet of Feeling Bad ‘makes room’ for feeling is also quite literal, 
since the video’s installations expand what counts as public space, as did the 
bedroom setting, which is a reminder that the theorist has a body and is not just a 
talking head. 
An abecediary as a writing workshop 
The two versions of The Alphabet of Feeling Bad have been screened in contexts that 
strain against conventional gallery exhibitions, which seems appropriate for work 
that straddles the boundaries between art and academe and between theory and 
vernacular. As such, it has also proved an interesting teaching tool, and I have 
experimented with different ways of incorporating it into talks not only to 
showcase the project, but also to demonstrate the popularization of theoretical 
work on queer and negative affect. I have been especially happy to use the video 
screenings as a vehicle for writing workshops, inspired by the work I have been 
doing in Public Feelings groups, writing with others in order to generate new 
theories, concepts, images, and short forms. Using The Alphabet of Feeling Bad as a 
point of departure not only builds on the conceptual work of the abecediary and 
keywords, but also uses theory as a vehicle for a writing practice that stresses 
thinking as activity or performance (as it was for me in the process of filming the 
first version). 
The Mid Sweden University project ‘Normalization and the Neoliberal Welfare 
State’ was an ideal venue for a Public Feelings writing workshop, since many of 
the participants had already experimented with alternative research practices (as 
evident in Griffin et al. 2013), and the abecediary was appropriate given that some 
members of the group specialize in children’s literature, which was the focus on 
one of the sessions. My goal for the writing workshop was to get the group to 
generate its own set of keywords as prompts for writing. Thus after screening The 
Alphabet of Feeling Bad, I asked that everyone make two lists of keywords: one a 
more ‘public list’ of words that were important at the workshop, the other a more 
‘private list’ of words that had personal meaning, whether in relation to their own 
research project or to their lives more generally. I sometimes begin workshops by 
asking the participants to describe how they feel, and I then incorporate the 
responses into the writing and discussion. In Sundsvall, practices of ‘processing’ 
were already on the table courtesy of the presentation by Maria Jönsson and Anna 
Rådström on feeling like a fraud and consciousness-raising, which was compatible 
with my own use of writing practice as ‘working through’ or affective labour. 
Everyone then shared one of their words along with a brief explanation. The 
cumulative force of the collective discussions usually comes through in this 
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process, and in Sundsvall this was certainly the case. As with The Alphabet itself, 
the words ran the gamut from theoretical to personal, and from shared to 
idiosyncratic (see Fig. 6). Many, of course, reflected feelings: e-motions, dis/trust, 
ambivalence, dis/comfort, daring, invisibility. Others reflected our discussions of affect 
theory and The Alphabet: reparative, internalized dominance, artist–theorist, finding 
words. And some, such as pink rebellion and soul-shrinking, seemed very particular: 
portals into other projects. Especially important to me were the Swedish words—
sinnesrörelse and våga(d)—since I had encouraged people to suggest Swedish terms 
so as not to take for granted English as the language of our conversation. Indeed, 
keywords are very adaptable to bilingual contexts and for discussions of 
translation. Although the workshop was conducted in English and most 
participants were fluent in the language, it is also valuable to be attuned to what 
does not translate well (including words such as affect and emotion), and it was 
useful for me to learn about the Swedish terms that came up. 
Once the words have been shared, I like to have everyone write about one of them 
together. Sharing words is a version of the transfer of affect, where you feel 
someone else’s feeling or, in this case, their vocabulary of feeling. Depending on 
how much time is available, people can choose a word on their own, or the group 
can arrive at a consensus. I have experimented with different systems, including 
voting, although the keyword that gets the most votes is not necessarily the only 
one to use. If there is time, working with the outliers can be another way of tapping 
collective feelings, including negative ones that might be lurking on the edges. 
Working in this way not only generates new keywords, but also allows theoretical 
terms or conceptual categories to be connected to the specific stories people tell 
about them. One aim of the workshop format is to use the activity of writing to 
generate stories rather than definitions—to let the word prompt other words and 
images rather than arrive at a single definition. Ultimately, then, The Alphabet of 
Feeling Bad is not about teaching definitions, but about opening up keywords (and 
affects) to more personal vocabularies and definitions that can be shared, and 
about making feelings less lonely and isolating. A writing workshop is also a way 
to spur on new thinking in the company of others, where seemingly stray or 
idiosyncratic thoughts and feelings can become the raw material for research 
projects.15 
                                                          
15
 I would like to thank Karin Michalski for inviting me to collaborate with her on The 
Alphabet of Feeling Bad. Her creative work has allowed me to see my own thinking and 
writing in new ways. I am also grateful to Eva Söderberg and the other members of the Mid 
45 
 
References 
Ahmed, S. (2010) The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke University Press. 
‘Art Affects—Politiken der Gefühle’, symposium, Freiburg, Germany, 13 to 16 
February 2014, <http://www.genderstudies.uni-
freiburg.de/news/Symposium2014>. 
Baldessari, J. (1972) (dir.) Teaching a Plant the Alphabet. [Video]. 
Baumann, Sabian & Karin Michalski, ‘The Alphabet of Feeling Bad & An Unhappy 
Archive’, Badischer Kunstverein, Karlsruhe, Germany, 24 April to 
22 June 2014, <http://www.badischer-
kunstverein.de/index.php?Direction=Programm&Detail=552>. 
Berlant, L. (2007) ‘Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency)’, Critical 
Inquiry, 33, 754–80. 
‘Counterparts’, Institute for Contemporary Art and Ideas, Gothenburg, Sweden, 22 
August to 14 September 2014, <http://www.icia.se/en>. 
Cvetkovich, A. (1992) Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian 
Sensationalism. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
—— (2003). An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
—— (2012). Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Griffin, G., A. Bränström-Öhman & H. Kalman (2013) (eds.) The Emotional Politics of 
Research Collaboration. New York: Routledge. 
Les Complices*, Zurich, Switzerland, <http://www.lescomplices.ch>. 
Logue, Deirdre & Allyson Mitchell, ‘Axe Grinding Workshop’ at the Civil 
Partnerships? Conference, Tate Modern, London, 18 May 2012, 
<http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/conference/axe-
grinding-workshop>. 
Love, H. (2007) Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
—— (2010) ‘Feeling Bad in 1963’, in J. Staiger, A. Cvetkovich & A. Reynolds (eds.), 
Political Emotions: New Agendas in Communication. New York: 
Routledge. 
Michalski, Karin, <www.karinmichalski.de>. 
Michalski, K. & A. Cvetkovich (2012) The Alphabet of Feeling Bad [version 1]. 
Germany, HD, 13 min. 
—— (2013) The Alphabet of Feeling Bad [version 2]. Germany, HD, 14 min. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Sweden University research group for the opportunity to present the ‘Public Feelings 
writing’ workshop that led to this essay. 
46 
nGbK Gallery, Berlin, Germany, 
<http://ngbk.de/development/index.php?lang=en>. 
Rosler, M. (1975) (dir.) Semiotics of the Kitchen. [Video]. 
‘Visualising Affect’, Lewisham Arthouse, London, 8 to 10 July 2013, 
<http://visualisingaffect.weebly.com>. 
‘Words Needed’, Umeå, Sweden, 31 January to 2 February 2014, 
<http://umea2014.se/en/event/words-needed/>. 
 
 
Captions for Images 
 
FIGURE 1 Production still from The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 1), 2012. 
Photograph by Robert Mleczko. 
 
FIGURE 2 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 1) for ‘An Unhappy Archive’, 
Badischer Kunstverein, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2014. Photograph by Stephan 
Baumann. 
 
FIGURE 3 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Words Needed’, Umeå, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Karin Michalski. 
 
FIGURE 4 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Counterparts’, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Kjell Caminha. 
 
FIGURE 5 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Counterparts’, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Mary Coble. 
 
FIGURE 6 Keywords from the Public Feelings writing workshop, Sundsvall, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Eva Söderberg. 
47 
 
FIGURE 1 Production still from The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 1), 2012. 
Photograph by Robert Mleczko. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 1) for ‘An Unhappy Archive’, 
Badischer Kunstverein, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2014. Photograph by Stephan 
Baumann. 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Words Needed’, Umeå, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Karin Michalski. 
 
49 
 
FIGURE 4 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Counterparts’, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Kjell Caminha. 
50 
 
 
FIGURE 5 The Alphabet of Feeling Bad (version 2) for ‘Counterparts’, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Mary Coble. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
FIGURE 6 Keywords from the Public Feelings writing workshop, Sundsvall, 
Sweden, 2014. Photograph by Eva Söderberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
  
53 
CHAPTER 3 
 
A REGIME OF FEAR? EMOTION, GENDER, AND MIGRATION IN 
THE AGE OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
Gabriele Griffin 
 
One of the issues that has provoked strong emotions in the public sphere in many 
north-western countries in Europe, including in Sweden, is that of migration (see 
Pred 2000). These expressions of emotion have taken quite specific forms, 
involving at one end of the spectrum the evocation of empathy with and sympathy 
for those displaced in appeals to support humanitarian aid (see Höijer 2004; Fassin 
2012) and, on the other, and much more problematically, articulations of fear and 
hatred of those ‘others’ who appear on Western shores, quite literally.16 In this 
essay, I want to examine that articulation of fear as it occurs in popular culture, 
and in particular, for the Swedish context, in two works by Henning Mankell, a 
writer more commonly cited in connection with crime fiction than in the context of 
migration or neo-liberal politics (see, for example, Bergman 2010; Agger 2011; 
Nestingen & Arvas 2011; Forshaw et al. 2012; Geherin 2012; Nestingen 2012).17 
Utilizing the theoretical writings of Arjun Appadurai (2006; 2009), I shall argue 
that Mankell’s work speaks in interesting and partly contradictory ways to the 
regimes of fear that govern contemporary popular cultural renditions of the issue 
of migration. 
What’s behind this whole thing? Neo-Nazis? Racists with connections all over 
Europe? Why would someone commit a crime like this anyway? Jump out into the 
road and shoot a complete stranger? Just because he happened to be black? (Mankell 
2011 [1991], 232) 
These are the words of Kurt Wallander, middle-aged male police inspector and one 
of the heroes of the post–2000 expansion of Scandinavian crime fiction (Saarinen 
2003; Nestingen and Arvas 2011; Forshaw 2012; Nestingen 2012). His colleague 
responds: ‘No way of knowing,’ said Rydberg. ‘But it’s something we’re going to 
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 There is an extensive literature on so-called ‘boat people’ going back to the 1970s, 
including Grant (1979), Tsamenyi (1983), Caplan et al. (1989), Marr et al. (2003), Pugh 
(2000), Pugh (2004), O’Doherty and Lecouteur (2007), Lewa (2008), Andersson (2012), 
and Phillips (2013). One of the most recent manifestations of this phenomenon in Europe is 
the arrival of ‘boat people’ from Africa and the Middle East in Sicily and Italy more 
generally (see Carta et al. 2014). 
17
 See Zizek (n.d.) for a slightly different take. 
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have to learn to live with’ (Mankell 2011, 232). By 2014, the assumption that one 
has to learn to live with such violence, the violence of everyday racism, has, one 
might argue, become the ‘new normal’. Racism in Scandinavia—in its many forms, 
and always with the threat of shadowy networks of neo-Nazis and fascists 
reaching across Europe in the background—has become ‘everyday’ (Essed 1991). 
Anders Breivik’s mass murders in 2011 were but the last, highly publicized 
instance of this. At the end of Faceless Killers, Wallander muses: ‘Again he thought 
about the violence. The new era, which demanded a different kind of policeman. 
We’re living in the age of the noose, he thought. Fear will be on the rise’ (298). One 
question we may ask is what kind of fear we are talking about and whose fear 
exactly is ‘on the rise’. 
When I first came to Sweden for an extended period of time, in the winter of 2008, I 
knew nothing of the Wallander series and I had no sense at all of ‘fear being on the 
rise’, of any culture of violence or racism.18 I remember that I was quite taken aback 
to discover, in the free local newspaper delivered through my letter box every 
week, a column entitled ‘Polisreporten’ which detailed all the crimes that had 
occurred in the previous week in the very well-to-do quarter of town, Ostermalm, 
where I had been put up by the university.19 I had always imagined Sweden a very 
safe place, and actually, in 2014 I still think of it as such. What really struck me 
about Stockholm in 2008, however, was how white it was—rather like some of the 
covers of Vintage’s English editions of Mankell’s novels. These tend to be black 
and white (a particularly apposite visual trope for certain kinds of crime fiction 
that cast the world metaphorically in black and white) and often feature a deserted 
landscape with just one house or a city in the distance.20 The whiteness of those 
covers mirrored in some way the whiteness I experienced in Stockholm in 2008, 
which was not just a function of the snow that fell. It was also a function of the fact 
that all the people I routinely saw were white—there seemed to be very few people 
(immigrants or non-immigrants) of any colour other than white. Coming from the 
UK this was particularly noticeable, since especially in the cities in which I had 
lived—London, Leeds, Leicester—multiculturalism visibly prevailed.21 The street 
scene in Stockholm was quite different, certainly in the quarters I frequented the 
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 As someone who does not routinely read crime fiction, I first became aware of Mankell’s 
work through the television series Wallander, which first appeared in Britain in 2008 (see 
Tapper 2009; Peacock 2011; Waade 2011). 
19
 I was Visiting Professor in Gender Studies at Stockholm University at the time. 
20
 See, for example, http://www.vintage-books.co.uk/books/0099532042/henning-
mankell/the-man-from-beijing/, accessed 26 August 2014. 
21
 Leicester in the UK is the first city where the majority population is migrant or 
descendents of migrants (see Panesar 2005). 
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most, which appeared to be largely monoethnic, something that is not the case 
today, just six years later. 
What also struck me in 2008 were the multiple exhibitions around Stockholm 
testifying to the horrors of mass killings and deaths elsewhere, outside of Sweden: 
an installation by Lars Lerin at Waldemarsudde, commemorating the Tsunami, 
reminiscent in its use of shoes washed up on the shores of Indonesia of another 
memorial articulated through shoes, that of Hungarian Jews in Budapest;22 works 
by Christian Boltanski at Magasin 3, memorializing the Holocaust.23 In all these 
exhibits, it was not the faceless killers that one confronted, but the faceless victims. 
Whiteness, and the cultural construction of the faceless victim—these seemed 
dominant. But they were also, importantly, accounts of what had happened 
elsewhere, rather than on Swedish soil. Mankell’s work returns these issues to 
Sweden, diagnosing, as Allan Pred (2000) has put it, that ‘even in Sweden’, 
‘racisms are currently flourishing’ (2000, 6). 
Facelessness has been much debated in post–2000 academe, partly in response to 
Judith Butler’s  discussions (2004, 2009) of the rendering faceless of certain groups 
of people in the context of what she described as ‘grievable lives’, and partly in 
response to the media rhetoric of plurification, of ‘floods’ and ‘masses’, which had 
come to dominate some European and certainly British public discourses about 
immigration (Charteris-Black 2006). Here facelessness and sheer numbers, 
expressed through metaphors of quasi-natural disasters, were mobilized as a 
measure to dehumanize immigrants and to reinforce arguments about the limits of 
welfare state resources. They represented the uncountable, the de-individualized, 
the masses that defy number and hence produce indifference. In his 2001 novel The 
Shadow Girls, Mankell attempts to address this facelessness. In the novel a Swedish 
reporter arrives at a Spanish refugee camp to write, as he says, ‘a series on people 
without faces, refugees who are desperately trying to enter Europe. We want to tell 
your story. We want to give you back your face’ (17). ‘Tea-Bag’, the female refugee 
he announces this to and one of the main protagonists, is outraged by his 
suggestion, and claims her agency by demanding an apology, stating: ‘I already 
have a face. What is he taking pictures of if I have no face?’ (17) She is not faceless. 
‘I am here, Tea-Bag thought. I am in the centre of things here, in the centre of my 
life’ (10). Tea-Bag’s encounter with the journalist translates into an uneasy 
confrontation, repeated in various ways throughout the novel, that articulates 
gender disparity (man, ‘first-world’, rescues woman, ‘third world’) and between 
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 See http://www.greatsynagogue.hu/gallery_shoes.html, accessed 20 August 2014. 
23
 See http://www.magasin3.com/v1/sv/utstallningar/boltanski.html, accessed 20 August 
2014. 
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two people in different states of uncertainty, in particular uncertainty about the 
meaning of the other. It is that scenario, of uncertainty about the other, which 
fuels—at least partly—the hatred and xenophobia I address here. 
Sarah Ahmed (2009), amongst others, has written about such uncertainties, 
especially in a piece on ‘The Organization of Hate’ where she discusses how hate is 
mobilized to generate ‘a subject that is endangered by imagined others whose 
proximity threatens not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, 
security, wealth) but also to take the place of the subject’ (252; my emphasis). This 
taking the place of the subject is what I want to discuss here. I shall use Arjun 
Appadurai’s work on the ‘Fear of Small Numbers’ (2006, 2009) and the two novels 
by Henning Mankell to think about the question of regimes of fear as a technology 
of neo-liberalism. Mankell’s novels, published ten years apart in 1991 and 2001, act 
as cultural barometers for the normalization of certain regimes of fear around 
immigration in the Swedish context, marked by a series of shifts in Swedish 
immigration policy (Rosenberg 1995; Eger 2010), and also in the socio-scape of 
Sweden, not least as it has appeared to me in my repeated and extended visits to 
the country since 2008. Things may have changed in Sweden in the past few years, 
but it remains far from certain how these changes might be engaged with. 
The question of how social groups relate to one another underlies Appadurai’s 
work on the ‘fear of small numbers’, where he seeks to account for the increasing 
numbers of large-scale ethno-nationalistically driven genocides that have occurred 
globally since the 1970s—in India, in Rwanda, in the former Yugoslavia, and so on. 
He argues that we live in an age of social uncertainty as the forces of 
globalization—specifically the transnational flows of capital, people, information—
have begun to marginalize nation-states’ abilities to control their borders, 
threatening their boundaries at every level. This results in an ‘anxiety of 
incompleteness’ as he puts it, which manifests itself in questions of identity that 
relate to the nation-state. As he puts it: 
One kind of uncertainty is a direct reflection of census concerns: how many persons 
of this or that sort really exist in a given territory? Or, in the context of rapid 
migration or refugee movement, how many of ‘them’ are there among us? … A 
further uncertainty is about whether a particular person really is what he or she 
claims or appears to be or has historically been. (2006, 5–6) 
Appadurai’s list of uncertainties is infinitely expandable, and, as he suggests, 
‘these various forms of uncertainty create intolerable anxiety’ (6) that may 
ultimately translate into violence, which then becomes a technique for producing a 
hierarchized order of ‘them’ and ‘us’. 
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The question of numbers in conjunction with a sense of social uncertainty (‘how 
many of “them” are there among “us”?’) looms large in the context of migration 
due the expansion of the immigrant population in Sweden as in other European 
countries from the 1960s onwards.24 This expansion has led to increasingly 
restrictive legislation (Westin 2006). Göran Rosenberg suggests that from 1972, 
labour immigration to Sweden ceased as ‘More or less overnight the Swedish 
political elite redefined the role of Sweden vis-à-vis its immigrants, from one of 
economic necessity to a moral duty’ (1995, 211), with ‘the word refugee [becoming] 
synonymous with immigration’ and a shift in emphasis occurring from ‘the needs 
of Sweden’—meaning its economic needs—to ‘the needs of the refugees’ (211). As 
Rosenberg states, ‘Refugees did not immigrate for the sake of helping Sweden; 
Sweden existed to help the refugees’ (211). This process led to the homogenization 
of immigrants and their redefinition as refugees and, in consequence, as economic 
burdens. Rosenberg blames the increasingly bureaucratized centralization of the 
immigration services that accompanied this, and what he describes as the political 
elite’s refusal to reconcile ‘political and moral commitments with economic 
realities’, for the development of randomness in the processing of immigrants and, 
ultimately, ‘increased insensitivity regarding individual refugees, i.e. … throwing 
people out after two or three years of investigation, forcing thousands of refugees 
into hiding’ (214). This precise issue is thematized in Mankell’s The Shadow Girls, 
which features three young refugee women in various positions of (il)legality, 
lacking recognition by the state as citizens in the form of a clear legal status, and 
acting as figures that present the difficulties the Swedish state has in managing 
migration. 
Both Faceless Killers and Shadow Girls articulate concern about the Swedish state as 
an ailing structure, incapable of using its institutions—the police, the immigration 
services—effectively to control the influx and settlement of migrants. Confronted 
with the brutal murder of an elderly couple which is initially attributed to 
refugees, Wallander thinks, ‘I really hope that the killers are at that refugee camp. 
Then maybe it’ll put an end to this arbitrary, lax policy that allows anyone at all, 
for any reason at all, to cross the border into Sweden’ (2011, 46). The result of this 
failure is that ‘The insecurity in this country is enormous. People are afraid’ (227). 
It is a fear that calls for change: ‘Maybe the times require another kind of 
policeman, [Wallander] thought … Policemen who aren’t distressed … Policemen 
who don’t suffer from my uncertainty and anguish’ (19). 
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 See the Swedish Migration Board data, http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-
the-Migration-Board/Statistics.html, accessed 20 August 2014. 
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Well, on one level—and this articulates a dimension of the gender politics of this 
novel—Wallander’s ‘uncertainty and anguish’ is the anxiety of a certain, 
conventionally dominant masculinity, especially in its middle-aged version in 
crisis. In this, Wallander is no different from the writer Jesper Humlin, who is the 
central male character of The Shadow Girls. Both men are adrift; they feel embattled 
and hollowed out. They feel ambivalent and anxious about their work, have 
strained relations with any female partners and indeed with women more 
generally, 25 with an unreflecting sexual predatoriness that suggests their sense of 
entitlement, in this context to dominating women. They stand for a failing, male, 
cultural majority, but also, by extension, a failing state. The women elude their 
control, and in fact, in the context of the state, turn out to be in control. When 
Wallander rings the head of the Immigration Service, for example, he ‘was 
surprised to be speaking to a woman. He assumed that all senior government 
officials were still elderly gentlemen full of arrogant self-esteem’ (2011, 117). 
Ironically, Wallander fails to see himself in this image. 
It is in this triangle of masculinity in crisis, ailing nation-states, and social 
uncertainty that Appadurai’s ‘Fear of Small Numbers’ (2009) becomes relevant. In 
it he raises the question of what he calls the formation of so-called predatory 
identities (236). He argues that the anxiety of incompleteness about their 
sovereignty can turn what he terms ‘majoritarian identities’ into predatory ones, 
where discourses of how the majority could itself become the minority ‘unless 
another minority disappears’ function as incentives to become predatory and so 
forestall the possibility of such reversals of fortune. In asking in particular under 
what conditions liberal majoritarianism becomes illiberal, Appadurai links emotion 
in the form of fear to the idea of number and the liberal imaginary. He suggests 
that liberals have a certain ambivalence about the legitimacy of collectives as 
political actors, since the critical number for liberal social theory is the number one, 
‘the numerical sign for the individual’. The other important number is zero, as it 
converts the one into tens, hundreds, and thousands: ‘in other words, zero is the 
numerical key to the idea of the masses’ (239). However, according to Appadurai, 
the masses in liberal thought are associated with ‘large numbers that have lost the 
rationalities embedded in the individual, in the number one’ (240). They are 
viewed as the basis for both totalitarianism and fascism, and ‘it is because of this … 
that much liberal thought has been rightly characterized by a fear of large 
numbers’ (240). One might argue that the presentation of immigrants, refugees, 
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 Both characters struggle to have relations with women that are not derogatory and 
dismissive, or immediately sexualized. They are incapable of treating women as their 
equals. 
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and asylum seekers in terms of faceless masses, not least in the media which 
Appadurai also indicts, fuels that fear in the neo-liberal regimes in which we live. 
Appadurai contrasts this liberal fear of large numbers with the fear of small 
numbers that is associated with ‘oligarchies, elites and tyrannies’ on the one hand 
and ‘the specter of conspiracy’ in the form of ‘the cell, the spy, the traitor, the 
dissident, the revolutionary’ on the other (240). Small numbers or minorities carry 
with them ‘special interest’ claims, and hence, especially as substantive, permanent 
minorities, they become problematic because of their rights claims. Appadurai 
argues that this has generated unease in Western democracies, where the struggle 
over cultural rights as they pertain to national citizenship has led to the emergence 
and reinforcement of predatory identities. 
 
Appadurai suggests that the fear of small numbers is linked to the majority’s fear 
of ‘becoming minor (culturally or numerically)’ (249). One might argue that these 
two fears—the fear of minorities with special interest claims and the fear of 
majorities of becoming minor—are powerfully and complexly interrelated. ‘Fear of’ 
may be understood in two different ways: as a genitive verb form, denoting 
belonging, the fear that someone has; and as the dative form, referencing the object 
of one’s fear. The majority may be fearful and translate that into violence against 
the object of its fear, the minority. At the same time, the minority may be equally 
fearful of the majority—though not, of course, for the same reasons. Thus in 
August 2014, the race riots in Ferguson, Missouri,  index both the majoritarian fear 
of minorities (affect articulating the assumption that young black men are likely to 
engage in criminal activity) and the latter’s rights claims (young black men’s right 
not to fear for their lives due to police brutality), as well as the minority’s fear of 
being brutalized by the police.26 Similar fears played a role in the riots in the 
suburbs of Stockholm in 2013 (Freeman 2013). The majority’s fears that their status 
will be undermined by the claims of minority groups that might gain the upper 
hand—which one might describe as a fear of redistribution—is mirrored by the 
minority’s fears of not being recognized, of misrecognition in Nancy Fraser and 
Axel Honneth’s terms (2003). 
The issue of the fear of becoming a minority is strongly represented in Mankell’s 
Faceless Killers, in which fears about being ‘overrun’ by uncontrolled immigration 
flows result in onslaughts on migrants, fuel right-wing extremism, and are used as 
an excuse to hype up media accounts of the threats that migrants present, not least 
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in terms of taking the place of the subject.27 But whereas in Faceless Killers 
Mankell—like Appadurai elsewhere—focuses mainly on the fear of the majority, in 
Shadow Girls he attempts to set against this the fear of the refugees, the minority, 
who—as illegals, and additionally and specifically as women who are the objects of 
the predatory and proprietorial identities of men both from their host country and 
from their own communities—are beset by fears that come in a series of guises: 
their fear of poverty and violence that prompts them to flee in the first place; their 
fear as invisible illegal immigrants of becoming visible, and hence vulnerable, not 
least to the authorities; their fear of men—their fathers, brothers, lovers, strangers. 
Visibility prompts accountability, and hence, as the novel would have it, 
‘freedom—if it actually exists—is always threatened’ (286). Problematically, one 
might argue, in Faceless Killers the majoritarian fear is ultimately vindicated, since 
the killers turn out to be two Czech criminals, on the run from the police in their 
own country and from the Immigration Service in Sweden. Thus, whilst the crime 
is solved, it also serves to reinforce the notion of the criminal, particularly the 
vicious criminal, as foreigner, a notion confirmed by the actual, disproportionately 
high number of foreigners in Swedish prisons (Martens 1997; Hofer 2003), and by 
implication to reassert a notion of Swedish purity—after all, and thankfully, the 
nasty murderers were not Swedish. Here we see some of the possibly unintended 
ambivalence in Mankell’s work as it both queries and reasserts notions of ‘we’ and 
‘them’. 
 
By the time of Shadow Girls things had become more complicated. Mankell 
attempts to counter the fear of the masses, and the social uncertainty that 
Appadurai diagnoses as arising from the effects of globalization and migration, by 
giving ‘faces’—identities, histories, and stories—to the shadow or migrant girls. 
But the intradiegetic author Jesper Humblin also says at one point: ‘I don’t believe 
much of what people tell me, particularly not if they are young female refugees’ 
(191). As he wonders increasingly ‘which story really belonged to whom’ (195) 
since the girls’ stories are full of contradictions and fragments that seem to come 
from other stories, their unique tales turn into ‘everywoman’, or rather, ‘every-
migrant-woman’ tales that return the girls to the masses rather than keeping them 
in the state of radical individuation that supposedly unique narratives demand. 
And, unsurprisingly, Humblin finds that, ‘Suddenly, as if in a vision, he imagined 
                                                          
27
 In the British context in 2014, against the backdrop of arguments that migrants, 
especially from Eastern Europe, take ‘British people’s jobs’, it has been argued that a report 
on this matter ‘reveals little evidence foreign migrants put British workers out of jobs’ 
(Travis 2014). Nonetheless, such fears persist. 
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thousands of small boats across the world filled with refugees on their way to 
Sweden. Maybe this is the way it is, he thought. We are living in the time of the 
rowing boat’ (206). This ‘new normal’ is a faceless one, where those who are 
rowing are metonymically supplanted by the boat, projecting the threat that the 
country will soon be swamped by immigrants who find it easy to enter illegally, 
and are then forced to lead lives of crime to survive, and who end up in a 
Dantesque hell, living in a parallel universe to the indigenous population. Since the 
majority is fearful of the minority, the notion of indistinct masses contributes to 
what I termed above ‘the production of indifference’, which governs people’s 
ability not to see others but to relegate them to the shadows, and to make fear their 
dominant emotion on the basis of which they refuse interaction. 
A more favourable reading would be to suggest that in Shadow Girls, Mankell 
attempts to show new ways of engaging with migrants, diverging significantly 
from Appadurai by portraying the regime of fear which governs the minoritized – 
the fear of persecution, the fear of eviction, the fear of invisibility. Mankell 
produces this counter-narrative through three different devices. 
First, he asserts what we might term the ‘indifference of difference’. By this I mean 
the implicit suggestion in Mankell’s texts that perceived differences are not ‘real’ 
and need to be understood as the effects of affect and lack of knowledge. He does 
this, for example, by constructing both the indigenous person—Jesper Humlin—
and the shadow girls as fearful. Fear, one might argue, unites them, or at least 
affords them parallel affective experiences. It lessens difference. But Jesper’s fears 
are also revealed to him as non-existential (2013, 199–200), not about survival, but 
about certain kinds of vanity and the thought of potential injuries to his amour 
propre. 
Mankell’s second device for constructing a counter-narrative to the one of the 
dominance of majoritarian fears is the repeated assertion of the fear and terror of 
the refugees, the minoritized. At one point, Tea-Bag, for instance, describes her 
experience of fleeing as ‘The most desperate fear can never be described or told in 
words. One can never quite say what it is like to run into the darkness with death 
and pain and denigration only a step behind. I remember nothing of my escape, 
only the incredible fear I felt’ (272). And, as the text asserts: ‘Why do people leave? 
Why do they pull up their roots and go? I suppose some people are chased away 
and forced to flee. Maybe it’s war or hunger or fear—it’s always fear’ (307). 
Mankell, in other words, attempts to shift the perspective from the majoritarian 
perspective on fear to the minoritarian one. 
62 
The third device Mankell utilizes is the production of the girls’ stories. The actual 
telling of their stories, in the first person and set apart from the rest of the text by 
being in italics, is designed to give back to the ‘faceless’ their face, to construct 
them less as victims than as survivors who have a history that they inhabit. The 
aim is to de-objectify them, to counter the narrative of their object status. However, 
one might also argue that the effect is to set them apart on more than just the page. 
The refugee girls’ object status depends partly on seeing the women as victims, 
without resources, helpless. At one point, for example, Humlin is told: ‘In this 
country immigrants are still treated like victims. Because of their circumstances, 
their poor language skills, for almost any other reason’ (86). This in a sense 
reproduces Rosenberg’s line, discussed earlier, about the shift of perspectives on 
migrants in Sweden from regarding them as contributors to the economy to seeing 
them as in need of assistance. However, the text again and again emphasizes the 
refugee girls’ resourcefulness, their ability to understand context and operate 
effectively within it. Indeed, Mankell suggests, ‘most of them simply want to be 
treated like normal people’ (86). The question that is not asked, however, is what 
kind of normal is envisaged here—who are these ‘normal’ people? Are they the 
‘new Swedes’, as immigrants are explicitly referred to in the novel at one point 
(44), or the old Sweden that Mankell’s middle-aged men recognize as having 
vanished and that seems to be as much a manufacture of popular culture—in 
particular, film and television—as the ‘new Sweden’? 
These are, in a sense, hard questions, not least because Mankell genders them in 
Shadow Girls but also, to an extent, in Faceless Killers. The old Sweden is represented 
by middle-aged men, fearful, paternalistic, intent upon preserving a certain status 
quo which nevertheless is escaping them and rendering them fearful. The new 
Sweden is a Sweden of female victims or survivors, of women who govern and 
who, as does the minister in Shadow Girls, provide refuge for (illegal) migrants. 
Mankell decides to construct his story in a bifurcated world where men represent a 
certain old order and women a certain new one. 
At the same time, Mankell challenges neo-liberalism’s insistence on the number 
one, the ‘I’, as its key figure. The survival of that ‘I’ as an individual human being 
depends upon its social reception, on the manufacture of a culturally acceptable 
self, of a narrative that will have social resonance and recognition. The refugees’ 
manufacture of different versions of themselves in their effort to be accepted as 
refugees in a safe country is emblematic of this. The problematic of this 
manoeuvre, however, is that it generates social uncertainty as to the veracity of the 
narratives. As Humlin’s publisher says to him at one point when discussing 
Humlin’s idea to tell the refugee girls’ stories, ‘They’ll never tell you the truth’ (76). 
The question Shadow Girls itself begins to raise is that of what truth is expected. 
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When Tea-Bag begins to tell Humlin her story, his response is, ‘There was 
something so unbelievable about her narrative that Humlin started to think it was 
probably true’ (139). 
Believability is here measured in terms of factual specificities, plausibility, the 
sense of the persuasiveness of an individual’s tale. Humlin tells Tea-Bag at one 
point, ‘I promise to listen, but I want to hear the truth. Nothing less. I am tired of 
this never knowing who you really are’ (159). But beneath the factual truth that 
Humlin hunts as if it was the guarantor of certainty lies another truth, the truth of 
need. When Humlin says, ‘I’m just trying to understand why you go by so many 
names’ to one of the refugee girls, she retorts ‘How are you supposed to make it in 
this world if you aren’t prepared to sacrifice something like a name?’ (182). The 
truth of the need that informs this question initially lies undetected—or detected 
and rejected—beneath the manufacture of the refugees’ narratives. This is where 
one finds the tension between the ability to engage with the few as ‘ones’, as 
individuals, but not to be overwhelmed by the many. And, in a sense, neither 
Appadurai nor Mankell offer an answer to this. In neither case is the nation-state 
seen as capable of responding to these needs, nor are its citizens. The state in that 
sense has become bankrupt. At the end of Shadow Girls the situation of the girls is 
unchanged. As one of them says, ‘I came to this country to tell my story and now 
I’ve done that. No one listened’ (325). The question raised by this statement is what 
would it mean ‘to listen’? What would it mean to hear this narrative? This is the 
question that we are left with; the question that, I would suggest, moves us beyond 
neo-liberalism. Mankell’s narratives make it clear that individuals are also social 
constructs, the motivators and effects of social interactions, who simultaneously 
embody individuals and are parts of groups, swayed both by certain forms of logic 
as much as by emotions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE POLITICS OF MEN’S EMOTIONS: FROM EMOTIONAL 
DETACHMENT TO COMPASSION IN MEN’S RESPONSES TO 
GENDER INJUSTICE 
Bob Pease 
 
Critical masculinity studies and profeminist masculinity politics have neglected 
the role of emotions in men’s lives.28 In part this is because most of the populist 
writing about men has focused on men’s emotional inexpressiveness and restricted 
emotionality as a key arena of change for men. This has taken the form of what 
Connell (2000) calls ‘masculinity therapy’, whereby men are encouraged to 
overcome their emotional illiteracy and face their vulnerabilities to achieve higher 
levels of intimacy with women, children, and other men. The implications of this 
form of masculinity politics was often to ignore male privilege and men’s social 
dominance, and to portray men’s difficulty in expressing emotions as a form of 
victimhood that created physical and mental health problems for men. 
Profeminist masculinity studies have also been quite critical of the association of 
emotions with men’s violence because it provided an excuse for men to deny 
responsibility and accountability for their violence. However, profeminist activists 
and critical masculinity theorists have often failed to grasp the functions of men’s 
emotionality for perpetrating violence and maintaining unequal gender relations. 
In this essay, my aim is to interrogate men’s emotional investment in male 
supremacy and violence, and to explore pedagogical strategies that use emotions 
to challenge men’s resistance to acknowledging and addressing male privilege and 
abusive practices. 
Emotions and critical masculinity theory 
What is of particular significance for my purpose here is the recognition by 
sociologists of emotions that emotions are reflective of macro-societal processes as 
well as individual psychology (Berezin 2002). They provide an important 
connection between the psyche and an individual’s subjectivity to the wider social 
order. Hence, I reject the biological and organismic view of emotions, which 
                                                          
28
 An earlier version of this essay appeared as ‘The Politics of Gendered Emotions: 
Disrupting Men’s Emotional Investment in Privilege’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 
47/1 (2012). 
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ignores cultural and social context, in favour of a socially constructed view of 
emotions (Galasinski 2004) that locates them within structured inequalities of 
power. 
The literature on the sociology of emotions also challenges the dominance of the 
disembodied, Western, male mode of scholarship (Williams 1998). The contrast 
between rationality and emotion is seen to be part of the Western male intellectual 
tradition of scholarship. The masculine Western subject is associated with thought 
and reason, whereas emotions are associated with femininity (Ahmed 2004). Male 
academics are thus more likely to study the international political economy than 
emotions or people’s personal lives (Duncomb and Marsden 1993). 
As a critical masculinity theorist, I am interested in the how emotional labour can 
either reproduce or challenge dominant forms of masculinity (Robinson & Hockay 
2011). I am interested in exploring how men’s emotions are involved in the 
reproduction of male privilege and power, and also how they can be used motivate 
men to interrogate their privilege. Emotions are a site of political resistance to 
oppression and privilege. Consequently, they have a relationship to social justice, 
and they have a key role to play in transforming gender relations. 
Revisiting men’s emotional inexpressiveness 
There has been a considerable body of writing in masculinity studies on emotions 
and intimacy. Many masculinity scholars have written about men’s issues of 
emotional suppression and emotional conflict (Balswick 1982; McGill 1985; Rowan 
1997; Brooks 1998; Middleton 1992; Rutherford 1992; Seidler 1997). Most of the 
literature on masculinity that is concerned with the men’s movement or personal 
change in men emphasizes men’s emotional inexpressiveness. Men are said to be 
out of touch with their feelings and that they need to express more emotions to 
allow themselves to be vulnerable. 
The language used to describe men’s limited emotionality is that of ‘the 
inexpressive male’ and ‘restrictive emotionality’. Balswick (1982) says that ‘male 
inexpressiveness’ can be categorized on the basis of at least three criteria: (i) 
whether or not feelings are evinced by the man; (ii) whether or not there is an 
attempt to express feelings; and (iii) whether the potential object of expression is a 
woman or a man. An expressive man is one who has feelings, and is able to 
recognize them and verbally express these feelings to both women and men. 
Steiner (1986) refers to this capacity to understand and deal with emotions as 
emotional literacy. 
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Various empirical studies have demonstrated that men report both less positive 
emotions such as affection, love, and joy and less negative emotions such as fear 
(McGill 1985; Duncomb & Marsden 1993; Brody 1999; Galasinki 2004; Hanlon 
2009). Men’s difficulty in expressing emotions is seen to have a number of personal 
and social consequences for men’s intimacy with women, for men’s capacity for 
nurturant fathering, for men’s friendships with other men, and for men themselves 
(Pease 2002a). 
Many women have expressed dissatisfaction with their intimate relationships with 
men. Hite’s survey of 4,500 women reported that 98 per cent of them said that the 
biggest problem in their current relations was a lack of emotional closeness. The 
most commonly expressed complaint (77 per cent) was that ‘he doesn’t listen’ (Hite 
1987). A constant request from heterosexual women is for men to express 
themselves more than they do. Most men have been challenged for not giving 
enough of themselves in their relationships. Seidler (1991; 1994; 1997) has written 
extensively about men’s emotional dependence on women, and men’s inability to 
comprehend the emotional work involved in maintaining intimate relationships. 
Much attention is also given in this literature to the toll that emotional 
inexpressiveness has on men. Men’s physical health is placed at risk because men 
are unable to recognize the physical cues to illness and disease (Coyle and Morgan-
Sykes 1998). Balswick (1982) believes this inability to express emotions has 
negative consequences for men because it robs them of potentially rich emotional 
experiences. 
Men’s interest in emotionality came into the foreground because of the importance 
placed on focusing on the personal in men’s lives. Men’s emotional illiteracy was 
seen by Rutherford (1992) to represent a silence in the construction of masculinity, 
whereby men were unable to develop a language or a knowledge of emotions. 
Men were thus encouraged to search inwards to find that which was lost, or to 
engage in what Middleton (1992) refers to as ‘the inward gaze’. 
In this view, men are lonely and isolated from close emotional attachments. After 
years of devaluing and denying their feelings, they are said to end up being unable 
to feel anything (Seidler 1991). Some writers have argued that this approach to 
men’s emotions pathologized men even to the point of referring to men as having a 
form of male alexithymia (Walton 2007), a diagnostic term used to describe people 
who have difficulty expressing and talking about their feelings (Tenhouten 2007). 
Some men report that they do have feelings but they choose not to disclose them 
(Duncomb & Marsden 1993). While it is seen to be important to be able to express 
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one’s emotions, the ability to manage one’s emotions is also held to be crucial 
(Robinson & Hockay 2011). Men, in particular, are under pressure to repress any 
emotions that might make them vulnerable. Middleton (1992) argues that men 
need to deny their emotions so that other men will not take advantage of them. 
Walton et al. (2004, 413) express it this way: ‘To experience emotions is human; to 
control their expression is masculine’. Thus, men’s behaviour in relation to their 
emotions is shaped by the gendered expectation that to express certain emotions is 
unmanly. 
Lack of emotional fulfilment in men’s lives is often cited by writers on masculinity 
as the reason for men to change. Thus, changing men’s emotional lives became a 
focus of concern in some forms of masculinity politics, particularly within the 
men’s liberation movement of the 1970s and 1980s, where men were often 
portrayed as victims at more of a disadvantage than women because of gender 
roles (Walton 2007). Such a view of men’s emotions, however, ignores the 
gendered power inequalities in which emotions are produced. 
This focus on men’s emotional inexpressiveness and emotional incapacities was 
seen by some feminist critics as being too self-indulgent and letting men off the 
hook. Robinson (1996, 231) is suspicious of talking about men’s emotional change 
towards being a new man as ‘softening the face of patriarchy’. It was said that men 
can use talk about their wounded male psyche as a distraction from analysing 
men’s privilege and power (Robinson & Hockay 2011.) As McLean (1996, 82) says, 
‘there is nothing quite so off-putting as listening to someone moan about how hard 
it is to be privileged’. 
One of the problems with much of this literature is that it ignores the impact of 
gendered power relations. Men involved in personal healing groups and men’s 
therapy tend to foreground men’s emotions in ways that neglect the political 
dimensions of gender relations (White & Peretz 2010). My interest here is how 
men’s emotional expression or inexpression is related to the reproduction of men’s 
patriarchal privilege. 
Many women have reported that they experience men’s emotional distance as a 
form of gendered power, whereby men choose to withhold emotions and intimacy 
as a way of exerting control over women (Robinson 1996). Many men fear that if 
they are seen to be too emotional, it will undermine their superiority over women 
because it challenges the hegemonic expectation of male rationality and strength 
(Coyle & Morgan-Sykes 1998). Some men even talk about loving and intimate 
behaviour as being feminine (Pease 2002a). 
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Sattell (1989) argues that the male inexpressiveness theorists misunderstand the 
origins of men’s emotional illiteracy. Their focus on men’s inexpressiveness as a 
tragedy does nothing to challenge the social forces that construct this phenomena. 
For Sattell (1989), men’s inexpressiveness is a prerequisite for preparing men for 
their positions of power and privilege. This is because it enables men who wield 
power to reduce their emotional involvement in the consequences of their 
practices. It is important for those who make decisions that will impact on the lives 
of others to close their eyes to the pain they have caused. So, in this view, men’s 
inexpressiveness is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. It is part of men’s 
capacity to control others, and it assists men in maintaining their power and 
privileges. Thus, when men fail to develop and express their feelings, they are 
more able to oppress others. Men’s emotional indifference allows them to inflict 
pain on others without having any consequences (McLean 1996). Thus, we must 
explore the male privilege that resides behind men’s emotional inexpressiveness. 
While men’s pain associated with distorted emotions is real, they are not simply 
victims of restricted gender roles. Rather, they repress their feelings because they 
do not want to be vulnerable to others. Men’s abuse of power requires them to be 
desensitized to their emotions. This enables them to perpetuate gender inequalities 
and abusive practices. Emotional brutality such as this thus plays a very important 
function in the reproduction of gendered power structures (McLean 1990). McLean 
(1996) points out that military training exemplifies this kind of masculine 
socialization, with soldiers encouraged to dehumanize and demonize the enemy. 
In military training, soldiers are socialized to cut off their emotions to enable them 
to kill on demand (Donovan 2007). 
The role of emotions in reproducing gender inequality  
One of the problems with the vast literature on emotional literacy and emotional 
intelligence is that it does not address the relationship between emotional 
behaviour and classed, gendered, and racialized positioning (Boler 1999). Drawing 
upon Foucault, Burkitt (2002) considers the relationship between power and 
emotions, and emphasizes the importance of studying the emotional dynamics of 
the exercise of power. He believes that emotions are connected to the status and 
power of particular groups who are divided by class, gender, race and other social 
divisions. 
One’s position in the social structure, then, is likely to have a significant impact on 
emotions. Those in positions of privilege who have the deference of others are 
likely to experience positive emotions associated with such compliance; those who 
have to accommodate to the power of others are more likely to experience negative 
emotions (Turner & Stets 2005). It is known that people’s location in the social 
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structure impacts on their emotional modes of being. The more powerless they are, 
the greater the likelihood of having unpleasant emotional experiences and the 
greater the limitations in being able to manage emotions (Williams 1998). Skeggs 
(1997), for example, identifies the increased levels of emotional distress 
experienced by men and women in the working class as they deal with the 
insecurities of life. 
This approach suggests that power inequalities between men and women are 
likely to be related to the different emotions they experience. Brody (1999) points 
out that men and women have different emotional connections to power. Whereas 
women experience power through a sense of accomplishment, men are more likely 
to experience power through the control and domination of other people. She 
suggests that men’s derogatory treatment of women may be related to their 
emotional need to enhance their own self-esteem. Men’s sense of entitlement in 
relation to women is thus premised on the view that men are superior and that 
they deserve more power and status. Brody (1999) relates the gendered division of 
emotional expression to gender roles, whereby women’s caretaking role requires 
them to express warmth and vulnerability, but men’s provider role requires 
aggression and pride and a decreased expression of warmth and vulnerability. 
People have strong feelings about ideological beliefs. White and Peretez (2010) 
argue that our feelings about our beliefs underlie our identity. The very perception 
of justice or injustice elicits powerful emotions (Zembylas & Chubback 2009). 
Hence, our emotional relationship to dominant social norms and exploitative social 
practices perpetuates those norms and practices. Boler (1999) explores how people 
invest in particular social structures to the point where any challenge to them is 
experienced as a personal threat to their very existence. Consequently, when we 
challenge social injustice, we also subvert our emotional attachment to those 
injustices (Zembylas & Chubback 2009). However, if emotions are involved in the 
reproduction of structural inequalities, they can also play a part in their 
transformation (Turner & Stets 2005). 
The role of emotions in challenging oppression and privilege 
Affective and reactive emotions are clearly involved in various forms of political 
protest and social action. People’s emotions are related to what they perceive to be 
the cause of the injustice they are addressing (Jasper 1998). Emotions have been 
used by marginalized and oppressed groups to resist injustice (Boler 1999). Ahmed 
(2004) reminds us that tuning into our emotions can heighten awareness of the 
material conditions of subordination. Thus, emotions have been very important in 
the politicization of oppressed people. In part, this is because they are connected to 
the politics of pain and suffering. 
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A key emotion in oppositional politics from below is, of course, anger (Holmes 
2004). As people tune into their experiences of injustice, they often find their voice 
through anger. Anger also conveys the message that there has been some form of 
injustice committed (Lyman 2004). Anger has thus been important for 
marginalized groups to articulate their experience of both structural inequalities 
and the experience of misrecognition. However, when women have spoken out in 
anger about violence and abuse, they have often been dismissed as being too 
emotional and insufficiently impartial (Ahmed 2004). Challenges to power and 
privilege are likely to evoke negative emotional responses from people (Turner & 
Stets 2005). The anger of subordinate groups often evokes angry responses in turn 
from the dominant groups as they perceive the threat it poses to their privileges. 
As Lyman (2004, 117) comments: ‘I feel defensively angry when you suggest that I 
examine my privilege’. 
May (1998) argues that men have a fundamental moral responsibility to challenge 
patriarchy, because they are collectively responsible for the harms attributed to it. 
He believes that men should feel some shame for, for example, their groups’ 
complicity in the prevalence of rape. Guilt is often an emotion that arises initially 
when people first become aware of their privilege. Ahmed (2004), in discussing 
Indigenous issues, argues that the experience of shame is important in recognizing 
how our practices and our inaction have caused pain and loss for Indigenous 
peoples. In her view, acknowledging shame is also important in healing and 
reconciliation. Shame is thus a necessary response to the acknowledgement of the 
suffering of Indigenous peoples. For Jensen (2005), the overwhelming feeling of 
acknowledging white privilege is sadness. Such an emotion is evitable when we 
consider the level of racial injustice in modern society (Pease 2010). 
The alternative to being moved by past and present injustices inflicted on 
oppressed people is to be detached from them, to claim that one is not in any way 
implicated in them. It seems as though people, when challenged about their 
privilege, have to choose between guilt or innocence (Lyman 2004). Injustices are 
perpetuated when people fail to respond emotionally to the suffering of other 
people. Thus, inequality is reproduced by suppressing or encouraging particular 
emotions. Nussbaum (2001) has observed that there are learned rules and 
impediments that impact on whether we feel compassion for others or not. She 
refers to the gendered dimensions of these impediments that limit the ability of 
many men to feel compassion for women’s experiences. How can we use emotions 
to disrupt the process of men’s defensiveness and avoidance when challenging 
male privilege and men’s violence? 
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Towards a pedagogy of discomfort 
Education for social justice always evokes emotional responses. These can range 
from excitement to resentment and anxiety (Zembylas & Chubback 2009). When 
we challenge the dominant norms and practices of masculinity, we develop a 
different emotional relation to those norms and practices. Challenging men’s 
privilege is likely to elicit strong emotional responses, because it touches men’s 
investment in maintaining their current position. Thus, it is important to consider 
the role of emotions in critical pedagogical strategies that challenge men’s violence 
and privilege (Kenway & Fitzclarence 1997). 
What are the emotional patterns that reproduce patriarchal attitudes in men? How 
best does one develop interventions that can challenge these emotional patterns 
(White & Peretz 2010)? While a number of writers on critical pedagogy (Boler 1999; 
Ahmed 2004; Zembylas 2007; Zembylas & Chubback 2009) have identified 
emotions as being important to social justice education, they are largely ignored in 
profeminist and anti-violence work with men. Connell (2000) identified cathexis, or 
patterns of emotional attachment, as one of the key dimensions of unequal gender 
regimes alongside production relations, relations of power, and systems of 
symbolism. However, in spite of identifying emotional relations in the context of 
masculinity as a new direction in theory and research over ten years ago (Connell 
2000), she has not addressed this issue in her subsequent work. 
Generally, privileged groups’ responses to challenges to their privilege fail to 
acknowledge the ways in which their emotional attachment to privilege shapes 
their responses. Hence, critical pedagogies intended to challenge privilege have to 
disrupt cherished beliefs; they have to interrogate the ways in which privileged 
positioning informs people’s experience of the world (Zembylas & Chubback 
2009). To challenge people’s sense of self-interest involves a process of becoming 
unsettled, and strategies are required for this purpose. Consequently, I am 
interested in developing what Boler (1999) refers to as a ‘pedagogy of discomfort’. 
I propose two related approaches to engaging men’s emotions in challenging their 
privilege. The first strategy is to foster social empathy by encouraging men’s 
understanding of the consequences of their structural power and privilege for 
women. A practice that I have used here is the facilitation of patriarchy-awareness 
workshops based on the Racism Awareness model. These workshops use 
presentations, small group discussions, and simulation exercises to explore such 
issues as analyses of patriarchal culture, men’s experience of power and 
domination, alternatives to patriarchal power, the impact of men’s domination on 
women, social and personal blocks to men’s ability to listen to women, and the 
potential for men to change. The workshops provide an opportunity for men to 
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move beyond their feelings of powerlessness in relation to gender issues and to 
identify ways of taking profeminist men’s politics beyond the arena of personal 
change to incorporate collectivist and public political action (Pease 1997). 
One of the workshop exercises involves drawing a timeline from 5000 BC to the 
present day across large sheets of paper joined together. The sheets of paper are 
laid out on the floor along with felt-tipped pens in front of the male workshop 
participants who are sitting in a circle. The participants are asked to think about 
the ways in which men have used their power over women. This may be in the 
form of violence, discrimination, or unequal treatment. It can include something 
that has happened to all women or just a few women; it can include something that 
has happened to women known to the participants, something they themselves 
have done, something they have heard about in the media, or something from 
history.  
Participants are given a few minutes thinking time and then are invited to come 
forward and name the event they want to record on the timeline and the date on 
which it occurred. Having recorded the event on the timeline they return to their 
seats. Participants can come forward as many times as they want to until there is 
nothing more they want to record. By the end of the exercise, the timeline is 
covered with numerous incidents of violence and abuse across the whole 
spectrum. There is no discussion during the exercise, and at the end there is time 
for quiet reflection on the events they have recorded. At the close of the exercise, 
the participants discuss their feelings about it. Because the exercise always elicits 
experiences about women known to the men, it often involves vignettes of self-
disclosure by the men about their own abusive treatment of women. The exercise 
always evokes emotional responses in the men as they reflect on the extent of the 
processes of victimization and violence against women throughout history, in 
contemporary society, and in their own lives and the lives of women they love. 
A second strategy to bring men to reposition themselves in relation to privilege 
and violence is to reconceptualize their emotional pain (Pease 2002b). Thompson 
(1991) argues that if men deny their own feelings, and their own pain, they will not 
be able to acknowledge the pain of others; and they will be unable to recognize 
their privilege unless their pain and hurt have been validated. For Donovan (2007), 
men need to gain the courage and ability to acknowledge and express ‘unmanly 
emotions’ that challenge dominant definitions of masculinity. He believes that if 
men owned and expressed their pain and fear, their experience of anger would be 
lessened and their violence reduced. Of course, the acknowledgement of men’s 
pain on its own is not enough—the plethora of masculinity therapy books and 
personal healing workshops for men are testimony to that. Rather, what is required 
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are strategies for connecting men’s pain to their position in the social relations of 
gender. 
One practice that I have used to reframe men’s pain is collective memory work. 
Memory work is a method that builds on, and yet goes beyond, consciousness-
raising. The method was developed by Frigga Haug (1987) to gain greater 
understanding of the resistance to the dominant ideology at the level of the 
individual—of how people internalize dominant values, and how their relations 
are colonized by dominant patterns of thought. Haug (1987, 13) describes memory 
work as ‘a method for the unravelling of gender socialisation’. Her argument is 
that it is essential to examine subjective memories if we want to discover anything 
about how people appropriate objective structures. 
By illustrating the ways in which people participate in their own socialization, 
their potential to intervene and change the world is expanded. By making 
conscious the way in which we have previously unconsciously interpreted the 
world, we are more able to develop resistance to this ‘normality’ (Haug 1987), and 
thus develop ways of subverting our own socialization. Furthermore, by 
recounting histories of oppression, suffering, and domination, those who occupy 
positions of privilege can find ways to recognize their privilege and their pain, and 
form alliances with those who are oppressed (McLaren & da Silvia 1993, 77). 
I have used the method to explore men’s socialization into dominant attitudes and 
practices and their resistance to the dominant ideology. In the context of a major 
research project on profeminist men (Pease 2000a), I developed four memory work 
exercises to examine aspects of internalized domination. These projects focused on 
father–son and mother–son relationships and experiences of homophobia and the 
objectification of women (Pease 2000b; 2000c; 2008). This was emotionally a very 
powerful method. Many times the men broke down and cried as they read out 
their memories to the group, and other men reported the tears running down their 
faces as they wrote down their memories in preparation for the meeting. What I 
found was that memory work enabled the participants to connect with their 
emotional histories, and it provided an opportunity for them to examine the 
emotional and psychological basis of their relationships with women and other 
men. 
I discovered memory work when doing research with profeminist men. Because I 
was so impressed with the impact that the writing and telling of memories had on 
the participants (myself included) and the conversations that flowed from them, I 
have since set up memory work groups with no specific research agenda in mind. I 
have found memory work to have the capacity to initiate a process of 
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‘unconsciousness-raising’, which brings the social dimension of one’s experience to 
the fore. That being so, I think that memory work warrants further investigation as 
a pedagogical method of interrogating the emotional underpinnings of men’s 
adherence to privilege. 
Emotional work and social justice 
As men are discouraged from expressing emotions, they are thought to be unable 
to provide the emotional labour required in relationships and to be largely absent 
from the care of children. Men can expect to have their emotional needs met by 
women. Because care-giving is associated with women, it is regarded by many 
men as ‘feminine’ and something to be avoided. This is largely because dominant 
definitions of masculinity do not include care-giving as a component of men’s lives 
(Hanlon 2009). 
Lynch and Walsh (2009) refer to the work required to sustain loving relations as 
‘love labouring’ or ‘emotional care work’. It involves the investment of energy, 
time, and resources. Lynch and Baker (2009) observe that there are significant 
inequalities in the doing of love, care, and solidarity work and being in receipt of 
love, care, and solidarity. This inequality of course is gendered. So if we are to 
achieve equality between men and women in the social relations of emotions, we 
have to problematize what Lynch and Baker call ‘the affective system’. 
Lynch and Cantillon (2007) make a case for including education in emotional work 
in relation to love, care, and solidarity in general education. This would make such 
emotional work visible, increase its status, and challenge its gendered dimensions. 
They call for the development of a ‘carer citizen’. The development of the ‘carer 
citizen’ would need to engage men about the gendered nature of caring and 
emotional work. Ascribing caring and emotional work to women reproduces 
patriarchal discourses and male privilege. The challenge for men is to understand 
how affective inequalities in the doing and receiving of care and love reproduce 
inequalities in economic, political, and social relations (Lynch & Baker 2009). Thus, 
the fostering of care-giving masculinities (Hanlon 2009) and caring masculinities 
(Gartner et al. 2007) is an essential part of promoting gender equality. In this way, 
rather than focusing solely on the negative emotions of shame and guilt, 
profeminist practice can also encourage men to feel the positive emotions of 
empathy, pride, and compassion in the struggle for gender equality (White & 
Peretez 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMOTIONS AND PRIVILEGE: INVESTIGATING PRIVILEGING IN 
RELATION TO ASYLUM SEEKERS 
Jonny Bergman 
 
In my dissertation (Bergman 2010), I found that asylum seekers take empowering 
action when faced with a disempowering situation. Although this was an 
important finding in relation to earlier research, which has concentrated on the 
passivity resulting from such situations, in my dissertation I also found that the 
situation for asylum seekers was characterized by dependence and inhospitality. 
The assertion of their power to resist was triggered by emotions such as 
resignation, frustration, and resentment. Further, I discussed how the empowering 
acts so identified must be understood from the point of view of how they were 
made meaningful in that specific situation. One of the main conclusions was that 
asylum seekers found a basis on which to take empowering action in the 
meaningfulness of leaving Afghanistan and seeking asylum in Sweden. Going back 
was just not an option. For those asylum seekers who are not granted asylum in 
Sweden, this stands in direct opposition to Sweden’s restrictive refugee policies. 
This contradiction between Sweden’s restrictiveness and the asylum seekers’ 
standpoints calls for further investigation. I concluded my dissertation with a 
couple of questions. 
Instead of asking what right asylum-seeking refugees have to reside here, which is 
currently done, we might ask ourselves what right ‘we’, as a collective of Swedish 
citizens, have to turn them down and not let them reside here? What remains now, 
perhaps, is to ask: what’s wrong with us? (Bergman 2010, 186) 
The conclusions I drew in my study of the lives of asylum seekers in Sweden thus 
made me more aware of my own privileged position, not only as a researcher but 
also as a Swedish citizen and a white, middle-class man. Such awareness set 
emotions in motion, later theorized as those of shame (see Ahmed 2004), sadness 
(see Jensen 2005), as well as guilt (see, for example, McIntosh 2012). Elaborating on 
these emotions and theorizing on privileged positions and practices, the natural 
step is to consider that 
Only if and when we understand privileging, and how privileged positions are 
normalized in such situations, can we more fully understand the situation limiting 
the asylum-seeking refugees’ actions in relation to a restrictive Swedish migration 
policy. (Bergman & Fahlgren 2013, 66). 
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That is, the better to understand the situation for asylum-seeking refugees, we 
need to look at who is privileged in relation to that situation (Bergman 2010; 
Bergman & Fahlgren 2013; Choules 2006). Theories of privilege and privileging 
have been identified as a way to investigate how a disempowering situation for 
asylum seekers (Bergman 2010) at the same time empowers other positions and 
practices (Bergman & Fahlgren 2013). 
Using myself as a database (see McIntosh 2012; Bergman & Fahlgren 2013), I have 
come to realize the importance of emotions in understanding the production and 
reproduction, as well as the challenging, of privilege. In this essay, I will argue that 
to understand and challenge privileged positions in relation to asylum seekers’ 
situation there is a need to investigate the role of emotions in producing and 
reproducing, as well as challenging, such positions and practices of privilege. One 
way of approaching this is to explore how resistance to privilege creates dilemmas, 
which in turn result in different sets of emotions, as exemplified in my personal 
account above. To make this point, though being able to use my own experiences 
as a database, I will instead make use of examples from research on the various 
immigration services, and more specifically their personnel’s dilemmas and 
emotions related to their interaction with asylum seekers. On the one hand they are 
clearly in a privileged position in relation to asylum seekers, with a mandate to 
decide everything from whether the asylum seeker will get to stay or not to issues 
of housing and allowances; yet, on the other, they are also challenged in relation to 
their positions and practices of privilege by being faced with asylum seekers’ 
resistance, as well as public accounts of personnel in the immigration services 
being too restrictive or—from various racist standpoints—too generous. 
I will first present a discussion on privileging in relation to asylum seekers, 
elaborating on the concept of globally privileged citizenship, and then consider the 
literature on dilemmas and emotions among immigration service personnel 
(primarily in Sweden and Norway), before using theories on privilege to discuss 
how privileging in relation to asylum seekers can be researched by looking at 
dilemmas and emotions arising from the way they elect to face the situation. 
Privileging in relation to asylum seekers 
In discourses on refugee protection, Kathryn Choules (2006) identifies charity and 
justice as the two distinct approaches towards refugee protection in place in recent 
centuries, none of which contains an analysis of power related to citizenship. In a 
charitable discourse, the ‘other’ is positioned as needing protection and in some 
way lacking in full adult capacity (Bergman 2010; Choules 2006), which places 
those in power in the benevolent and condescending role of protector. A privileged 
position related to citizenship can be exemplified in the way in which Swedish 
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policies on refugees takes on the role of protector in relation to children and to 
some on grounds of oppression, such as persecution due to gender and sexuality 
(see Migrationsverket 2014), without jeopardizing the state’s position of privilege. 
The role of protector as maintaining privilege is also related to paternalism. Peggy 
McIntosh (1988, 4) points out that 
whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, 
and also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen as work which 
will allow ‘them’ to be more like ‘us’. 
In a similar way, the Swedish policy on refugee reception has been discussed in 
terms of the dominant Swedish nationalist discourse, which is ultimately 
paternalistic in its treatment of asylum seekers, with its constructed self-image of 
providing a humane and fair reception and a show of solidarity—paternalist in 
that it ‘seeks to help and raise “others” up to the same level as “us” ’ (Bergman & 
Fahlgren 2013, 60). The preferential right of interpretation reflects Sweden’s 
dominant position in the world system, and subjects asylum seekers to an 
interpretation of their situation made solely by Swedish authorities. One example 
of this is the way in which repatriation efforts are depicted as being beneficial both 
for individual asylum seekers and for their countries of origin (Bergman 2010). 
Sweden’s is a justice-based discourse founded on equal rights for all, where, 
although lip service is paid to the position of the powerless, the position of the 
powerful is not questioned. Fault is often seen to lie with the ‘other’—with those 
who are non-male, non-white, non-able bodied, non-heterosexual, non-affluent, or, 
in relation to asylum seekers, non-citizens (Choules 2006). The relationship 
between citizenship and human rights is not without its frictions, as the universal 
character of human rights runs counter to the particularistic nation-state’s 
citizenship (Soysal 2012). 
When it comes to citizenship, attention needs to shift to those who are privileged. 
Far from being positioned in a neutral or benevolent position, the privileged are 
challenged because of their role in perpetrating injustice by retaining privilege 
(Choules 2006). Research into asylum seekers needs to incorporate how systems of 
domination relate to privileged positions—a conscious attempt ‘reverse the gaze 
that sees refugees and asylum seekers as the problem and place it on those of us 
who occupy the privileged positions’ (Choules 2006, 275). Choules has made the 
argument for investigating globally privileged citizenship—something she defines 
as the privilege of ‘citizenship of a safe, stable and materially affluent country’ 
(2006, 276)—as an unrecognized category of privilege. Like other categories of 
privilege, citizenship attaches to people by accident of birth, although it can also be 
achieved through naturalization (Choules 2006), and is thus a legal status that can 
change (although not easily, as the case of the worlds’ refugees shows). Unlike 
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other categories of privilege such as maleness, whiteness, and able-bodiedness, the 
privilege of citizenship is not a physical characteristic. Although the power that 
can be exercised from the physical characteristics of being male, white, and able-
bodied is socially constructed, people are generally unable to rid themselves of 
them (Choules 2006). Also, uniquely among the categories of privilege, the 
privilege of citizenship is acknowledged in international treaties and domestic 
legislation; restrictive policies on refugee protection and asylum, alongside strong 
border controls, serve to legitimize the privilege. The strong support for 
maintaining the privilege of citizenship is related to ‘welfare nationalism, the claim 
of nationals to a privileged standard of socioeconomic welfare’ (Boswell 2006, 670, 
italics in original). The privilege of citizenship is also related to racism through 
nationalist discourses on immigration control and their basis in racialized 
nationalism directed at racialized groups (Mynott 2002). The Swedish case shows 
how repatriation policies go hand in hand with the discourses of the nation-state. 
Such discourses and policies have a clear ethnic dimension in how some groups 
are singled out in repatriation efforts (Johansson 2005). 
The privilege of citizenship has its benefits for those who are citizens of a safe, 
stable, and materially affluent country, so not all countries’ citizens can expect the 
same benefits. Similarly, the privilege of citizenship intersects with other categories 
of privilege such as being male, white, middle-class, able-bodied, or heterosexual, 
so not all citizens in any one country can expect the same benefits. Even so, a 
discussion of globally privileged citizenship brings another dimension to the 
theorizing on privilege, which is especially helpful in relation to refugees and 
asylum seekers. Privileging in relation to asylum seekers using the category of 
‘globally privileged citizenship’ looks promising, but needs elaboration if we are to 
understand how this kind of privilege might play out in different situations and 
how in different circumstances it might intersect with other categories of privilege. 
Looking at the specific situation in which immigration service personnel’s 
privileged positions and practices operate, I propose to make the empirical case for 
such an analysis. 
Dilemmas and emotions in work with asylum seekers 
Drawing on the literature on the dilemmas, challenges, and emotions that face 
immigration service personnel, I will outline a possible path for future research on 
privileging in relation to asylum seekers. The choice has fallen on institutional 
personnel because they, more than most who enjoy the global citizenship privilege, 
are faced with challenges to the privilege of citizenship. This is not to attach blame 
to any specific group of citizens, of course; it merely reflects a hope that the 
examples will demonstrate that this could be a fruitful avenue in understanding 
the question of privileging in relation to asylum seekers. 
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Research into the working situation of children’s case workers at Migrationsverket, 
the Swedish Migration Board, has shown how they experience challenges to their 
role and in their work depending on ‘the intersection between conflicting policy 
objectives, and given the contradictions inherent in their role as street-level 
bureaucrats’ (Ottosson et al. 2012, 247). One of the dilemmas that presents itself is 
the conflict between the organizational demands for efficiency and the protection 
of the interests of the child in relation to the Swedish Migration Board’s priorities 
(Ottosson et al. 2012; Lundberg 2011). Managing these types of dilemmas in 
bureaucratic settings, where the questions of autonomy versus control, 
responsiveness versus standardization, and demand versus supply are resolved in 
favour of control, standardization, and supply, makes the working situation 
difficult (Hjörne et al. 2010). However, it has also been suggested that, in providing 
welfare services in general at the street level, there are still possibilities for 
professional autonomy, even when faced with increased control and accountability 
(Hjörne et al. 2010). Although there is very little room for manoeuvre in the asylum 
system, this has indeed been found to be the case among welfare professionals 
working with asylum-seeking children in Wales, where examples were found of 
questioning and even challenges to policies by frontline staff (Dunkerley et al. 
2005). Institutional logic, however, makes challenging the systems of efficiency and 
economy difficult, as has been shown in the case the Swedish Migration Board, 
where by ‘repeated and various types of interaction rituals, an emotional regime is 
enacted and sustained that provides employees with a sense of authenticity, 
meaning and organisational loyalty’ (Wettergren 2010, 400). 
In the case of an institutional setting such as the Swedish Migration Board and its 
particular emotional regime, personnel are protected from ambivalent situations in 
which they might have to juggle being publicly accused of being cynical and 
restrictive while at the same time being made the target of racist comments in 
letters or private comments (Wettergren 2010). Against this, Swedish policies have 
to attend to a situation in which, while operating a system that is depicted as just 
and equitable with the humane, fair, and individual examination of each case, the 
policies on the Swedish reception of asylum seekers have to attend to its emphasis 
on a restrictiveness, ‘burden sharing’ among states taking in refugees, containment, 
and repatriation (Bergman 2010). Swedish asylum policy also has to address 
xenophobic tendencies. Åsa Wettergren (2010) has shown how at the Swedish 
Migration Board an emotional regime of ‘procedural correctness’, drawing on 
democratic, humanitarian, and individual rights inscribed in the Alien’s Act and 
the Administrative Act, offers an ideal identity of a kind, self-confident, and proud 
professional whose duty it is to execute legislation in the service of the 
customer/applicant; ‘procedural correctness’ becomes a ‘fantasy of impossible 
perfect correspondence between the law and reality’ and ‘the professional is a 
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phantom that epitomizes the exemplary emotional dispositions of the officers’ 
(414), and by ‘becoming the professional’ and aligning with the emotional regime 
of the Swedish Migration Board, its staff can manage their feelings of shame and 
pride, thus escaping personal responsibility by emphasizing that it is their 
employer who is the ‘guardian of the right to asylum’. 
From the point of view of ethical conduct, Helga Eggebö (2013) has found that 
emotions have an ambiguous status in the bureaucratic work of the immigration 
services in Norway. In deciding applications for family integration in Norway, 
employees gave accounts of dilemmas and challenges that were analysed from the 
point of view of aligning with two different ethical principles (Eggebö 2013): 
emotions can be understood as indispensable for ethical conduct, yet, equally, they 
may cloud judgement and thereby threaten democracy and justice. The 
contestation is between arguing that emotions have no place in a rational 
bureaucracy (see du Gay 2008) and that emotions are essential for ethical conduct 
(see Bauman 1991). On the one hand, there is the potential to achieve justice if 
everyone is treated equally and according to democratically defined legislation and 
rules: in realizing the principle of equal treatment, emotions are not wanted. On 
the other hand, bureaucracies can be essentially immoral, and their emotional 
detachment, distance, and rationalization can allow for injustice and even 
atrocities. Examples of both approaches to emotion in bureaucracy are to be found 
in various immigration services, although ambiguously, they point towards 
emotions being put to one side (Eggebö 2013). Eggebö, like Ahmed (2004), offers a 
critique of these two opposing views on ethical conduct and justice by showing the 
ambiguity between them. An example of this ambiguity can also be seen in the 
following quote from Wettergren (2010, 401) about the Swedish Migration Board: 
Officers think that they are professional rather than cynical, empathetic but 
(necessarily) detached, and that their job is essentially linked to objective and 
cognitive assessments of an applicant’s right to protection. Instead, they are 
orienting towards collegial recognition and status while continuously negotiating 
their feelings for the applicant. 
Research into the role of emotions when it comes to privileging in relation to 
asylum seekers thus needs to be elaborated further to investigate the contingencies 
between emotions and other categories such as rationality, ethical conduct, and 
justice. In other words, we must ask what emotions do in a specific situation (see 
Ahmed 2004; Eggebö 2013). 
These examples from earlier research into immigration service personnel working 
with issues concerning asylum seekers and their situation show that both 
dilemmas and emotions are present in this work when challenged with the 
contradictions inherent in the reception of asylum seekers. However, challenges to 
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a privileged position do not readily translate into an awareness of privilege, nor do 
they necessarily promote a questioning of these privileged positions. Rather, 
feeling unjustly accused of being too restrictive, Swedish Migration Board 
personnel can actually end up arguing that they are defending the right of asylum 
against racist undercurrents. This shows how ‘the emotional regime’ at the Board 
‘is tied to the illusion that asylum seekers can be rejected in a humane and 
dignified way’ (Wettergren 2010, 401). What the discussion of dilemmas and 
emotions in relation to their work with asylum seekers also shows, however, is that 
privileged positions and practices are being challenged at the individual level. 
Seemingly, these (mute) challenges to privileged positions and practices do not 
seep through to the institutional and discursive levels, where privileged positions 
and practices rather find support, as in the example of the emotional regime of the 
Swedish Migration Board, which 
must be seen as inherent to a larger nationalist project to safe-guard the (increasingly 
perceived as threatened) privileges of Swedish citizens by controlling the influx of 
destitute foreigners, without recognizing the dehumanization of the self and the 
others involved in this practice. (Wettergren 2010, 415) 
This speaks directly to the use of a concept such as global citizenship privilege for 
analysing privileging in relation to asylum seekers, but also, given earlier 
theorizing on other intersecting categories of privilege, to the difficulties of 
conscious-raising in relation to privileged positions and practices. There is an 
ongoing discussion on how privilege may be analysed and challenged by 
incorporating emotions into the theorizing on privilege (see Pease 2012), which, 
further developed, will open for an analysis of privileging in relation to asylum 
seekers. 
Investigating privilege 
The nature of privilege is such that for those who are privileged it is difficult to 
recognize that fact, while for those outside the charmed circle it is all the more ease 
to see (Bailey 1998). On the invisibility and normality of privilege, Pease (2006) 
demonstrates how the privileged are also less likely to be researched or studied, 
reflecting the fact that they are seen as ‘normal’ and thus do not have to be 
investigated. The privileged come to represent a hegemonic norm whereby ‘white, 
thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian and financially secure people come to 
embody what it means to be normal’ (Perry 2001, 192). This norm also comes to 
represent the base line from which negative evaluations of difference are 
measured. Pease (2010) has set out and discussed certain aspects of privilege in 
relation to the categories of race, class, gender, sexuality, and ability, identifying 
key dimensions of privilege that need to be acknowledged if one is to make sense 
of how individuals gain different benefits through privilege: ‘the invisibility of 
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privilege by those who have it; the power of the privileged group to determine the 
social norm; the naturalisation of privilege and the sense of entitlement that 
accompanies privilege’ (Pease 2010, 9). Michael Kimmel (2003, 1) illustrates this by 
saying that privilege is like running with the wind at one’s back—‘It feels like just 
plain running, and we rarely if ever get the chance to see how we are sustained, 
supported, and even propelled by that wind.’ To be in a situation of privilege is 
further related to feelings of being at home in the world. Peggy McIntosh (1988) 
writes that positions of privilege frees people from feelings of fear, anxiety, a sense 
of not being welcome, of not being real; by escaping penalties or dangers that 
others suffer, by not having to hide or to be in disguise, the privileged are also kept 
from having to be angry. Feeling comfortable, safe, or entitled to various rights and 
resources are also connected to belonging (Yuval Davis 2011). It can thus be very 
comfortable to be white, male, heterosexual and middle class, as the wind will be 
at your back.  
In order to break out of these illusions of favour and comfort, in order to 
understand society better, there is a need to examine arenas in which we are 
privileged as well as those where we are not—again, to borrow a metaphor from 
Kimmel (2003, 1), ‘only when you turn around and face that wind do you realize 
its strength’. Having our privilege challenged, we are also unable to relax in a 
position of privilege. We can never be quite sure of our position of privilege as it 
varies according to time, place, gender, ethnicity, and class, and in ways that we 
can never be sure of (Hacking 1990; Svensson 2007). In maintaining the 
vulnerability and uncertainty of privileged positions—for we are all vulnerable to 
the risk of being treated as ‘the other’—emotions are an important feature of 
normalization (Fahlgren 2005; Bergman & Fahlgren 2013). Privilege is also 
challenged through the emotions of the ‘other’, as in the example where the 
situation for asylum seekers has been found to prompt the resignation, frustration, 
and resentment that trigger resistance (Bergman 2010). Such emotional responses 
to injustices on the part of subordinate groups in turn often evoke defensive 
emotions of anger in privileged groups, caught between emotions of guilt and 
innocence when they see their privileges threatened or challenged (Pease 2012). 
Guilt and shame can be regarded as promoting change, while a refusal to feel guilt 
and shame makes it difficult to acknowledge one’s complicity in the oppression of 
others (Pease 2010). 
In investigating privilege in relation to oppression, we also need to acknowledge 
that privilege is something that is done. Rather than seeing the concepts of race, 
gender, and class as categories, we should be more attentive to the processes of 
racializing, gendering, and classing (Pease 2006). Understanding and challenging 
positions and practices of privilege thus involves both investigating what 
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comprises certain aspects of privilege and raising awareness of how certain groups 
and individuals in society are privileged and gain benefits in relation to others. The 
invisibility of privilege to those who are privileged, its naturalization and 
normalization, calls for research that digs into different situations, looking at how 
privileged positions and practices are produced and reproduced in that certain 
situation. To understand privilege ‘we must investigate privilege at interactional, 
cultural and structural levels at the same time that we explore the intersections of 
privilege with oppression’ (Pease 2010, 35). To keep the scope of such research 
manageable as well as to acknowledge that different categories of privilege are 
played out differently according to time and place, situational analysis can be 
employed. Situational analysis (Clarke 2005) delimits a situation to be analysed at 
different levels, where the interactional factors of a certain situation, not to mention 
the cultural and structural factors, can be investigated. By mapping what is going 
on, who the actors are, and what the positions in a situation are (Clarke 2005), the 
theories of privilege can be used to establish an understanding of the positions and 
practices of privilege. 
The literature on challenges to privilege shows that people respond with different 
discursive strategies to different categories of privilege. White privilege research, 
for example, has found discursive strategies such as colour blindness, equal 
opportunity racism, and meritocracy, as well as open challenges to white privilege 
(Nenga 2011). Sandi Kawecka Nenga (2011) has taken these as a starting point in 
looking at whether similar discursive strategies might be found in her research on 
class privilege. Using the case of how affluent youth volunteers respond to class 
privilege in volunteer work, Nenga shows that the privileged young exercise 
agency in response to class privilege in the form of evading class, employing 
equalizing discourses, blaming cultural capital—not simply challenging class 
privilege, in other words. As discursive strategies in response to class privilege 
both resemble and diverge from responses to white privilege, Nenga (2011, 263) 
points out that ‘discursive responses to privilege are not universal and vary 
according to the type of privilege being consolidated or challenged’. Without going 
into the detail of different discursive strategies in response to white and class 
privilege, we might ask what are then the discursive strategies employed in 
relation to globally privileged citizenship. 
My suggestion is that the Swedish Migration Board’s personnel, in their interaction 
with asylum seekers, would be an interesting group to consider, as they face the 
oppression of the other, and are therefore also challenged in their own positions 
and practices of privilege. As the examples from the general literature on 
immigration service personnel shows, they are indeed challenged in their positions 
and practices of privilege: they are challenged by dint of meeting the 
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disempowered situation of asylum seekers as well as asylum seekers’ resistance 
and attempts to seek empowerment (Bergman 2010); they are challenged by dint of 
their having to juggle being publicly accused of being cynical and restrictive, while 
at the same time being the target of racist comments (Wettergren 2010). Given an 
institutional setting such as that of the Swedish Migration Board, their responses to 
challenges to their privileged position have a direct bearing on the dilemmas, 
emotions, and affinity with the collective of professionals in their work with 
asylum seekers. By looking at challenges to privilege and the role of emotions in 
the production and reproduction of the same, it is possible to unravel the 
discursive strategies inherent in the privilege of citizenship. Finally, importantly, 
we must not forget that the aim is to improve the situation for asylum seekers, and 
as such needs to be accountable to them. Accountability in this case needs to be 
turned on its head: ‘Accountability usually occurs when those with less power are 
accountable to those with more power. In challenging privilege and oppression, 
this is reversed’ (Pease 2010, 182). 
Conclusions 
I have argued that to understand and hopefully to challenge privileged positions in 
relation to asylum seekers we need to investigate the role that emotions play in 
reproducing privilege, and the way in which emotions can play a role in 
investigating and challenging the same. One way to approach these issues is to 
look closely at ambivalences and dilemmas. I would argue that meeting and 
working with asylum seekers challenges the positions and practices of privilege, 
creating unease at the emotional responses. This is not to suggest, though, that it 
makes individuals conscious of their own privileges, or, being made conscious of 
their privileges, challenges them. Earlier research into the working conditions of 
immigration service personnel suggests that emotional responses to having one’s 
privileges challenged on the personal level are resolved in a variety of different 
emotional responses on the institutional and structural level that in fact reproduce 
positions and practices of privilege. I would suggest that in order to analyse 
privilege in relation to asylum seekers, an exploration of the dilemmas and 
emotions of working with asylum seekers is a way to further investigate how 
discourses, structures, and practices sustain and normalize certain ways of 
privileging. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ON BEING A RACE TRAITOR: THE EMOTIONS OF 
BEING/PASSING AS PRIVILEGED 
Ulrika Schmauch 
 
A terrorist attacks the government building in Oslo and slaughters over 60 
youngsters at a summer camp. Hours later the expert on terrorism on the news talks 
about the threats from al-Qaeda that have been made against Norway because of its 
presence in Afghanistan. 
   Jimmie Åkesson, the leader of the racist Sweden Democrats, writes an article in 
the local newspaper saying that Muslims are the biggest foreign threat to Sweden’s 
safety not least because they have so many children and want to make the whole 
country Islamic. 
   In Forserum, a town in Southern Sweden, Somali parents keep their children out of 
school as they are not safe from physical and verbal racist attacks on their way 
home. 
   And once again a student uses Somalis as an example of an immigrant group that 
differs most from Swedes in relation to education, literacy, employment, and (level 
of) culture. 
I consider myself somewhat of a race traitor for two reasons. One reason is my 
antiracist practice and race-critical research and the other being a white ‘Swedish’ 
woman married to a practising Muslim black man from Somalia, and it is this 
second reason I want to focus on in this essay. My choice of husband is not a 
political statement, although of course, just like other personal matters, it is 
political. Talking about oneself as a race traitor risks, as Moon and Flores (2000) 
argue, creating a narrative of the enlightened subject who heroically distances 
herself from exploitation, privilege, and the subordination of fellow human beings. 
I am not that naïve. Of course I am a part of the everyday doings of race and living 
within a culture that is constructed on racist premises. But I have made a choice, 
and continue to make the choice, not to forget and to try to do what I can to use my 
privileges as a way to abolish that very privilege. Having my political convictions 
and my research questioned is something I have brought on myself, something I 
can live with; when it comes to my marriage and the everyday racist comments 
about my husband, his religion, and our family, it is far more hurtful and difficult 
to put into words. 
Let me start by saying that this has been a difficult essay to write. For two reasons. 
The first is that it deals with something very close to my heart—my insecurities, 
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fears, hopes, and thoughts, the ongoing debates in my head that never seem to be 
resolved and probably never will be. It is personal. 
The second reason is that I am worried that I will fall into the trap of portraying 
myself, the white body, as the centre of the universe. Yet another white person 
feeling sorry for herself for not having the privileges she is used to having, or 
feeling guilty for having privileges denied to others, intent on portraying herself as 
‘a good white’. I am not trying to deny the privileges that my white body gives me, 
but I want to suggest that the dichotomy of ‘victim of racism’ versus ‘not victim of 
racism’ needs to be understood as more complex and contradictory, and that 
racism is not only linked to the racialization of individual bodies, but also to the 
racialization of relationships between bodies of different races. I want to look at 
what happens when the hegemonic racial boundaries between racialized groups 
are transgressed. 
I use the term racism to refer to those everyday practices in a historical context that 
construct an existence where privilege, exploitation, marginalization, and silence 
are ordered along ‘racial’ lines (Essed 1991). In a Swedish context this means that 
employment, financial assets, cultural influence, health, desirable housing, travel 
opportunities, provision of eldercare and childcare, and so on are on an aggregated 
level concentrated to those in the population who are seen as being racially and 
culturally Swedish—and one central aspect of being seen as Swedish is being 
white, and the right kind of white (Schmauch 2006). Racism helps to reinforce, and 
sometimes to weaken, other structures and systems of domination such as class, 
gender, and heteronormativity. 
This means that I view racism as a practice, as a material and cultural structure that 
positions people of different body types, and not primarily an attitude, a mental 
predisposition, or an extremist political ideology. While overtly racist parties are 
on the rise in Sweden, and indeed in the rest of Europe, there were still about 90 
per cent of Swedish voters who did not vote for the so called Sweden Democrats in 
the most recent election. 
I’m having lunch with my colleagues and we’re talking about the research one of us 
has done on bisexual men. Another colleague turns to me and asks, ‘When are you 
going to have kids? And how would Mohammed react if the kid turns out to be gay? 
I meet a lot of Muslim women in my gym-class and they often complain about 
people not being accepting towards them, but they are not very tolerant when it 
comes to gays and lesbians themselves. I mean, you can’t expect people to be 
accepting of you if you are not accepting of others!’ 
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A race traitor (in) passing 
The most central trait of the race traitor is a refusal to accept the supremacy of her 
own race and the centrality of maintaining racial boundaries. In so doing, the 
traitor questions the very normalcy of the maintenance of these boundaries and, 
one could argue, the structure itself. In this essay I write about everyday 
experiences and comments from family, friends, and co-workers. I want to stress 
that many of them are people who I love. They are not ‘evil’. They would gladly 
sign petitions against racism, and I am certain they think that refugees should be 
granted protection and permanent residence permits. So I do not believe that they 
are extreme in any way. Everyday racism is, after all, normal, practised by normal 
people. 
Racism is something that some are forced to learn in order to protect ourselves 
from it; trying to act in such a way as the risk of being subject to everyday racism is 
kept to a minimum. 
I burn myself when taking food out of the oven and it leaves an ugly weal on my 
arm. ‘I wonder if they’ll think my husband did it to me because they think “those 
Muslims” are violent and beat “their” women?’ 
   I complain to a friend that I am sick and tired of Islamophobic comments about 
how evil my husband is. My friend looks at me and says ‘Well, come on! You know 
they are more prejudiced against women in those cultures!’ 
   A colleague talks about her annoying husband who gets in a bad mood when she’s 
out late because he doesn’t like being at home on his own, and I’m thinking to 
myself ‘If I told a similar story about my husband, people would assume he wants 
me to be home at night because in his religion/culture they see women as property 
that they have the right to control. And if women don’t do what they’re told, they’re 
severely beaten.’ 
I am not sure if people actually would react as I fear, of course but I’m not entirely 
sure. Cannot fully know. One could argue that I am overreacting, just like people 
of colour who react to racism are often accused of overreacting—thinking too 
much about racism, assuming that people are thinking something they would 
never think. But I disagree. Part of being the victim of everyday racism, either 
oneself or vicariously, is that you develop what du Bois called a double 
consciousness (1989; see also Collins 2001)—of knowing both your own ideas, 
culture, and interpretations and the dominant form of consciousness—to view 
yourself from the privileged position. So even if I cannot know for certain, I will 
not risk it and keep my mouth shut. 
As I am white, racism is easier to avoid. It is possible for me under most 
circumstances to ‘pass’ as a common white/Swedish woman with no personal 
emotional attachments to people of colour. I can live my life as a ‘normal’ white 
woman as long as my husband’s identity is kept hidden. This means that I escape 
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some of the racist comments, but it also means that some people feel ‘safe’ to 
express views on Muslims, black people, immigrants that they probably would not 
have said if they, as a woman in Frankenberg’s study says, ‘knew who they were 
talking to’ (1993); ‘safe’ from those overreacting people of colour who always take 
exception—as a colleague of mine put it, ‘always claiming to be discriminated 
against, although it’s their own fault they’re not successful’. 
And, once again, students assume immigrant youth are torn between cultures, have 
an identity crisis, live in marginalized neighbourhoods, like hip-hop, and/or just 
generally suffer. 
   And once again a student uses Somalis as an example of an immigrant group that 
differs most from Swedes in relation to education, literacy, employment, and (level 
of) culture. 
The position of the race traitor is, of course, a gendered position. While back in the 
Nineties the academic journal Race Traitor: Treason to Whiteness is Loyalty to 
Humanity had a tendency to describe race traitors as heroic men who claimed to 
have unlearned their privileges and had married women of colour as a political 
statement of their commitment to anti-whiteism, the position for women who 
betray their race has historically had different consequences. While white men who 
get involved with women of colour have been seen as freeing women from the 
patriarchal relationships they are assumed to have with men of ‘their own’ 
kind/culture/race, white women who get involved with men of colour have 
historically been seen as either promiscuous or sexually unsuccessful, naïve, 
and/or as potential victims of tribal/Islamic/cultural violence. The danger of white 
women mixing races is not only seen as a threat to individual women, but also to 
their potential children, as being of ‘mixed’ background is often portrayed as living 
in constant rootlessness, and it is assumed that men of colour not only mistreat 
(white) women, but also are controlling of their children, not least their sexuality. 
And, of course, white women who betray their race are a threat to the race/the 
nation/culture itself as other races threaten to take over the white race—one child 
at a time (Frankenberg 1993). 
My uncle looks at me with a worried look. ‘A Muslim? Oh girl, you be careful.’ 
And I angrily say ‘Yeah, ’cos they bite, right?’ And he looks me in the eye and says 
‘Yes.’ With a look that begs me not to be naïve and put myself in danger. 
   Before my teenaged sister-in-law moves to Britain with her mother and three 
brothers, she gets into a fight with her teacher and starts skipping school. A year 
later I hear that the teachers at the school are deeply worried about her since they are 
convinced she was taken to Somalia against her will and forced into an arranged 
marriage. 
Although we know that many racist movements tend to position women as 
passive and in need of protection, and that racist ideology and practice has tended 
to privilege men and masculinity, the examples in this essay show that women too 
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struggle to maintain boundaries between desired and undesired intimate 
relationships between cultures/races/religions, and that women’s bodies still tend 
to become the battleground in the reproduction of racism (Ware 1997). 
Yes, I am still ‘white’ 
Speaking from a similar position as mine, Rastas (2004) asks the question ‘Am I still 
White?’ when married to a black man and with children of colour? When I feel the 
pain they are subjected to and hearing comments about my family? She comes to 
the conclusion that we should stop talking about ‘colour’ altogether in order to 
make race disappear as a social category. While I too think that our respective 
positions tend to make us vulnerable to racism, and in some way victims of 
discrimination by proxy as well as destabilized whiteness, I strongly disagree with 
the conclusion that we should stop talking about race. Not speaking about race has 
been used as a way to continue to silence experiences of racism and to maintain the 
status quo (Bailey 1998; Schmauch 2006). Also, many of the privileges connected to 
whiteness—having one’s culture represented in a differentiated way, not fearing 
that it will be assumed one is sexually willing, not being denied housing based on 
race or ethnic background, taking for granted that one’s right to be in the country 
will not be questioned, and so on (McIntosh 1990)—are linked to the physical 
appearance of whiteness and not to the social position of the individual body in 
relation to people of colour. Therefore, denying one’s whiteness, I would say, is a 
way to underestimate the racism that people of colour face on a daily basis. 
I would rather understand the position of the race traitor as someone who 
decentres the centre. Although that way of seeing is in some ways off-centre, it is 
still a position within the centre. It is to me a standpoint, in Sandra Harding’s sense 
(1991): a political position achieved by collective struggle, a choice to make a stand, 
and one that requires taking responsibility for my interactions and for developing 
everyday practices that do not reinforce the racist status quo. Privileges, after all, 
should be used to abolish privilege. 
Some argue that it is impossible to understand the emotional and physical 
experiences of those living different lives than one’s own. That it is impossible to 
truly feel what it is like to be marginal. While that might be true, I agree with 
hooks who writes, 
And indeed we must be willing to acknowledge that individuals of great privilege 
who are in no way victimized are capable, via their political choices, of working on 
behalf of the oppressed. Such solidarity does not need to be rooted in shared 
experience. It can be based on one’s political and ethical understanding of racism 
and one’s rejection of domination. (1992, 13–14) 
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The position of the race traitor—entered into out of love or political conviction—
tends to heighten one’s sensibility to racism and urges one to take at least that first 
baby step, to develop the double consciousness with which to look at the world 
from two perspectives at once. This does not mean it is the responsibility of people 
of colour to make sure that white people do develop such a consciousness, but 
rather it makes the normality of privilege more difficult to uphold. Yes, in many 
ways it is an uncomfortable standpoint. But perhaps knowing that privileges are 
not earned, that they are not the natural order of things, is also uncomfortable? To 
my mind, it certainly should be. 
Being and passing as privileged 
Racism not only serves to keep people of colour in their place, but also to keep 
white people in theirs. By controlling women’s bodies and drawing boundaries for 
acceptable/non-acceptable sexual relationships, the most intimate of relationships 
are affected by racism. This not only affects the relationships themselves and their 
inherent structures of privilege, power, pleasure, and pain, but also how racism, 
gender, and other structures play out in everyday life. After all, as Ambjörnsson 
(2006) writes, heteronormativity is not merely about controlling LGBTQ bodies, 
but about controlling what kind of heterosexuality can be seen as normal, healthy, 
and acceptable. 
The common notion of who experiences racism, the common notion that we only 
get hurt if the treatment we suffer from is directly directed at us, is too simplistic. I 
would suggest that we need an understanding of racism that takes into account its 
dual nature, both directed at keeping outsiders out, and keeping the inside clean 
and pure and free from degeneration, and how these are intertwined. Only then 
will people start to take into account the pain of seeing loved ones hurt, silenced, 
and disrespected. This does not mean that racism directed at those in the centre is 
of the same magnitude, or even that white people and people of colour suffer from 
the same kind of racism. In the end, my white body is subjected to racism not 
because of the way it is racialized per se, but because of relationships I was free to 
choose. The habit of viewing social actors solely as individuals, cut loose from all 
alliances and solidarities, responsibilities and intimacies with others might be all 
too common at a time of increasing social atomization, but it tells only part of the 
story of about the maintenance of racist structures of privilege. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
NEO-LIBERALISM—A REGIME OF FEAR? 
Siv Fahlgren, Katarina Giritli Nygren, Anders Johansson, and Eva Söderberg 
 
Our aim in this essay is to explore emotion’s importance to the power and politics 
of normalization in the context of neo-liberal governmentality (Larner 2000)—what 
neo-liberalism does to us emotionally, in other words. Following Bronwyn Davies, 
who took Frigga Haug’s memory work and developed it into what she terms 
‘collective biography work’ (Davies & Gannon 2006), we have conducted this 
analysis as collective memory work. The four of us have worked together for 
several years, and have thus established a degree of mutual trust and commitment. 
Having decided to do memory work on the theme ‘neo-liberalism—a regime of 
fear’ (Davies 2011), we spent a whole day noting down our memories of key 
moments of fear. One could, perhaps, say that the fact that our choice fell on 
memories of fear—and not memories of, say, joy—shows a predetermined opinion 
of neo-liberalism. However, fear being a crucial part of all forms of government, 
we prefer to see our work as an investigation of the particular aspects of fear that 
inhabit neo-liberal governmentality, and which are not necessarily more pernicious 
than other types of fear that are mobilized in the governing process. 
In order to come as close as possible to ‘an embodied sense of what happened’ in 
our four different memories (Davies & Gannon 2006: 3), we first wrote down our 
memories and then reading them aloud to one another. When listening, we 
consciously set out to ask ourselves, ‘What is it to be this? What does it feel like?’ 
The memories were rewritten and reread until we all had a collective sense of what 
happened in the memory and what it felt to be the ‘I’ concerned, our stated aim 
being a better understanding of how we as individuals are discursively constituted 
in particular embodied moments, since this makes way for particular, local, and 
situated truths (Davies & Gannon 2006, 3–4). 
We then discussed these memories in an email exchange spread over the course of 
a couple of months. They were also subject to a theoretical approach that is 
attentive to normalization and gender, class, and ethnicity/race, and how these 
issues might be connected to neo-liberal governmentality and politics. We draw on 
Sarah Ahmed (2004) to describe the emotions as historical, cultural, and social 
practices that form both individual and collective bodies. The emotions in this 
sense are not something ‘I’ have, located in each individual, but instead are 
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movements in time and space, or movements between individuals that form their 
bodies. It is through emotions, or our response to our surroundings, that 
individuals and collective bodies alike are shaped. We are one another’s 
preconditions for the kind of life and identity that might be possible. Thus our 
social location is integral to our emotions, for emotions are constituted and 
conditioned, experienced, and expressed in a social location that makes them 
(im)possible (Ahmed 2004, 4–12; Bränström Öhman et al. 2011). 
Collective memory work makes memories collective in a special sense, and thus 
we have decided to present the memories in this essay anonymously, one by one. 
After that, we use a dialogue form to explore and comment on how best to 
understand the way emotions serve to produce the position of the legitimate neo-
liberal subject from different and contradictory angles. This dialogue too is 
anonymized, since we do not think it is important to know which one of us made 
which comment. By retaining the dialogue form, we remain true to the collective 
nature of the work, but without the compromises required of a unified text, by 
allowing the ambivalences and differences between our voices to be heard. At the 
end of the essay, we comment not only on our findings, but also on the course of 
the work itself. 
The fear of losing control 
The crying lady’s grief over not being able to go out is lessened by using Sobril. 
Getting outside for fresh air on a daily basis is not part of a reasonable living 
standard—this is what the decision-makers have decided. Who is to take care of 
whom, after all? I’m afraid of getting old, although it’s not ageing or death that 
scares me, but becoming dependent on others. I’m afraid of not being able to look 
after myself. My whole body aches when I think that someone else will be deciding 
what I need and don’t need. There’s no space for the individual. Afraid that no one 
will listen, afraid of being scared. Don’t want to be a burden, don’t want to lose 
control. I have to manage by myself, have to be strong, have to save money, must 
buy insurance, mustn’t become dependent. (Memory 1) 
— When thinking about how neo-liberalism is produced by fear and reproduces 
fear, I do think we have to view it as an emotional reaction to a perceived threat 
embedded with social meaning. The threat appears as a call for action; an 
interpellation which constructs and assumes a moral agency and certain 
dispositions to social action that necessarily follow. It is emotionally an enabling 
praxis, but also a technique of government that sets in motion a reflexive 
subjectivity deemed to bear the consequences of its actions. The fear of not being 
strong enough, not being able, and through this insecurity a contempt for 
weakness, dependency, and neediness are produced and upheld. 
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— Yes, and central to the doing of normality today is the individualized notion of 
being ‘at risk’ (Rose 1996). By formulating or creating specific dangers and risks in 
a community, ‘normal’ becomes re-assembled as not being ‘at risk’, a position that 
is constantly narrowing and becoming more difficult, not to say impossible, to 
perform. Being ‘at risk’ thus tends to be described in terms of individual and 
personal failures, and as an individual who lacks the cognitive, emotional, 
practical, and ethical skills to take personal responsibility for rational self-
management. 
— You could also see how the fear of the degeneration or disintegration comes to 
be associated more with some bodies than others (Ahmed 2004), and the narratives 
that seek to preserve the present through anxiety and fear lodge that which is 
fearful in those bodies that take on fetish qualities as objects of fear (Ahmed 2004, 
78–9)—in this case the elderly/dependent/ill. Which we will become. It may be that 
fear allows the storyteller to remain closer to the object of the ‘normal’ community 
at the same time as it transforms the elderly into an object of fear. Fear and the 
expressions of contempt create ‘that which I am not’ but fear to become. Her recoil 
from fear involves turning towards a ‘fellow feeling’ of life as it should be (Ahmed 
2004, 64–74), a life where one is included, with dignity, and has full control. Thus 
the fear created by the individualistic neo-liberal discourse is normalizing the very 
same discourse. Fear becomes the driving emotion in this normalization. 
Fear and insecurity 
She’s standing in the middle of the bare exhibition room in front of a huge, heavy, 
dark mantle, hanging from ceiling to floor, trailing somewhat on the floor. 
   The mantle is thick. The surface is irregular, lacklustre, rather matted and oily in 
places—and it curves in and out. Like a rolling landscape.
29
 
   It is her fascination that has brought her to a halt here, just as much as the unease 
she feels. She stares at the mantle. It is forbidding, but still draws her closer. She 
feels as if it has consumed all the light in the room, like a black hole, and that she’s 
being drawn in herself.  
   It pulls and pulls. 
   She intensifies her focus to pull back and stop the motion. At first she sees the 
colours: all of the shades from black, dark grey, light grey, and dirty brown. Then 
the shapes start to form and appear. An ear thrusts out from the dirty fluff, a paw 
sticks out from a soft fold and a nose from another. She discovers teddy bear 
conjoined to teddy bear—and other soft animals—making up the impenetrable 
structure of the mantle. 
   More ears, paws, noses—and many black-shining pairs of eyes bobbing up and 
down on the soft sea. 
   A mass grave. 
                                                          
29
 The artwork, Fatima Abelli Bifeldt’s Regrets collect like old friends, ‘a weave of 
discarded soft toys’, was on display in the 2014 spring salon at Liljevalchs in Stockholm. 
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   Her discomfort has already given way to a feeling of disgust, but she stays put. In 
front of the soft toys, in front of the guards at the border between dream and 
wakefulness, the symbols of safety, the transitional objects. (Memory 2) 
— The image of the dirty, sewn-together soft toys creates an emotion, a sense of 
how security is snatched away; the symbols of safety, those that have safeguarded 
her relationship with the world have been dragged through the dirt and buried in 
a mass grave. Distancing, rejecting, but still affected by what she has rejected. 
— It is as if the object of disgust threatens her by the possibility that what is ‘me’ or 
‘us’ might slide into ‘not-me, not-us’. Turning away in fear and disgust—is that the 
same as turning towards a nostalgic ‘home’? And what does this emotional signal 
do? What is normalized through this? Do we see here a nostalgic yearning for the 
‘home’ that neo-liberalism has dismantled? Was that a better place? 
— When the teddy bear ‘dies’ or is ‘killed’, it is also the symbolism it is associated 
with which is so brutally brought into question. The child, innocence, security, 
culture, kindness, expectation (Söderberg 2009): an expression of a powerful 
security discourse. The insight takes time; all the sewn-together animals demand 
the onlooker’s attention. Does she feel the loss of earlier dreams and hopes? 
— If we have buried our transitional objects, how shall we be able to carry on? 
Why does she stay there, feeling sick; why has she stopped in front of the mantle? 
Why does she choose not to leave? We have to choose. Everyone has to choose. 
That is the neo-liberal discourse. Within a neo-liberal regime she is reduced to a 
rational, choice-making, autonomous, and responsible subject, based as she is on 
the subject of individual choices, both irreducible and non-transferable (Foucault 
2008, 272). 
— Frozen by ‘raven-black eyes of fire’ of affective waste, affections turn into waste. 
No meaningful choice is possible. Death as the ironic undoing of rational choice. 
Our constant risk of becoming abject waste.  
The fear of (in)visibility 
If there isn’t a text? If writing isn’t possible? If things don’t get better? If I can’t? If I 
don’t want to? If I wasn’t forced to? (Memory 3) 
— No memory as such, just broken pieces, fragments. If, if, if … Why? Writing and 
doing research means being constantly related to norms and processes of 
normalization. Audit culture reinforces such aspects, but they are always there, 
important parts of how we affectively engage with the world. Writing about norms 
means that you are always performatively iterating them; no matter how critical 
you may be, but also perhaps (and hopefully) producing some change through 
this. Visibility, clarification, measurability, security under the law—there is always 
something of me in the norms that I relate to. 
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— Objecting to norms always has a portion of self-hate, because norms are never 
purely exterior. Norms breed on me understanding them—which I have to if I am 
to criticize them. They are intimately linked to the very thought of understanding 
one another. They are ‘being together’, as if ‘understanding one another’ was the 
only way of being in the world. The agreement is what is important, not the norms 
in themselves. The ideal of normalization is complete understanding, not 
knowledge (Dean 2010, 141).  
— From a feminist point of view there is something paradoxical in the need to be 
seen. Normalization of the male/masculinity has for a long time been seen as a 
patriarchal power strategy that has meant that the feminist position has become to 
demand visibility of that which is silenced and made invisible. To be seen is to 
exist, to gain affirmation, and to belong. At the same time, audit culture has made 
clear that what is built into visibility also makes you a countable unit. The 
individualized subject of neo-liberalism must be able to appear to be whatever a 
particular workplace wants, in whatever way the workplace deems will maximize 
its productivity (Davies 2011). Everything the researcher does must be set out in 
the light, measured, analysed, and evaluated. You are forced to make yourself 
seen, and at the same moment you are reduced to a unit that is measured and 
examined, and thereby risks being judged (unmasked?), but not a part of it. The 
demand for visibility thereby risks rebounding in a fear of vulnerability that can 
have a paralysing effect. 
— But what if I can’t? Each individualized subject feels impelled to maximize his 
or her own advantage within this threatening and constrictive order of things. In 
this way, neo-liberalism heightens individual competition by actively increasing 
individual vulnerability (Davies 2011). But what is the most frightening—the risk 
of being outside or of being included? If I wasn’t forced to? 
 
The fear of becoming an affect alien—a sticky killjoy 
The seminar continues and she has just asked for the floor. This just has to be said. 
Her heart starts beating fast—she’ll soon have the floor. She writes small notes in 
the form of memory bubbles on her paper, needs support not to forget the vital parts, 
go off on a tangent… Her heart beats faster. What are they talking about now? She 
can’t listen; has to concentrate on what she herself has to say—as soon as it’s her 
turn. Suddenly she feels completely empty—why can’t she just stay quiet? Why 
must she always … No, it has to be said—but how should she put it across? She’s 
sweating—feels the colour in her face rising, it’s her turn soon. But why? She takes 
the floor although she knows—she’ll never be able to express herself as well as they 
can! (Memory 4) 
— She’ll soon have the floor, but the question is, can the floor be hers? Fear takes hold 
of her body, makes her heart pump faster, blood flowing to her face. Julia Kristeva 
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speaks about the female position in a linguistic sense as an exile position. The 
predominant culture and language—not least the institutional academic language, 
not least in a neo-liberal figure culture—is masculine/male; it is the language of 
scientific rationalism, a general, legal relationship with the world. She describes the 
female position in language as a language at the limit, a listening, questioning, 
seeking language that can only be heard in the rhythm, melody, the space in 
between. This language has been colonized by the legal relationship, and sends 
away the woman who does not allow herself to be colonized in exile (Hörnström 
1994). Woman has therefore never been terribly good at the global language—his 
master’s voice—even if she has learned to slide along with it, even quite 
successfully. However, sooner or later the indignation takes over and she loses her 
balance, does not keep to the agenda, forgets herself and trips up, has an outburst, 
stutters (Hörnström 1994, 15). Does she have to be like him to be accepted, seen? 
— Probably. Or we could also ask, Which ‘him’ does she need to be like? This loss 
of balance, having an outburst, stuttering … could it not be caused by a fear of 
other subordinate positions too? 
— I read this memory as a strong urge to speak out, to say what has to be said, but 
at the same time there’s a fear before doing so. If I read the memory again, but 
consistently replace some of the words—The seminar continues and he has just asked 
for the floor. This just has to be said. His heart starts beating fast—he’ll soon have the 
floor—how does the text work now? Does it even seem odd? 
— Again, from a more general point of view, the text could be about the 
importance and danger of being visible, or too visible. About not speaking their 
language and the (im)possibility of resistance, about the relationship with being 
implicated in that which one opposes. Not only as in the risk for failure, but also in 
the paradoxical sense of the danger of succeeding. Perhaps she cannot stand on the 
floor—or perhaps she cannot stand the floor (see Jönsson & Rådström in this 
anthology). 
— Fear has always been understood as an instrument of power; subjects have 
given up their freedom in order to be free from fear, and the promise of civil 
society is the elimination of fear. But fear has also been regarded as ‘a sign of times’ 
and I would rather see this fear as an effect of the process than its origin. Becoming 
visible, finding a voice, also means losing oneself, losing one’s voice. 
Epilogue 
The memories discussed here are examples of how neo-liberalism is upheld by a 
regime of fear. Still, after reading these memories of fear and commenting on them 
in our email exchanges, we have come to ask ourselves just why we started our 
memory work with a predetermined feeling? Why didn’t we just ask, What does 
neo-liberalism feel like? or What are the feelings of neo-liberalism? Why did we choose 
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fear, and only fear, since other emotions and ambivalent feelings towards neo-
liberalism also came to the fore in our discussion. 
One answer might be that it is our theoretical point of departure, a consequence of 
the fact that we have long worked with concepts such as normalization, discipline, 
governmentality, the production and risk of outsiderhood, and so on. This research 
focus perhaps does not leave place for the ambivalence or the openings we also can 
experience in neo-liberal discourses and practices, and for the opportunities and 
‘rooms of our own’ they can create for us as feminist researchers (see Fahlgren, 
Giritli Nygren, and Sjöstedt Landén forthcoming) 
However, there might also be another answer: a kind of blind spot in us. Much like 
melancholy changes character depending on society’s shifting class and gender 
orders, so can fear (Johannison 2009). There is something interesting in the 
repetition of the fears that make the ‘I’ visible in our memories; something that has 
to do not only with gender but with class and privilege, and their preservation. We 
believe they may say something about how the Swedish middle classes attempt to 
self-perpetuate in a wider perspective, and we as a part of that middle class. It is 
increasingly common today for the problems (and fears) of the middle classes to be 
highlighted: how to choose where their children should go to school, welfare in old 
age, debt, and so forth. Is it the middle-class position that most of all feels 
threatened and obsessed by outsiderhood’s precariousness, ‘at risk’ (Rose 1996)? 
Perhaps neo-liberalism articulates the middle classes through their problems rather 
than their privileges? Perhaps it is the case that the way in which the middle 
classes are done in our memories is driven by a fear of sliding down the social 
ladder rather than concern at the effort to climb upwards? This is also in line with 
what Ahmed (2004, 12) writes: the emotions move us into line with power and can 
attach us to orientations that oppress others. 
Finally, there is a common thread in all these memories: the fear not of the other 
but of oneself, or rather the one that one risks becoming. Abjection in relation to 
ourselves, or a contempt for our weaknesses. This confirms Bronwyn Davies’ 
description (2011) of the ways in which the extreme individualism of neo-
liberalism is upheld in a regime of fear: ‘Individualized egos must be defended at 
all costs, since they are intensely aware of their potential demise. Every threat to 
the survival of the ego creates a wound, and the wounded ego seeks, ever more 
avidly, confirmation of its survivability.’ 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
STILL ‘FEELING LIKE A FRAUD’? REVISITING PEGGY 
MCINTOSH’S CRITIQUE OF ACADEMIC SUCCESS CULTURE 
THIRTY YEARS LATER 
Maria Jönsson and Anna Rådström 
 
A lack of self-esteem is bad both for the health and for bold thinking. 
The quotation comes from an article in the Swedish trade union magazine 
Universitetsläraren (‘University Teacher’) (Skarsgård 2013a). A group of 
postgraduate research students in philosophy had been interviewed about 
academics’ feelings of inadequacy and fraudulence, and especially amongst 
younger researchers. The tone in the interview is confiding, and somewhat 
excitable, with the subject played up as being both shameful and taboo. A sense of 
relief is expressed within the group when they listen to one another; relief that 
their feelings are shared, and that it is possible to overcome them. There is 
something optimistic about this interview. The students are full of hope about the 
possibility of finding ways of dealing with these negative emotions. They talk 
about their careers as something that will happen—as a certain hope. At the same 
time, the interview leaves questions unanswered. In a short commentary published 
alongside the interview, the magazine asked us to reflect on the interview 
(Skarsgård 2013b). We duly did, but still many of the questions echo within us. 
Why did these students feel like frauds in the first place? Why is that feeling 
considered so dangerous, so shameful, and why is it necessary to overcome it? 
As feminists who have worked in Swedish academe, with all its Anglo-American 
influences, for quite some time now, reading the interview and pondering the 
questions it leaves hanging, it is impossible for us not to think of Peggy McIntosh’s 
‘Feeling Like a Fraud’ (1985).30 In this ‘old’ article, published thirty years ago, she 
dissects the feeling of fraudulence within academia and other public spheres in the 
US. She does so from a social, feminist point of view, and detects an intimidating 
                                                          
30
 McIntosh is an American feminist, anti-racist activist, and academic. She has done a 
great deal of work on inclusion and exclusion in academia, in progressive pedagogy, and in 
education. Privilege is one of her main themes: the importance of raising awareness of the 
workings of power and informal privilege, and the importance of self-reflexion for political 
change. She is perhaps best known for her article ‘Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack of 
White Privilege’ from 1989.  
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pyramidal, hierarchical, authoritarian power structure that produces the feeling of 
being a fraud. McIntosh takes what she calls a ‘double look’ at this phenomenon, 
and suggests on the one hand ‘that we mustn’t let the world make us feel like 
frauds’, and on the other that ‘we must keep alive in ourselves that sense of 
fraudulence which sometimes overtakes us in public spaces’ (1985, 2). The feeling 
of fraudulence is thus something to avoid and to embrace at the same time. Feeling 
like a fraud does not necessarily mean that you are one; rather it may signal that 
you are seeking a way to avoid dishonesty. 
It is interesting (and to our minds also a bit discouraging) to note that in contrast to 
the critical approach McIntosh expressed three decades ago, the postgraduate 
students in the interview from 2013 do not address the socio-political structures 
that produce feelings of fraudulence, but instead seem confident that the feeling of 
fraudulence can and should be overcome with time. The goal seems to be to (re-
)win the position of a confident, self-reliant researcher. The students express relief 
that they can share the emotion—it is important to realize that ‘everyone’ 
sometimes feel inadequate as a researcher—but the ambition is to shed such 
feelings and realize that one is as good as anyone else. These students do not ask 
themselves what it means to be a ‘good’ researcher in the first place (at least, not in 
the interview), or if there is such a thing as excellent research. The neo-liberal 
rhetoric of success and failure, excellence and mediocrity, winners and losers 
remains unquestioned.  
This observation is not a critique of those involved in the interview (which is short 
and has no time for nuances), but it raises the question whether this public and 
politically charged language has become so dominant that it mutes other ways of 
speaking? The interview was published in a trade union magazine—a journal that 
should voice teachers’ and students’ perspectives on academia today. Is it not 
strange that the answers given to questions of fraudulence are so spontaneously 
articulated in the individualistic and therapeutic terms of self-help? McIntosh 
questioned this sort of neo-liberal rhetoric thirty years ago, a few years into the 
Thatcher and Reagan era, when the whole restructuring of the universities and 
welfare state and had only just begun. One may ask if it is not even more urgent to 
denaturalize this language today, thirty years of neo-liberalism later? McIntosh’s 
thoughts on this are useful when, say, dealing with the turn towards new public 
management in academia and the ongoing introduction of more and more 
competition, rankings, measurability, standardization and regulation (see Griffin 
2013). 
‘Feeling Like a Fraud’—one of the gems in the archive of feminist critical 
thinking—is described as a ‘work in progress’. McIntosh, who is still active in the 
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field, has revisited the subject of fraudulence since. In two subsequent articles, she 
develops her topic by addressing feelings of authenticity in conflicts and in writing 
practices (McIntosh 1989; 2000). However, we have chosen to stay with her first 
piece of progressive writing, where she opens up the concept of fraudulence in 
unexpected ways. It is this article that initially helped us and many other feminists 
in the Eighties to see that feeling like a fraud can be a sane reaction, signalling that 
one has not completely internalized the demands of self-sufficiency, sovereignty, 
and over-achievement that prevail in the hierarchical university world. What has 
happened to these insights along the way? In the following we will highlight and 
discuss some of the points that McIntosh makes, and relate them to our everyday 
work as researchers in the field of gender studies. 
Apology as critique 
The reader enters McIntosh’s text by way of a series of apologies: 
…I just wanted to say 
…I have just one point to make 
…I never thought of this before, but… 
…I really don’t know what I am talking about, but here goes! (McIntosh 1985, 1) 
Do you recognize these apologies? Have you used them yourself—or have you 
been advised not to use them? McIntosh lists the phrases when recapitulating her 
recent experiences from a conference on women’s leadership in higher education. 
At this conference, seventeen woman, all leaders, one after the other began their 
talks with an apology. Yet, all of them had been invited as speakers because they 
were assumed to know what they were talking about. They were standing at the 
podium as seemingly successful individuals. On one level, the scene described 
comes across as provocative, and one quick feminist response to the apologists is 
that they better stop that sort of behaviour as it reinforces the stereotype of the 
incapable female leader. They should own the stage; they should assert their 
positions. But then, on second thoughts, assert what positions? Their positions as 
all-knowing authorities? How does that rhyme with feminist practice? 
Like McIntosh, we are struck by the number of apologetic women at the 
conference. Seventeen is a lot, and as the apologies are all delivered within the 
same public space one may wonder if there is an underlying ‘strategy’ of some 
kind? McIntosh notes that the speakers ‘seemed to share a feeling of illegitimacy’ 
when giving speeches to audiences of women similar to themselves (McIntosh 
1985, 1).31 The notion of feeling illegitimate in public situations, connected to 
prestige, competition, hierarchies, and power, conjures up the psychoanalyst Joan 
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 As McIntosh uses the pronoun ‘we’, it seems that she was one of the speakers. 
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Riviere’s article ‘Womanliness as a Masquerade’ from the late 1920s. In it, Riviere 
described a structure in which professional women unconsciously downplayed 
themselves in public situations situated outside traditional female territories, solely 
in order to diminish the risk of being punished for trespassing on (white) 
patriarchal land. As a defence against being found out as possessors of masculinity 
they wore a mask of (emphasized or exaggerated) womanliness. Riviere’s text 
offers an interesting narrative. One of the examples she gives is that of a bright 
female ‘university lecturer in an abstruse subject which seldom attracts women’ 
(Riviere 1929, 39). This woman dresses in an exaggeratedly feminine manner, and 
on top of it she jokes and acts frivolously when lecturing in front of her 
(presumably all-male) colleagues, leading her to ‘treat the situation of displaying 
her masculinity to men as a “game”, as something not real, as a “joke”’ (Riviere 
1929, 39). Her unconscious strategy is not a success. Her colleagues reportedly 
consider her behaviour improper and annoying. They dismiss her. She fails. She 
seems to come across as bit of a flirt, and flirting is risky business if you are not the 
one controlling the situation.32 As this is a psychoanalytical analysis, castration of 
the father figure and various forms of sexuality (etcetera) feature large, but in the 
context of our text these aspects are immaterial. What is important to us is the idea 
of a ‘strategy’ when entering the public stage, the act of masking oneself in order to 
avoid retribution, and the ever-present risk of failure and being exposed as a fraud. 
The audience at the conference attended by McIntosh in the Eighties was different 
from the audience who heard the ‘frivolous’ university lecturer in the Twenties, 
and the speakers did not engage in the masquerade described by Rivere. Certainly, 
the seventeen apologetic women were seeking a way to enter a public situation 
filled with expectations and demands, but rather than masking themselves, they 
performed an act of unmasking and thereby exposed their uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities. They were in a sense risking their credibility, their trustworthiness 
as leaders, as their apologies could have been taken as disclaimers distancing them 
from responsibility. They could have come across as failed leaders, but would that 
have meant that they had failed in all possible ways? Or could failure—the 
inability or reluctance to meet certain demands and do certain things in a success-
oriented culture—also be considered an act of resistance as recently suggested by 
Judith Halberstam (2011)?33 McIntosh concludes that if seventeen women known as 
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 Rivere’s analysis, based on her psychoanalytical therapeutic practice, has been criticized, 
but has also been adopted and turned into a powerful postmodern theory of feminist/queer 
subversion built on repetition and exaggeration.  
33
 In her book Halberstam does not address Riviere’s ideas, but the example of the joking 
university lecturer can be discussed in relation to her notion of the terms ‘serious’ and 
‘rigorous’ as code words for disciplinary correctness in academia and elsewhere. According 
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‘leaders’ choose to apologize, we should listen and consider what they are doing in 
the process. 
In the world of winners, standing at a podium is synonymous with knowing. One 
simply does not apologize. McIntosh’s initial response to the women’s choice of 
words was that they were ‘testimonies to women’s incompetence’. And, as she 
points out, this is also the world’s judgement on them. But then she began to listen 
to them in another way. Assuming that women are competent, she heard a message 
behind the apologies. And the message was not that they could not stand behind 
the podium: the message was that they could not stand the podium. The point of 
their apologies was to try to find a form of public speaking that mean they did not 
have to be so fraudulent (McIntosh 1985, 4). 
Ambivalent about their power, these women leaders were entering the public 
space in a tentative way. As McIntosh notes, they were open to engaging in 
conversation and, unknowingly, entering into a relation with others by so doing. 
To converse with an audience is something else than speaking to it. The 
conversationalist is open to the others’ perspective, always ready to respond and 
reformulate. The importance of this observation is crucial, and resonates with 
contemporary queer theory on the ethics of vulnerability (see, for example, Butler 
2005; Halberstam 2011; Ann Cvetkovich, 2012). For instance, Halberstam—writing 
thirty years after McIntosh—argues that conversation ‘rather than mastery indeed 
seems to offer one very concrete way of being in relation to another form of being 
and knowing without seeking to measure that life modality by the standards that 
are external to it’ (Halberstam 2011, 12). In conversation, you are expected to be on 
the same level as the one you are conversing with—you are involved, and cannot 
withdraw to the commanding high ground where you are in control. However, 
while McIntosh’s thoughts on conversation appear to have their sisters within 
contemporary queer theory and theories of subjectivity, they seem to have little to 
do with our everyday performances as feminists and researchers in an academy 
that demands straight answers in facts and numbers and most of all in measurable 
results. But what would happen if, instead of embracing self-promoting and all-
knowing speech acts, we were to hold on to our impulses to apologize for our 
shortcomings? Is it possible to articulate a language of failure within academia 
today, or is it suicidal behaviour? 
                                                                                                                                                   
to Halberstam (2011, 6) these words indicate, ‘a form of training and learning that confirms 
what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow 
for visionary insights or flights of fancy.’ Perhaps the jokey lecturer was seeking other 
methods of knowing instead of trying to avoid retribution? 
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Imposter syndrome as a social diagnosis 
McIntosh writes about women feeling like frauds when ‘singled out for praise, 
press, publicity or promotion’ (1985, 1). She also brings in the ‘imposter syndrome’ 
that hits high-achieving women when they sense they are not a self-evident part of 
the environment—someone that has nestled her way in on false grounds, or ended 
up in a position just because ‘it happened’ that way. To feel like an imposter is to 
feel that one’s position is not the result of hard work, but of luck, chance, or even 
cheating. McIntosh observes that the higher women (and others) climb up the 
pyramidal power structure, the more praise they get—yet, the more hollow they 
are likely to feel (McIntosh 1985, 4). It just gets worse. Success does not vaccinate 
against negative emotions. 
Feelings of being a fraud or an imposter tend to go hand in hand. In her article, 
McIntosh lists positive remarks that fail to get through to the person they are 
intended for, in this case students (who, if they continue, will feel more and more 
fraudulent and out of place): 
The Admissions Committee made a mistake. I don’t belong here. 
I got an A on this paper. So he didn’t find me out. 
I got a B on this paper. So he found me out. 
I got a C on this paper. He really found me out. (McIntosh 1985, 2) 
When feeling like a fraud you do not take words at face value; you always find 
‘subtexts’. If someone says you have done a good work it means that that someone 
has merely failed to understand what a fraud you are. And of course, if there is a 
negative comment, this will immediately be taken as a sign of confirmation: yes, I 
am fraud, I have been found out, and there is no need to argue against the 
judgement. An academic who feels like a fraud necessarily leads a draining 
existence, because ‘subtexts’ are all too easy to find. These underlying messages are 
not necessarily the product of the individual’s poor self-esteem and paranoia, but 
rather of a structure that often lacks transparency, ongoing in spite of all the 
guiding documents it produces. What is the feminist response to this today? It is 
certainly not to explore the feelings of being a fraud and imposter. We are instead 
either likely to use methods of empowerment—strategies to collectively overcome 
feelings of inadequacy—or the neo-liberal language of cognitive therapy, where we 
are supposed to change the way we think about ourselves through constructive 
new habits. In either case, we do not hold on to our excuses. But perhaps we 
should? 
Double vision: overcoming and not overcoming 
McIntosh describes a vertical success culture within the academy, a culture in 
which results and rankings are highly valued ingredients. This particular culture, 
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which may empower a few but clearly disempowers many, demands ‘competitive 
strength’ from those who it includes. One has to develop ways to navigate it if one 
wishes to avoid exclusion. McIntosh does not use the term ‘cognitive therapy’, but 
writes about ‘assertiveness training’, which by all means might make you feel 
better for a while on an individual level, but cannot hope to lead to a structural 
change. When training to become assertive, one may argue that one has as much 
competence as everyone else and therefore the same right to the podium. This 
argument, spelled out, runs: ‘I may be a fraud, but I am no more fraudulent than the 
next person’ (McIntosh 1985, 4 original emphasis). But, McIntosh asks, ‘Is the next 
person fraudulent?’ With this question, ‘we’, as she puts it, ‘move into the territory 
where assertiveness training and speech workshops may be of no help.’ The other 
person at the podium is likely to play a role where fraudulence and imposter 
behaviour come into play, but this has less to do with the individual than with the 
hierarchical system that encourages such role (McIntosh 1985, 4). These lines of 
thought activate McIntosh’s previously mentioned ‘double look’, which may also 
be regarded as a strategy. 
McIntosh argues that the feeling of fraudulence is a good one. It is a sign that 
something is wrong. To feel like a fraud could be seen as a person’s acceptance of 
values connected to competition and prestige, but McIntosh’s point is that this 
feeling could be understood as a refusal to identify with these values. We (please 
feel included!) should therefore work with two strategies at the same time.34 One of 
the strategies is, of course, to deal with fraudulence and realize that it is not the 
individual who has a problem. We should not feel like frauds because the world 
should not make us feel that way. We need to confront the contexts that produce 
fraudulence. The other strategy is to affirm and embrace the feeling of fraudulence. 
The impulse to overcome bad feelings such as shame in favour of pride and self-
confidence tends to serve a neo-liberal ideology. When we aim to overcome 
feelings of fraudulence and shame we run the risk of accepting the idea that there 
actually are such things as academic success, excellence, and intact sovereign 
research subjects. Instead, we should welcome the fact that we feel like frauds, 
since it reveals spaces of negotiation—spaces where we have not internalized a 
hierarchical value system, and the apologies we make are symptoms of resistance, 
not of adjustment. This strategy—described by McIntosh thirty years ago and 
elaborated on in her subsequent articles—seems to be of even greater importance 
today. Especially since it seems almost impossible to visualize how it should be 
carried out. There is no language for collective mobilization. McIntosh’s ideas are 
expressed in a straightforward, almost faux naïf, tone that feels awkward to use 
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 Regarding the problematic “we”, see Naomi Scheman (2011, 155). 
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today—and this awkwardness is a warning sign that we should take seriously.35 
Has it become embarrassing to express the hope that we could change power 
structures—even locally? 
The self-made subjects 
I came up from nothing, rags to riches, from pink booties to briefcase on Wall 
Street. I did it all myself. I knew what I wanted and I was self-reliant. You can be, 
too, if you set your sights high and don’t let anything interfere; you can do anything 
you want.
 
(McIntosh 1985, 6) 
The researchers working on the Swedish research project ‘Gender and Career in 
Academia’ have found that traditional masculinities are losing ground as growing 
numbers of women position themselves in research; yet, equally, they have found 
that present pressures from a performative culture only strengthen the structures 
that work to the disadvantage of women and other groups not traditionally in 
power. Women tend to do the background work at departments—making sure 
that there is a good working environment, going to seminars, commenting on 
colleague’s papers, washing up everyone’s coffee mugs, doing more service work 
in general. The ideal of the excellent, high-performing researcher is a man 
dedicated to his career, putting his efforts straight into publication, not to relations 
at the workplace (see Öhrn & Lundahl 2013).36 
The general view today is that women (or ‘background workers’ in general) should 
follow the example of these seemingly self-made men. They should leave the 
groundwork to someone else. But to follow McIntosh is to recognize that no 
researcher is self-made. We are all fashioned by our relationships, and we get our 
positions due to luck, to networks, to colour, gender, or class background. We 
stand on others’ shoulders. Feeling like a fraud is a way of acknowledging this. If 
we follow McIntosh we should continue to do the reproductive work in academia, 
and we should celebrate it, underscore it, because that work is what keeps us all 
alive, outside and inside academia. Consider McIntosh’s description of that 
competence: 
the experiences of washing the dishes and patting the cat, and having talks with 
one’s friends, and earning enough money to put the bread on the table, and getting 
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 Halberstam 2011, 11–12, for example, addresses what Foucault called ‘naive 
knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required 
level of erudition or scientificity’ when arguing for a ‘knowledge from below’. She sees 
‘the naïve’ as part of a project which ‘may lead to a different set of knowledge practices.’ 
36
 The construction of the ideal, excellent researcher are discussed by Petra Agnerwall, 
‘Vem blir excellent forskare’, in Öhrn & Lundahl 2013. 
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the bread on the table, and washing the dishes, and loving those who cannot help us 
“get anywhere.”i‘get anywhere’. (McIntosh 1985, 8) 
There is a sophisticated naïvety and something very radical and acutely important 
in McIntosh’s defence of the horizontal practices and values. It may sound like 
reactionary essentialism or idealism, but we find these values, this work, to be 
highly political, necessary, and concrete. The world does not need more 
empowered, gung-ho men or women, self-confident and successful. The world 
needs more self-criticism, reflection, and hesitation. To feel like a fraud is to pay 
attention to the fact that I am not a self-made ‘man’, I am a product of luck, 
privilege, circumstance, and others’ hard work. This political stand is needed not 
only in academia. As McIntosh says: 
We need that tentativeness in high places. We need it in the Pentagon, in the White 
House, and in makers of public policy. We need that conversation, that ability to 
listen, to have a non-rhetorical, a relational self to keep us from blowing ourselves 
up. (McIntosh 1985, 7) 
This essentially pacifist line may seem hopelessly out of date. But we would argue 
that here McIntosh has much in common with recent queer and feminist work on 
vulnerability (by Judith Butler, Judith Halberstam, Ann Cvetkovich and others), 
and its search for an ethics grounded in a relational view of the subject. The 
differences are that McIntosh’s article addresses our everyday practices in 
academia in such a straightforward manner, it searches for concrete strategies and 
tools for change, and therefore also is somehow more uncomfortable. 
The importance of canaries 
The universities of today are run like companies, demanding measurable results. 
The demands are growing, the results are weighed in ever finer scales. In the 
bright light of new public management, we count students, teaching hours, 
publications, research funding, citations, and on and on (Jönsson & Rådström 2013, 
130–43). We are pinned down individually as teachers and researchers. At the 
same time we become isolated from one another—so much for collegiality, for 
being part of a collective or a profession. We answer directly to the head of 
department (who in Sweden these days no longer answers to a board of selected 
staff representatives, but to the university’s chancellor), and we negotiate rights 
and salary individually, keeping quiet if we win, keeping quiet if we lose. More 
and more, the individual is emphasized when it comes to critical structural 
analysis. If one does not promote oneself and compete, while hiding all second 
thoughts, one is likely to drop out or become an academic loser. It is easy to feel 
like a failure today. And if you are successful in the system, you are likely to feel 
like a fraud—because it is only a matter of time until they find out that you have 
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not published enough, or in the right places, or generally done what you were 
supposed to do. 
Today you are supposed to blow your own trumpet as a researcher or lecturer, or 
indeed just as a human being. We have gone from a culture of relative modesty to 
a hard-core ‘bragging culture’. We have gone from praise to self-praise, and we 
make sure to construct impressive CVs, websites, or Facebook pages as proof of 
our success. We learn all sorts of success strategies. Career-planning, making our 
teaching portfolios look impressive, managing our Internet profiles, presenting our 
excellent research (before we have done it) at conferences (making sure to mention 
that we have external funding and exactly which prestigious source it comes from) 
and so on. What happens to everyone who still feels like a fraud and imposter? 
What happens with all those who cannot or will not use the strategy handbook? 
Are they under threat of becoming an extinct academic species? Will they be forced 
to leave or will they leave even before being forced to? (Some are perhaps leaving 
already.) And when they do leave, what happens to all the knowledge that 
disappears with them? Can the academic system really afford such a loss? No, it 
cannot, and this for very practical reasons. McIntosh writes about the ‘canary bird 
test’, in which the birds were used to detect carbon monoxide in coalmines. The 
frauds, women or men, are perhaps our best canaries, because when ‘they begin to 
keel over, we know we are really in trouble—that the air around them does not 
have enough life-sustaining oxygen’ (1985, 7). In other words, we will all suffocate. 
The rhetoric of success, of winners and losers, is not ‘only rhetoric’. This language 
is powerful; it shapes how we think about ourselves and act towards one another. 
The first time we talk about ourselves in these terms we may feel embarrassed, or 
like frauds. But what about the third time? We would find ourselves in cognitive 
behaviour therapy, collectively. We would learn how to repeat the behaviour that 
makes us feel awkward so many times that we no longer feel the discomfort. The 
twentieth time I use the word ‘senior lecturer’ or ‘excellence’ about myself I may 
actually believe that there is something to the terms. To feel like a fraud is in that 
sense to be a dysfunctional part of the academy—but in another sense it is also a 
sign that you are still alive. 
We have now decided (however encouraging or well-intentioned we may feel) to 
never say to a colleague who makes excuses or apologizes for her performance that 
she should not apologize, or say that the apology takes focus or authority from 
what is being said. Instead, we will remind ourselves that we are faced with a 
canary, and that we should listen carefully. If we cannot listen to a person who 
apologizes or expresses insecurity without becoming impatient, we really are in 
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trouble. What is an inability to listen but a contempt for weakness? McIntosh 
should have the final word: 
Until we see the authoritative forms as forms, we will continue to deny those parts 
of ourselves that have no words, that don’t come in paragraphs and chapters and 
footnotes; we will be forced to deny the woolgatherer, the conversationalists, the 
imaginer, the lover of women and lower caste men, the one who likes people and 
joins with them without necessarily ‘achieving’ anything. The world of 
neighbourhoods and of human communities is the world of survival. If the public 
world becomes more honest, it may help us invent a form of podium behind which 
honest people don’t have to apologize for their connectedness to others. (McIntosh 
1986, 9) 
 
Postscript 
‘That’s easy for you to say!’ is a common response when we have presented these 
ideas in different academic contexts (McIntosh met a similar reaction twenty-five 
years ago).37 The fact that we are two so-called ‘senior lecturers’ who have a lot of 
research time built into our contracts, and thus can be considered privileged by the 
system, seems to be a problem when it comes to critique of the very same system. 
Of course we are privileged. But is that a reason not to criticize? Is it easier for the 
postgraduate student to raise her voice? When is the ‘right’ time or place for self-
criticism within academia? Is it ever time? 
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 For McIntosh’s reply to this comment see her article from 1989. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
FEELING LIKE A FRAUD: A JOYFUL RE-MEETING AT THE 
MÖBIUS CROSSROADS 
Peggy McIntosh 
 
I am delighted with the brilliant work Maria Jönsson and Anna Rådström have 
done in bringing my work on feeling like a fraud to the attention of readers of this 
anthology. Their paraphrases are absolutely accurate and their quotations 
beautifully chosen. I am sorry to read the authors’ descriptions of the hard-edged 
value system of the Swedish academic world at the present time, for we in the US 
are suffering from exactly this problem, and I would have preferred to keep my 
always idealized versions of Sweden intact. 
Still, it gratifies me that thirty years after its publication, the first ‘Feeling Like a 
Fraud’ paper is still seen as important work to scholars in the US and to these 
researchers in Sweden. Or rather, it is perhaps still seen as important work to those 
who always thought it was! For those who knew nothing of this analysis, it may 
shed light on the fraudulence of some of today’s measures of academic excellence. 
But perhaps it will not, because today’s extroverted and other-directed 
institutional roles and postures that are demanded of people in academic 
structures mitigate against scholars’ acceptance of a theory that suggests their 
uncertainties may be the most honest, authentic, and promising parts of 
themselves. 
I have been invited to comment on Jönsson and Rådström’s essay, and am happy 
to do so. In the US we face the same winner/loser mentality in the leadership of 
most universities, reducing academic life to matters of measurement, appraisal, 
assessment, and perceived return on the institution’s investment, while 
knowledge-making suffers from narrow ideas of what is worth studying and 
where knowledge is to be found. Jönsson, Rådström, and I all have alternative 
views that could bring better balance to institutions that claim to be in search of 
knowledge, for the betterment of human life. I will elaborate on a few points and 
draw connections to some of my other work about American problems seen 
though analyses of fraudulence: hierarchies in US education, and US socio-political 
myths that keep racism and white privilege in place. 
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I appreciate Jönsson and Rådström’s style of writing, for it is straightforward and 
somewhat informal in tone. All of my writing is informal in tone, and it is usually 
understandable by those who may not have had a college education. I write this 
way as a matter of principle. It is a great pleasure to be able to write informally 
here for editors and authors who have, by their attention, validated my style and 
respected the new analytical frameworks I have described, while keeping the 
commitment to clarity and simplicity that my frameworks endorse. I feel that 
abstruse language is oppressive and exclusive, and is one of the current 
pathologies of ‘higher’ education in Europe and the US. In the context of this 
discussion of fraudulence, I want to express my feeling that abstruse language by 
scholars and researchers can be one of the indicators of fraudulence in the 
privileged academic world. Yet ironically, obscurity may be one of the academy’s 
few protections against the measurers! 
Seventeen women in a row sounded apologetic as they took the microphone at the 
conference I described in my first essay on ‘Feeling Like a Fraud’ (1985). I was 
particularly surprised by their tentativeness, because each of them was a college 
president, a dean, or the director of what the conference organizers considered to 
be a major national project of some kind. The conference was even entitled 
‘Women in Educational Leadership’. One reason why I was, at first, so provoked 
by the apparent hedging by these female speakers was that at some level I urgently 
wanted them to show, to demonstrate, their administrative competence and 
confidence. I thought to myself, angrily, ‘Women, we will never make it into the 
boardrooms of the US unless we can stand at the podium and deliver the goods!’ 
What turned me around and made me suspend my anger is that I remembered 
that I worked at a Center for Research on Women, where we are committed to 
putting women’s experiences and perspectives at the centre of our research 
questions. So I asked myself what might happen if I gave these women the benefit 
of the doubt, as though they were making significant choices in the way they 
spoke. I asked, ‘What are these women doing with their apologies?’ 
As Jönsson and Rådström realize, I decided the women’s disclaimers were actually 
intuitive strategies for building and keeping a relationship with their listeners and 
with the complexity of their own experience. The openings ‘I have just one thing to 
say’ or ‘I’m not sure of this but—’ allow members of audiences to feel they need 
not be persuaded of anything. To open one’s comments with ‘You may not agree 
with this, but—’ works against the tradition of rhetoric, in which the aim is to 
persuade someone else of your point of view, and to change their mind if they 
disagree with you. In this sense, rhetoric is violent. I realized that the women’s 
‘You may not agree with this but—’ is an anti-rhetorical strategy. It signals to the 
listeners, ‘You exist; I exist. My aim is not to persuade you, and we can talk later.’ I 
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realized that what these women leaders were doing with their disclaimers was 
strengthening the social fabric of the group before it could be torn by rhetoric; they 
were doing with one another the lateral, relational work described by Jean Baker 
Miller in her 1976 book Toward a New Psychology of Women. I went from feeling 
impatiently—‘Women, we need to stand at the podium and deliver the goods’—to 
seeing that we were making connective moves, despite the high position that the 
podium and the amplified voice gave to each successive speaker. I decided that it 
is not that we cannot stand at the podium, but rather that we cannot stand the 
podium, a place that allows and encourages dominance. In our tentative and 
contingent ways of wording things, we were trying to connect with one another 
before the social fabric could be torn by rhetoric. So our apparent hedging had a 
pro-social and relational aim at odds with the universities’ traditions of 
knowledge-making as argumentation. 
When I asked myself what makes women feel like frauds, I kept coming back again 
and again to what I concluded in that first paper. When a person, any person, 
climbs up a ladder into territory that has not been associated with people like 
themselves, they are likely to feel fraudulent by the standards of competence 
associated with a position in that dominant territory. Now, I wanted women to 
speak confidently, regardless of their level of power, yet I applauded their humility 
and resistance to being as sure of themselves as the top-down, individualistic 
holders of high positions have been. I kept feeling two apparently opposed things: 
‘We mustn’t act as though we are frauds’ and ‘Aren’t we wise to feel like frauds in 
situations where anyone in the room might have as much to say?’ The key question 
for me came down to this: ‘Am I saying that feeling like a fraud is deplorable or 
that it is applaudable? Which side am I coming out on?’ I found I had to say ‘Both 
sides.’ At that point my analysis turned into a Möbius strip. When I give talks on 
the subject I make this geometric form, named for the German mathematician 
August Möbius, which looks like a one-sided, floppy number eight. I write on one 
side of a strip of paper ‘We must not let them make us feel like frauds’, and on the 
other ‘Let us continue to spot fraudulence in the public roles we are asked to play.’ 
I put the two ends of the strip together, twist once, and then tape the ends together. 
Now I have a one-sided strip that makes both statements. I can pull the strip 
toward me between a thumb and forefinger and I will cover both messages 
without changing sides. The Möbius strip makes one-ness of my plural and 
apparently opposite thoughts. 
I believe that plural thinking is natural to us, and that anyone who is half awake in 
a twenty-first-century university uses plural thinking. I first explored this idea in 
my 1983 essay, ‘Interactive Phases of Curricular and Personal Re-Vision: A 
Feminist Perspective’. I feel I am in all five of the phases I described in that essay. 
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Feeling like a fraud relates to all of these phases, which are five frameworks for 
thinking, acting, and ascribing value. In phase one, the curriculum of school or 
college is a pinnacled affair that features men’s achievements; it is uniformly white 
and womanless, and it does not acknowledge its exclusions. But it can make those 
who are excluded feel subtly or strongly like impostors in the school or university. 
In phase two, one admits exceptional others who are seen as not like their kind and 
therefore worth studying. This phase is located a little below the tops of the 
pinnacles, and its honorees, though perhaps feeling tenuous because they are 
newly arrived themselves, see the ones below as defective variants of themselves 
who should stop complaining and bringing up ‘issues’. 
In phase three, down in the valleys, students, teachers, citizens get angry and ask 
who invented these de-oxygenated accounts of reality that leave out nearly 
everyone, and they ask who benefits from these accounts. Now they can teach or 
study all of the ‘isms’, the oppressors and the oppressed, the victimizers and the 
victims. Life is war, and nothing more. Yet the repetitive nature of the analyses and 
their recurrent winner/loser theme can seem a little fraudulent when set against the 
complexities of people’s actual experiences, such as learning from so-called losers. 
In phase four, below a geological fault line, the grain of the rock is lateral rather 
than vertical. This is the territory of experience rather than opinion. We all have 
our complex stories and all of our stories count. No one is only a victim or only an 
oppressor. We are all both. The making and mending of the daily fabric counts 
most. Up in phase one, we try to win, lest we lose. In phase four, we work for the 
decent survival of all, for therein lies our own best chance of survival. 
Phase five balances the vertical competitiveness of phases one, two, and three with 
the lateral tendency to live in relation to one another and the rest of the world 
without trying to tear one another apart. Both vertical and lateral propensities are 
in all of us. In my country (I certainly cannot say anything about Sweden in this 
connection), the most disempowering and disabling feelings of fraudulence occur 
in people who have been born to low status of some kind and are not welcomed 
into the higher ranks of pay, promotion, press, praise, prizes, or prestige. In my 
country, low status may be especially threatening to self-esteem if one is born poor 
and as a person of colour. But just being born female in the US can do the damage. 
Internalized oppression, in which the victim of oppression punishes her or himself 
for not being ‘right’, ‘good’, ‘smart’, ‘strong’, ‘competent’, ‘confident’, or ‘creative’, 
is often accompanied by feeling like a fraud for trying to assert oneself at all in a 
public context. 
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I published two further essays on feeling like a fraud, one in 1989 and one in 2000. 
In the latter I tried to answer the question of how I know when I am feeling like a 
fraud: it is when I adopt an assertive and public self, by contrast with what I 
named the ‘home self’, which for me is conversational, relational, plural, 
intellectual, reflective, and maternal. In that phase four home self, I am family-
oriented, informal, meditative, imaginative, and attuned to daily life and the daily 
cycles of the natural world. Yet I cannot rest in the home self yet; it does not 
contribute strongly enough, in my case, to social justice or social change, and it 
does not earn a living. I need the phase three muscles of heart and mind, class 
power, and rhetoric to help make the world I want to live in. In that third essay, I 
examined why I feel so fraudulent on coming into conflict, and acting within the 
resistance movements of phase three, or even standing up for myself. I concluded 
that I invariably found conflict too simple for my plural self. ‘In a sense I am not up 
to the fray. But in another sense the fray is not up to me.’ 
My phase three self got up its nerve to write the typology of US myths that I will 
sketch out here. They take the feeling-like-a-fraud analysis beyond the critique of 
the knowledge-making system that I set out in my first fraud paper. They analyse 
fraudulence in the major white socio-political frameworks of the US. Did I feel like 
a fraud writing such a sweeping critique? Of course. But I decided that our 
prevailing race-coded myths themselves are so fraudulent that I would name and 
challenge them according to the second exhortation of the Möbius strip: ‘Let us 
continue to spot fraudulence in the public roles we are asked to play.’ Being an 
uncritical American, accepting our nation’s most prevalent and white-oriented 
myths, is one of those ‘fraudulent roles I have been asked to play’, and I did not 
want to keep on playing. I titled this paper ‘White people facing race; uncovering 
myths that keep racism in place’. All five of the myths reinforce the position of 
those who have the greatest privilege to begin with. 
The myth of meritocracy has two parts. The first is that the unit of society is the 
individual; the second, that whatever you end up with must be what you 
individually wanted, worked for, earned, and deserved. This myth completely fails 
to recognize that there are systems of power, structures of advantage and 
disadvantage, which expand or limit freedom of action and choice. It implies that 
only individual talent and effort determine life outcomes. It promotes a feeling that 
all the doors of opportunity are open to all. It justifies a punitive attitude toward 
anyone who has not thrived. 
The myth of manifest destiny, a doctrine of manifest destiny even, is that God 
intended white people to take over the whole of what is now the continental 
United States from the indigenous people who were living here. That same God 
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wanted the US to annex the Philippines, for the good of the people on those 7,107 
islands. This myth uses God to justify American actions as a world power, feeling 
that the US sets a good example and has been called upon to take charge of other 
people’s destinies. Thanks to this myth, whites do not have to allow it to seep into 
their moral or ethical awareness that we live on land taken from indigenous 
peoples, and whose cultures and physical existence white people attempted to 
destroy. The myth has excused many whites from seeing that white culture and 
colonialism rest on racial oppression in which whites are the wrongdoers. 
The myth of white racelessness is that white people do not have race. Others have 
race, which we are led to believe makes problems for them, or for white people. 
We who are ‘normal’ are racially unmarked, and set the standard for what it is to 
be human. Within this myth, the participation of white people in creating systems 
of dominance or oppression is not seen as racial.    
The myth of monoculture is idea that there is one American culture that we all 
experience in more or less the same way, and that anyone who is has trouble with 
American culture is not seeing accurately or behaving appropriately. This myth 
imposes a requirement on people of colour to see, feel, and behave like white 
people (‘normal’ people)—that is, they must assimilate into white culture. It 
assumes that they have nothing to lose by forsaking their cultures of origin, and a 
great deal to gain by fitting into the one ‘normal’ culture.  
The myth of white moral and managerial superiority rests on the assumption that we 
white people run nearly everything because we can do it better than anyone else 
could. It reinforces the idea that it is natural for us to be in charge of the world and 
its affairs, for only very unusual persons of colour, unlike others of their kind, 
could be trusted to manage power anywhere. Through this myth whites internalize 
superiority and maintain white privilege and white supremacy in the worlds we 
control. 
I feel that these five fraudulent myths are dangerous to the US. Though they are 
presented to many school and college students as truths, they in fact undermine 
the wisdom we need to acquire and acknowledge about how power, including our 
own, has worked in the world and in us. It is hard to challenge the myths because 
in the US citizens have not yet learned to think very systemically. I think 
Europeans got a head start in systemic thinking because of feudalism, the French 
Revolution, and Marxism. Most American elites are stuck in an ethos of 
individualistic capitalism, which makes seeing individuals easy and seeing 
systems much more difficult. I feel that, in my country, seeing both individuals and 
systems is nearly impossible, but it is our great conceptual need. We need it for 
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balance, and without it we will continue to labour under fraudulent myths about 
ourselves and about how our social systems work.  
It seems that what the universities are doing both in Sweden and in the US might 
benefit from systemic analysis—along the lines of race, class, gender, and 
sexuality—of what the current value systems promote and reward. I feel there is a 
need for universities to respect and use precious resources such as the imagination 
and plural-mindedness of our humanity, which cannot be calibrated in 
mathematically based assessments of whether our liberal arts institutions are 
serving the common good. 
I had to laugh when I saw how Jönsson and Rådström reminded us readers in 
several passages that in my original paper I had used ‘we’ sweepingly in places 
where it would have been more accurate to speak for myself. In their gracious and 
funny prose, thirty years later, they have pointed out that I would have done better 
to clamber down from that rhetorical and intellectual, first phase, top-down mode. 
I say cheers and thank you for such wonderful and respectful colleagueship over 
the years. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
DEATH IN SWEDISH PICTURE BOOKS: GENDER, EMOTION 
AND INDIVIDUALISM 
Eva Söderberg 
 
An afternoon in a Swedish city in summer. The sun is shining and the weather is 
extraordinary hot. I am on holiday. All of a sudden, as I walk down the sunny street 
to get to the hotel, I see my reflection in a shop window. I also notice some odd red 
splodges that aren’t part of me, and in order to get a clearer view I move closer and 
peer. It turns out that the red splodges are from a bright red evening gown in the 
shop, standing on a piece of white and shiny silk. With it is a red clutch, and behind, 
a background of pictures showing another red evening gown, a red urn-like object, 
and a pair of red high heels. 
   What is this place? 
   I peer again and try to get closer without touching the window. Is it a clothes shop 
or an upmarket second-hand shop? No … there are too few things even for an 
exclusive boutique. Is it a shop selling party clothes and special occasion dresses? 
No, it all feels too neat and sterile. 
   My eyes wander over the bright red objects and it feels almost awkward, this 
impression of a sparkling New Year’s Eve in the middle of summer. I really try to 
understand why the objects are there. It is so obvious this is a shop window—but 
what is the owner of the business actually marketing? Then I notice that on the right 
side of the white wallpaper in the background is a huge lipstick kiss, placed in 
something that looks like a death announcement in a newspaper, but enlarged. I 
focus on the words underneath the kiss. 
   Yes! I’m right. 
   I find all the usual information in a death announcement, but here and there 
formulated in a slightly different way. The lipstick kiss, coral red, is where the 
crucifix usually is, and underneath, instead of the information about how the dead 
person is related to those who had put the death announcement in the newspaper, I 
could read the words: ‘I kiss you all!’ And after that come the date and place of 
death and some lines of verse both beginning and ending with the English words ‘I 
am what I am’. The last bit—the invitation to the funeral—is what surprises me the 
most: 
Welcome to my last party! 
The funeral will take place 
In St Gertrude’s Chapel 
Dress code: Pink with red lips.
38
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 The author’s translation from the Swedish: ‘Välkommen på mitt sista party! | 
Begravningen äger rum | i St: Gertruds kapell | Klädsel: Rosa med röda läppar.’ All 
quotations in this essay are the author’s own. 
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From the death announcement, it is obvious that the dead woman has invited the 
guests herself. The urn-like object is not only something that looks a lot like an 
urn—it actually is an urn. I raise my eyes and become aware of the words in big 
black letters, earlier hidden by the reflections from the street: ‘A celebration of life’. 
They were followed by the words ‘Bon vivant’. These keywords were surrounded by 
pictures of more items: a cake stand of cupcakes; a coffin painted cerise and 
trimmed with sparkling ornaments and angel wings; and, finally, there is a huge 
cork. Probably from a bottle of champagne. 
   A death announcement, an urn, a coffin … Despite all the vivid colours and party 
trimmings it slowly but surely dawns on me. The shop I’m facing is nothing less 
than a funeral parlour, a realization that is soon confirmed by the logotype for the 
Swedish Funeral Directors’ Association. But the logotype is followed by some 
words in English, ‘Never ending story’, and my curiosity grows as I move on to the 
other windows. There are what I assume to be death announcements, urns, coffins, 
and other objects dedicated to different types of personalities. The female ‘Bon 
vivant’ has a male counterpart with a red bow tie, a top hat, a brandy glass, a black 
death announcement, a black coffin, and a greeting from his men’s club. 
   Here is an ‘athlete’ as well, a young golfer surrounded both by golf shoes and 
high-heel shoes. My attention is drawn to the symbol in her death announcement: 
some grass, a tee, and a golf ball. Instead of some lines from hymn or a poem there 
is the hope that the grass ‘will be even greener on the other side’. The coffin is 
white, the memorial service is going to be held in a golf club—dress code 
‘something checked’. Another funeral arrangement, dedicated to the ‘Music lover’. 
Different instruments, records, other typical things, and, in the death announcement, 
an electric guitar and a statement: ‘You rock all the way’. 
As I stood there in the broad sunlight, I was thinking of the distance to the 
undertaking business that had been passed down through my family in the 
twentieth century. Here there was only a small black sign with gold lettering that 
announced it was an undertakers, and the large windows overlooking the street 
were full of objects that had nothing to do with funerals, such as art, ceramics, and 
crystal, some of which was also sold inside. In the funeral parlour from my 
childhood, all the urns and tiny models of coffins were hidden behind a thick 
curtain in a room where the only window overlooked the backyard and an old, 
empty orchard. No one had a reason to walk past during the day. But here, on the 
contrary, people were going past continuously and everything was on show. 
 
The feeling that struck me that fine summer’s day was mixed. On the one hand, I 
was elated because of what at first sight seemed to be such a flagrant breach of the 
accepted formalities regarding death and funerals. What I saw in those windows 
made me think of the multi-coloured ceremonies arranged to celebrate people who 
had died from AIDS in the Eighties, as a reaction against the fact that homosexuals 
were sometimes forced back into the closet after their deaths (Svensson 2013). At 
the same time, it reminded me of archaeological grave goods—clothing, jewellery, 
food—but also of the death motifs in some picture books. Very often picture-book 
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illustrators try to catch a childlike naivety in the face of death, combining a lot of 
imagination and artistic expression. In some of the picture books, objects, 
memories, and written pieces are actually arranged like in those windows. Objects 
related to a beloved grandfather or grandmother have to be included in rituals and 
ceremonies to make the whole concept of death more understandable, or at least 
tangible in some way. 
 
On the other hand, I was disturbed. What advertising agency had got this account 
and decided to make such a joke of it, verbally as well as visually? What was the 
target group? How did those in charge think about gender, class, and ethnicity? If 
they thought at all? And the question that had struck me when I first came across 
the window now struck me again, but with a new force—what were the owners of 
the business actually marketing? Was it really about funeral concepts arranged for 
different personalities? Or did it have to do with different kinds of consumers? 
 
I brought these questions to my ongoing study of the death motif in children’s 
literature. In the study, I focus primarily on picture books, more precisely a corpus 
of some seventy picture books written in Swedish or translated from other 
Scandinavian languages, published in Sweden from the Sixties onwards. All the 
books are explorations of death, dying, and mourning where old and new 
ceremonies are described, mostly with children in mind. Inspired by Ann 
Cvetkovich’s An archive of feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Culture 
(2003, 7), where she develops a queer approach to trauma, I use the same metaphor 
regarding this collection of children’s books. I see them as an archive of feelings, 
where feelings are expressed both verbally and visually in many different and 
interesting ways. The dialogue between image and text, as well as the fact that the 
author’s and the artist’s temperaments are at work at the same time in the reading 
of a picture book, provide multiple levels of meanings. The picture book is 
multimodal; the ‘real’ picture-book text—the iconotext—is realized only when it is 
read and both text and images are considered. Thus, text and image can 
complement, expand, and even contradict each other (Hallberg 1982; Nikolajeva 
2000; Scott & Nikolajeva 2006; Rhedin 2004; Becket 2012). 
 
Furthermore, a picture book is aimed at two categories of readers, albeit not 
explicitly. In most cases, it is meant to be read aloud to small children, who are 
rapidly developing emotionally and intellectually, by an adult who has far more 
experience and a wider conceptual understanding. This may result in mixed 
messages and ambivalence. Furthermore, picture books find their expression 
between the two poles of pedagogy and fiction. The idea that a good educational 
text should be clear and unambiguous while fiction should offer multiple ways of 
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entry, layers, and possibilities of interpretation has directed picture-book creators 
in different ways. All of these things, combined with the fact that picture books 
have become increasingly aesthetically qualified, with innovative graphics and 
formats, make this literary category especially interesting to study when it comes 
to motifs of death. 
 
In this essay, I will initially touch on the concept of death and the relationship 
between death and taboo. I then sketch the context in which these picture books 
were created, with examples of different types of books in the selection, and go on 
to chart why concepts such as gender, emotion, neo-liberalism, and individualism 
can be important to such an analysis. Finally, I will comment on the selection as a 
collection of crossover books, and point to further avenues of research. 
 
Death in a Swedish context 
Death is a paradoxical and common condition of life, which awakens existential 
questions (Bauman 1994; Lundgren 2006). Is life, as was suggested in the windows 
I walked past, ‘a never ending story’ that will continue after death? What in that 
case might the ‘afterlife’ be like? Will we live on in another life on earth or in some 
other place? And is it possible that the way an ‘bon vivant’, an ‘athlete’, or a 
‘musician’ lives their lives affects their afterlife? Who will actually be rocking all the 
way on greener grass? Will there be any grass at all? Does the moment of death 
mean that our minds are wholly extinguished? That none of it will survive the end 
of our bodies? Does the ‘never ending story’ in that case refer to our bodies 
breaking up, but being part of the biological cycle of nature constantly turning into 
new life forms? Or does it mean that we live on in the work we have done, or in 
other people’s memories that will live on, at least for a time, even after we are 
dead? 
 
It is only human to ask such questions about death, to reflect on them. This is 
something we have tried to do down the ages, as is testified in pictures, myths, 
fairy-tales, and many other kinds of stories (Ariès 1978; Wenestam 1989). Most 
people will experience the death of a loved one, which also makes grief and 
mourning a shared experience. In spite of all this, death is often said to be a taboo 
subject (Bauman 1994). An Internet search for the words ‘death’ and ‘taboo’ (in 
Swedish) returns thousands of hits. It is apparent that discussions about death 
often concern the taboo associated with it. 
 
In the literature about death there are examples aplenty of similar assumptions. 
‘Today, the subject of death is often taboo. We fear our own transience. Instead, we 
deport death to an attic chamber of the mind and double-lock the door’: this from 
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the anthology Att levandegöra döden (2007, 7), in which the journalist Ingvar von 
Malmborg and the psychologist Thomas Silfving say that far too little has been 
written about the subject in recent years—‘Where are the great philosophical 
works, the novels, the movies, the artwork and the non-fiction books dealing with 
death, the moment of death, sorrow, and suffering?’ To their mind, death in our 
time has been relegated to mass culture, only affecting fictional characters which 
one can safely ignore. They claim that death in the twenty-first century is just as 
repressed as sexuality has ever been; it is a mammoth act of denial, a denial 
surrounded by a great deal of prejudice as well as a compact silence. ‘Why is it that 
we say so little about something that is inevitable?’ they ask. 
 
The ethnologist Britta Lundgren is of a different opinion: because death and grief 
are common to all people, they are widely described and researched subjects. ‘Far 
from being silent or hidden phenomena in our everyday life and society, they 
permeate the popular representations in media such as film, television, and 
literature; they are in our memories and fears, and they are being dealt with by 
experts and laymen’, she writes in Oväntad död—förväntad sorg (2006, 12). She 
reminds us that death has been the subject of magazines articles, dissertations, 
scholarly essays and seminars, conferences, and networks (Gustavsson 2009) with 
research spanning everything from ‘the uttermost existential questions to death in 
its embodied, concrete materiality’ (Lundgren 2006, 12); and that sorrow and grief 
have been described, talked about, and analysed in the same way. 
 
These two positions should not be pitted against each other, but rather put side by 
side, for they are two poles, two equally ‘true’ statements, in a discursive field 
filled with tension. Death and grief elicit both denial and silence. Undoubtedly, 
urbanization, secularization, and the striking segregation of the generations have 
left many people distanced from real death, which in turn has become more and 
more institutionalized, unknown, and frightening. At the same time, our 
preoccupation with death is plain, over and over again in many different contexts. 
Some people today, in Sweden just as in other countries, seem almost to be caught 
up in a civil action to reclaim death and grief: a questioning of the 
institutionalization of care and dying; a discussion about the concept of death 
itself, about euthanasia, and about the right to choose your own rituals when it 
comes to dying, death announcements, obituaries, and funerals (Möller 2011; 
Wallander & Danneman 2014). 
 
Such a reclaiming is undoubtedly the way to respond to taboos, the invisibility of 
death, and the imperative to be happy in today’s society. It can also be seen as a 
reaction against old rituals. Since 2000, the Church of Sweden is not a state church 
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any more, but, according to the law, it is still responsible for all funerals, and 
everyone, regardless their religion, has to pay a special funeral tax to the Church 
(Sveriges Riksdag 1990); the Church, in turn, has to provide taxpayers who belong 
to other religions or are atheists with a venue without Christian symbols. The fact 
that more and more people are leaving the Church and trying to find ways of 
arranging funerals outside the Christian ceremonials, just as the Church has to be 
more open and accommodating in order not to lose members, has led to a change. 
Music, lyrics, and rituals do not always have to be from the canon, or even 
particularly spiritual. Obituaries and gravestones display a creativity today which 
would have been impossible just a few years ago. There are artists who specialize 
in manufacturing personal—and fun—headstones. It are even examples of evening 
classes in carpentry where you can build your own coffin, fitted out to be used as 
something else until it is finally needed, a present-day memento mori (Joelsson 
2008; Möller 2011; Hemström 2013). 
 
Tragic events and disasters, in Scandinavia and further afield, have contributed to 
the increased importance of ritual and the new forms of collective grief (Svensson 
2009). Equally, the Internet has opened up new possibilities. People blog about 
death and grief; there are groups for the bereaved; and there are virtual memorials 
online and even websites for stillborn children with photographs, stories, and links 
to other ‘angel child’ websites. You can read the innermost thoughts of someone 
who is terminally ill, a poem written by a grieving parent, a freshly published blog 
by someone who has witnessed a fatal accident and a plethora of articles, reviews, 
and essays that deal with death and grief. And, of course, you can also participate 
in games where death is an important function, and click to see torture and 
execution scenes whose authenticity is alluring (Johannisson 2008). 
 
Changes in relation to death, dying, and mourning practices can be seen as a 
reaction to old customs and partly a result of a digital development. Yet, as I will 
argue, it is also important to see these changes in the light of a shifting policy 
context. Many of the phenomena mentioned have developed in more neo-liberal 
times, with their stress on autonomy, personal responsibility, and choice (Dean 
2009; Rose 1998, 1999). For example, a coffin is something that is not only supposed 
to subtly correspond to someone’s social status, it can also be the result of an active 
act of responsibility, deliberately chosen to fit the personality and interests the 
deceased wanted to communicate during his or her lifetime—and still wants to 
emphasize after death. Thus a coffin can serve as a lifestyle product. ‘Lifestyle’ is 
actually the word used on the webpage where a series of coffins and urns 
developed jointly by the Swedish Funeral Directors’ Association (SBF) and a coffin 
company is presented (Sveriges Begravningsbyråers Förbund 2014). ‘For a large 
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number of people are interest in seas and lakes not only a hobby’, they state, ‘but 
also a lifestyle.’ The coffin ‘Ocean’ is supposed to suit them, with its ‘a maritime 
flair’, its deep blue colour, hemp rope, and nautical symbols reminiscent of the sea. 
For those who during their lifetime were fonder of nature and the great outdoors, 
there is the ‘Skogsro’ coffin adorned with forest fauna. 
 
It dawned on me that a special collection of coffins was what I had been pondering 
in the undertaker’s window that summer’s day: ‘Never ending story’. ‘Everything 
has a beginning—and an end’ it said, suggesting that it could also be the other way 
around: that the end could also be a beginning, and that when we die we move on 
to something else. According to ‘Never ending story’ there might be ‘a reason to 
approach a funeral a little differently’. Both neo-liberal ideology and commercial 
undertones are intertwined in the presentation of the concept: 
With the concept of Never Ending Story, we want to highlight something more than 
a definitive end to our lives. We want first to show that in life we dared to be exactly 
what we wanted to be. That, after hopefully a long and glorious life, we ended the 
same way we lived. In our own way. 
Who are the ‘we’ here? People who want to control their own death and legacy? 
People who have successfully made the right choices during their lives and will 
now have a successful afterlife—unless they leave this final, crucial choice to 
someone else, of course. A glorious life is obviously thought the result of personal 
actions and investments, attainable for any and everyone who can pluck up 
courage. The coffin—the ‘angel box’—is the final acknowledgement that ‘we’ have 
been prosperous neo-liberal subjects with agency and power to shape their life—
and death. 
The SBF concept of the ‘Never ending story’ encompasses not only the coffin, but 
also a specially developed life archive, urns, floral arrangements, tombstones, and 
newspaper announcements. Furthermore, the various coffins are both class and 
gender coded and stereotyped. A contradiction is thus built into the concept from 
the very start. How can a prefabricated series catering to a limited range of 
lifestyles pretend to be unique? As it says in the presentation, ‘In our own way’, 
the SBF has the answer. They have noticed the trend to start planning for death 
earlier and earlier in life, with people having increasingly ‘precise ideas’ about the 
funeral ceremony, what music to play, what decorations to use, and so on. 
According to the SBF they encounter this trend daily, and therefore they will 
‘continually develop products and services that make it easier for all who dare and 
want to add a more personal touch to the funeral.’ 
Personal expressions in mourning and funerals, and everything that encompasses, 
can turn into imperatives that enforce even more individualized practices. This is 
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how to mourn properly! The deceased has to be presented as an original, not as a 
copy. One example is the symbols in newspaper death announcements. An 
analysis shows that the number of crucifixes fell markedly, from nearly 100 per 
cent in 1976 to 39 per cent of announcements in 1995, and only 32 per cent in urban 
newspapers. Symbols increasingly used during the same period time birds, 
flowers, boats, and nature scenes, as well as symbols of careers and hobbies—a 
trend that seems to have exploded in the last couple of years (Dahlgren 2000). One 
explanation, suggests Dahlgren, is the wish to emphasize the individual, because, 
as he puts it, ‘no one wants to be anonymous’. Among the symbols you will find 
tractors, sticky buns, a winking pig, and a skeleton waving goodbye. As death 
announcements have the newspapers for the digital world, our imagination, 
according to Dahlgren, is only limited by what might be possible in future (Ölund 
2012). Nevertheless, it must be more and more difficult to find symbols and 
expressions that have not been used before. 
Other examples are the many memorial sites with flowers, stones, crucifixes, and 
toys at the roadside where someone has died in a traffic accident. At the end of 
Eighties the practice was rare; nowadays it is the rule rather than the exception 
(Nordström & Hemström 2013). Something that used to be a spontaneous act can 
thus turn into something that is almost obligatory. Another parallel is the practice 
of decorating a child’s grave (Haag 2013). How many angels, white stones with 
messages on them, teddy bears, and hearts are needed to express the uniqueness of 
the child and the parent’s love? How does the parent feel who cannot, will not, 
bow to such demands? 
However, in the midst of this carefully orchestrated grief—in newspapers and 
churchyards, at the roadside, in digital contexts—in the midst of this exposure, 
fictionalization, and straining after uniqueness, there is also repression, silence, 
and awkwardness (Bauman 1992, 12; Lundgren 2006). How should I treat a dying 
person? How do I approach the relatives of the person who is dying? What about 
my own death? Perhaps I cannot even bear to think about that. 
Images of death, as well as tradition and the old and new rituals developed to 
serve it, are multi-faced and fraught with tension and contradiction. Contrasts 
meet—closeness and distance, global and private, technological and intimate, 
awkward and competent, quiet and exposed. Death has an absolute biological 
materiality, but equally well is a phenomenon with psychological, mental, and 
spiritual implications that generates innumerable questions. 
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Death in children’s literature 
Different ways of thinking about death, by the time they are expressed in fiction, 
have often been shaped much earlier in human history, and can be found in 
various religious and philosophical traditions of thought (Ireton 2007). When Von 
Malmborg and Silfving (2007) write that they would like to see philosophical 
works, novels, artworks, and non-fiction that deal with death, dying, grief, and 
suffering, they do not mention children’s literature. Children’s literature, unlike 
general literature, it is a relatively young literary category, but one which 
constitutes a forum where existential questions have long been elucidated and 
discussed. Motifs of death and grief exist in all children’s genres from picture 
books for the very young, via non-fiction, to children’s and young adult books, 
which in some cases have been adapted as films. It is against the wider context 
described above—a context signified by continuity as well as change, opposition, 
and tension—that the motif of death in children’s literature should be seen, and not 
only as a reflection. 
The way children’s literature has grappled with the motif of death has varied in 
intensity over the years. In older children’s books, characterized by a Christian 
view and designed to foster a religious person, death had its natural place and was 
sometimes even described as desirable, even for children. Children’s deaths 
became something of a revivalist motif in nineteenth-century Sunday school 
literature: there was often a pale, bedridden family member waiting for death, the 
liberator. For Christians, resurrection and the promise of eternal life were the goal 
(Ørvig 1985; Gibson & Zaidman 1991). In the literature of the 1920s and 1930s, 
mentions of disease and death no longer came naturally. From the first World War 
onwards, there are signs that this kind of literature became less common in the 
Western publishing world. Not until the 1960s did the motif of death reappeared, 
and since 2000 the children’s literature nominated for Sweden’s prestigious August 
Prize often deals with death. 
Adults and children may discuss death when coming across the subject in 
children’s books; however, portraying death within the bounds of a picture book 
aimed at preschoolers is still a challenge. There are many ways of thinking about 
death, and prospective readers may for the first time be faced with the existential 
questions posed by the thought of death. In Barn, död och sorg (1990, ‘Children, 
death, and grief’), the children’s psychologist Sis Foster argues that the adult 
concept of death is incomprehensible to children all the way up to teenage, and 
that lack of experience makes it hard for them to gain any emotional 
understanding. 
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Death in picture books 
In a partial study, I have examined the motif of death in about twenty Swedish 
children’s books published between 1966 and 1990 (Söderberg 1995). The purpose 
was to see who dies in the books, how different ways of thinking about death are 
expressed, and how death is portrayed and, in some cases, explained. The results 
show that it is mostly older, male relatives and pets that die from natural causes, 
usually age-related. Lasses farfar är död (Eurelius & Lind 1972, ‘Lasse’s grandpa is 
dead’), Lenas farfar är i himlen (Sjöberg & Benson 1972, ‘Lenas’s grandpa is in 
heaven’), Farfars Lajka (Wahl & Nygren 1989, ‘Grandpa’s Laika’) are some 
examples. Probably the purpose is to show, in the least frightening way, that death 
is a natural part of life: it happens to old people who are ‘ready’ and to animals 
that are old, sick, and suffering. The fact that mostly old men related to the young 
protagonist’s father die can be understood from a gender perspective. The female 
body is often associated with giving birth and life-sustaining processes; the death 
of a woman thus goes against everything conceived of as ‘natural’. No children die 
in Swedish picture books from these years, a lasting taboo, the sole exception to 
which can be found in a book about sudden infant death syndrome (Foster & 
Gissberg 1989). 
What, then, is the message about death in these books? There are books with 
secular, Christian, generally religious, and philosophical messages—and books in 
which various messages are mixed. Furthermore, it is apparent that the number of 
books with more philosophical and ambiguous messages increased during this 
period, as did the fact that the role of the children in the books changed: no longer 
did they ask questions and receive answers, they were now the ones who had their 
own answers or who single-handedly worked to find the answers out. This may be 
seen as an expression of the discourse of ‘the competent child’ which, in its turn, 
should be understood in the context of neo-liberalism 
One example of this is Resan till Ugri-La-Brek (Tidholm & Tidholm 1987, ‘Journey to 
Ugri-La-Brek’), where two children play their way into understanding their 
grandfather’s death. On the manifest level, the journey is to a kind of land of 
death—where mostly old people and their pets live—while on a symbolic level 
their repetitive play portrays an inner journey, a quest for understanding to cope 
with the loss. The children use their imaginations and the dispersed and 
fragmentary messages they receive from the grown-up world about death. They 
also use their nascent cultural competence to read their neighbourhood and 
discover vague contours of mythical patterns. There is, for example, a river to 
cross. Theirs is a quest that is culturally framed, but at the same time is genuinely 
personal. 
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A deeper analysis of the relationship between images and text, the iconotext of this 
material, shows that there is collaboration between text and images as 
counterpoints and expanded relationships. In picture books where death is 
portrayed as something final, illustrators experiment with something that I refer to 
as life markers. These may nuance or contradict the message at the manifest level. In 
Lasses farfar är död (Eurelius & Lind 1972), the only colour except black and white is 
blue, which reinforces the talk of blue flowers emerging from the earth which the 
grandfather’s body has turned into. Above the dead dog in Hunden Sture blir 
gammal (Ingves 1985, ‘Sture the dog is getting old’), the reader can see a bird flying 
past the window, carrying nest-building materials. Behind Sture are pots with 
green shoots—probably from the bulbs which we have seen on the book cover. The 
book Farfars Lajka (Wahl & Nygren 1989) tells us how Lajka the dog turns into dust, 
but in one illustration where the dog is sitting surrounded by darkness, a sliver of 
light slips through the upper edge of the image and seems to shine onto the dog. 
These life markers can be seen in books where the author and the illustrator are 
different people and when they are one and the same. 
In Swedish picture books about death published from 1990 onwards, pets continue 
to dominate among the dead—Lina, Gulan och kärleken (Lundgren & Hald 2003, 
‘Lina, Gulan, and love’), Rufus i Underjorden (Mellgren 2010, ‘Rufus in the 
Underworld’), and Godnatt, min katt (Skugge & Digman 2012, ‘Goodnight, cat’)—as 
do older, male relatives—Vi tänker på dig, farfar! (Wagelin-Challis & Garhamn 2007, 
‘Thinking of you, grandpa!’) and Den finaste skatten (Hedman 2012, ‘The greatest 
treasure’). But in the material there are also a few older, female relatives among the 
deceased. In När mormor glömde att hon var död (Karlsson & Bengtsson 2001, ‘When 
granny forgot she was dead’), the ghost motif is twisted in a fun and 
psychologically interesting way when grandma forgets she is dead. In När pappas 
farmor dog (Farzaneh & Gårdsäter 2013, ‘When Dad’s granny died’) a father and his 
little son visit the great-grandmother’s house after she has died. In the books from 
this period we also find examples of life markers, for instance the great, sun-like 
dandelions which lie around the dead guinea pig in Adjö, herr Muffin (Nilsson & 
Tidholm 2002, ‘Farewell, Mr Muffin’). On the last page of the book we can see Mr 
Muffin hastening toward a setting–or rising–sun in the distance. 
In the 2000s it has become more common for parents and children to die in picture 
books. Among these books there are also many examples of the border between life 
and death becoming tenuous and fragmentary. In Ängeln Gunnar dimper ner 
(Lindgren & Ramel 2000, ‘Gunnar the Angel takes a tumble’), the eponymous 
angel brings dead people back to life. They literally come back from the grave—
and there is no sign that this is merely temporary. In När jag besökte himlen (Stark 
2003, ‘When I visited heaven’), the adult Ulf visits his dead aged parents in heaven 
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to see how they are doing. The drowned boy in Pojken i havet: En berättelse 
(Magntorn & Rosiin 2007, ‘The boy in the sea: a story’) watches the world of the 
living from his new kingdom, and in Jag känner en ängel (Svensson 2010, ‘I know an 
angel’), a dead father continues to be there for his daughter—only now he has 
wings. 
In these books, too, life markers are essential. In Jon har ett svart hål i sitt röda hjärta 
(Rottböll & Virke 2013, ‘Jon has a black hole in his red heart’), the boy asks his 
mother if his father can climb down the tall trees to get back from heaven. His 
mother says no. ‘Daddy will never come back. Not even in a thousand years.’ The 
answer is very definitive, but in the picture accompanying the text you can see the 
tall trees rising up in the sky, the feet of mother and son in the hammock attached 
to one of the trees and—which is significant—the mother’s toenails painted red, 
but her son’s painted alternately red and green. He is a mixture of two 
complementary colours. And on one of his toes a big, beautiful butterfly is sitting 
with its wings outspread. The butterfly is not mentioned in the text, so here the 
iconotext is essential to grasp the possible meaning. Butterflies as well as birds are 
frequent in picture books about death—they send a message about transcendence 
and a movement between different spheres. 
To write about a dead parent in a picture book is to tackle a very sensitive subject. 
In Jon har ett svart hål i sitt röda hjärta (2013), the ‘black hole’ of the title in Jon’s ‘red 
heart’ is actually illustrated in the book; a book that addresses many aspects of 
grief and mourning, using images to deepen the emotional message and get nearer 
a psychological truth. Other books from the same period have different purposes. 
Some of them mix humour, a sense of play, and the materiality of death, for 
instance in a picture-book parody intended for a preschool readership, Titta Max 
grav! (Lindgren & Eriksson 1991, ‘Sam’s grave’), and the unsentimental parody of 
the non-fiction genre, Dödenboken (Stalfelt 1999, The Death Book) and Mysteriet döden 
(Lindström 2010 ‘Death, the mystery’). When an encyclopaedic ambition and 
humorous illustrations collide with such as serious subject as death, the comic 
effect becomes obvious. Under the guise of writing a factual book, you can step 
round all taboos or skewer them with a sparkle in your eye. 
 
Swedish translations of Scandinavian picture books 
The idea that Sweden was early to break the taboo about death in children’s 
literature is only part of the story, however. In a Scandinavian context, books from 
Denmark, Finland, and Norway were in some cases well ahead of Sweden and 
served as a source of inspiration. The Danish photographic picture book Mor, var är 
de döda? (Leunbach & Bellander 1964, ‘Mum, where are the dead?’) was important 
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when it was published, because until then it was considered very difficult to deal 
with the subject of death in books for small children. 
It is the question of the ontology of death—about what death might mean to the 
person who is dying—that is discussed in Mor, var är de döda? This is closely linked 
to questions concerning the surviving relatives. How are their lives affected by the 
death? What are their feelings and expressions of grief like? How do they process 
grief? According to Dessislava Stoeva-Holm (2002), emotions, ‘as followers of our 
thoughts and actions, affect our interpretation of the world and helps orient us in 
the now’. We are sometimes ready to show others these feelings or to put words to 
them and discuss them, she says. Researchers such as Ekman and Friesen (1975) 
have shown that there appears to be a two-rule social system: ‘feeling rules’ for 
inner feelings and ‘display rules’ for expressed emotions. The pictures in picture 
books are used to show expressed emotion, yes, but also the inner feelings. 
When it comes to the surviving relatives’ feelings about death, and the expression 
they find, a Finnish-Swedish picture book led the way. In Sweden, the book Lasses 
farfar är död (Eurelius & Lind 1972) was criticized for frightening children with an 
illustration where the boy Lasse’s father is sitting on the floor, crying and grieving. 
The fact that it was a grown man who was shown crying was probably one of the 
reasons (Söderberg 1995). There was even an ‘anti-book’ with what was supposed 
to be a less frightening and more religious portrayal of the same motif, Lenas farfar 
är i himlen (Sjöberg & Benson 1972). After this, it seemed that no one in Sweden 
dared to show grieving parents. In Ängelungen (Thun & af Enehielm, 1990, ‘Angel 
kid’), again from Finland, powerfully expressive pictures are used to show the 
pervasive expressions of sorrow by parents, an older sister, and even the pet gerbil 
when the younger brother in the family has died. The parents seem to cling to each 
other in desperation and love. Their tears, and the red hearts which also flow from 
them, are the size of their hands and the whole picture is full of colour. This book 
showed that bolder illustrations were possible. 
A picture book from Norway, Farväl, Rune (Kaldhol & Øyen 1986, ‘Goodbye 
Rune’), shows a child’s sorrow when her friend has died, expressed in a face with 
tearful eyes and with an poetic realism unmatched in Swedish publications. In 
Änglakatten (Sandemose 1995, ‘Angel cat’), also from Norway, the inner emotions 
are portrayed with strong, psychological realism, but in symbolic pictures. In one 
of these, the main character is sitting in the middle of the gigantic empty space 
which her large cat has quite literally left. The empty space has a cat’s contours. In 
the Norwegian Roy (Dahle & Nyhus 2009, ‘Roy’), in which a dog dies, the pictures 
as well as the grieving boy’s feelings are portrayed in the images. This can be seen 
in the colour scale of the book, which is done in nuances of grey, and in all the 
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details which show, as parallels, the way the dog had been part of the main 
character’s life since he was born, and the boy’s ideas about death, which stem 
from different people’s stories about it. 
Today it is mostly Denmark, where a kind of art rebellion seems to be taking place 
among picture-book artists, that delivers new motifs and aesthetics in picture 
books about death (Rhedin 2009). Among others we find the book Idiot (Oskar K. & 
Karrebaeck 2009), in which an old mother takes her own life and helps her 
mentally challenged son to die. Oskar K., the author, has also created a picture 
book in which the existential anxiety and thoughts of foetuses are portrayed, but it 
has not been translated into Swedish (Rhedin 2009). 
In other cases, the Scandinavian connection is apparent. The Finnish-Swedish book 
Linnéa och änglarna (Sundström & Bondestam 2003, ‘Linnéa and the angels’) and 
the Danish Jättebra Olga! (Gjerding & Helfer 2010, ‘Well done, Olga!’) and Annas 
himmel (Hole 2013, ‘Anna’s heaven’) are all about life after the death of a mother, 
and in all three there are references to Astrid Lindgren’s books about the strong 
and independent Pippi Longstocking, in the shape of red hair, pigtails, or 
mismatched stockings. In Sweden this motif is still very rare, and one of the first 
picture books in which a mother died appeared only very recently: Dom som är kvar 
(Saler & Ahmed Backström 2014, ‘Those left behind’). Both text and images speak 
volumes about what grief and mourning can be: to cry, to fall silent, to stay in bed 
watching television, to sit at the table staring at nothing, to talk incessantly with 
different people, to squabble, or to break something and get hurt. The message of 
the book is clear: it is important to take the chance to talk about a life with 
affection, to talk about death, and, equally, to be silent. It is essential to learn how 
to cope with the fact that the dead are dead, and that those who are alive are alive. 
In Dom som är kvar, the picture of the nuclear family remains intact even after the 
death of the mother, as the father, his two sons, their grandmother, and a black dog 
stand close together in front of her gravestone. As they leave the graveyard, the 
youngest son points out a bird in the sky, flying in their direction. 
 
  
150 
Concluding Reflexions 
The way death, sorrow, and mourning are dealt with in picture books 
published in Sweden in the last fifty years has obviously changed. The picture-
book artists adjusted to old patterns and motifs, but they also continued to 
challenge literary taboos. Not longer was it only pets and grandparents who 
died; down the years fathers, sisters, and brothers have joined the list and, in 
the last decade, even mothers. Since 1990, funderals are more common in the 
books, and dead bodies have been much more in evidence, sometimes even 
being touched by the children. It is interesting to note that the boy in Min 
pappa ville inte leva (Runvik 1998, ‘My dad doesn’t want to live’) does not want 
to caress his dead father’s hand, while the girl in Farmor och paradiset (Hammar 
& Sandler 2005, ‘Granny and Paradise’) kisses her grandfather’s cheek and 
finds that it smells from the porridge with cinnamon that he had for breakfast. 
The child’s relation to death is on many levels getting more and more intimate.  
Grief is also expressed in more varied ways, and as a matter that concerns 
both men and women, boys and girls. It is true that children’s literature mirrors 
our society and its complexities, but it is not only a passive reflection; it is also 
part of a series of discourses that can influence the world outside books. Is it 
possible to see a more reciprocal connection between ritual and ceremony in 
these books, and indeed in a neo-liberal society where individualism is an 
avowed ideal? My answer would be yes, for reasons I will finish by detailing. 
The picture books offer many examples of children trying to understand and 
come to terms with the death of a beloved pet or a family member. In that 
process, objects imbued with meaning are used, both in traditional religious 
ceremonies as well as in more private rituals developed through the children ’s 
play and conversations with other people. In Vi tänker på dig, farfar! (2007) the 
grandfather’s worn slippers are placed by the coffin during the funeral service, 
and the slippers are important in the children’s picture of the rocket that, in 
their minds, will take their grandpa to heaven. After the funeral the slippers 
help the children get close to him. In Mormors sjal (Lind & Hellgren 2014, 
‘Granny’s shawl’), two cousins decorate their grandmother’s grave with small 
white stones they have been collecting for most of their lives. The white stones 
make a circle on the ground that echoes a number of red balls in the air on the 
previous spread. A discussion about life and death has taken an associative 
step towards questions about jugglers. How can they keep all the balls in the 
air at once, the two girls wonder. One possible subtext here is about gravity 
and transcendence. The big black shawl of the title, decorated with red roses, 
offers the girls a place to hide—and reflect. With two dots over the letter A in 
Mormors sjal you have Mormors själ—‘Granny’s soul’. 
151 
Another example of how a child tries to come to terms with death is when the 
girl and her grandmother in Farmor och paradiset (2005) finally find a place they 
can call ‘Grandpa’s Paradise’. In a beautiful clearing by the sea they find the 
very spot where grandmother and grandfather had first met, a paradise with 
birds, flowers and trees. On top of a stone the girl places a pink flower and 
grandpa’s spare hearing aid—he’ll need it in Paradise—and the grandmother 
adds some coins, in case he wants to take the bus back to visit them some day. 
Neither the girl in Farmor och paradiset nor the children in Vi tänker på dig, 
farfar! are dressed in black. The girl in Mitt svarta liv (Eriksson 2007, ‘My black 
life’), on the contrary, is wearing her black-and-white pirate costume and a black 
eye patch for the funeral service where the rest of the congregation is dressed in 
traditional black or dark blue. You missed a real party, she tells her grandfather 
when she gets home from the service. Her enjoying the fun part of it, and insisting 
on doing it ‘her way’, would sit well with the ‘Never ending story’ approach 
described at the beginning of this essay. It in turn was probably influenced by 
children’s traditional and yet broad-minded views about the rituals and 
ceremonies of death. It is perfectly acceptable to dress up in a pirate costume; any 
object can represent the deceased person. Yet, interestingly, mourning, memorial 
services, and death ceremonies in children’s picture books present a broader, more 
heterogenic and complex picture than do the different stereotypes promoted by the 
Swedish Funeral Directors’ Association and the various coffin manufacturers. 
The symbols and life markers found the picture books discussed in this essay can 
often be interpreted as the result of an active and imaginative child’s quest for 
understanding. They do not speak directly to lifestyle or personal statements of 
belief. The accounts of death and mourning in picture books are often more 
creative and artistic, and afforded a greater philosophical and existential scope, 
than those designed for adults. There is also every reason to ask to what extent the 
objects such as the tractors, dogs, and dancing couples included in death 
announcements make the deceased special and unique? Are they even capable of 
embodying someone’s entire personality and interests? The objects in picture 
books are often chosen to correspond to a child’s perspective—but nevertheless 
they seem to open up a space around the deceased, and such books on the whole 
provide multiple levels of meaning. 
Sandra Beckett suggests in Crossover Picturebooks (2012) that ‘the picturebook genre’ 
should be situated in the broad international phenomenon that is crossover 
literature. I would argue that picture books about death and dying often do have 
these crossover qualities, and can be just as rewarding for adults to read. Some of 
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them may well help adult readers see what has been normalized in society when it 
comes to death, dying, and mourning. 
In my project I will continue to analyse the way the creators of picture books 
balance the metaphysical and the phenomenological in their discussion of death, 
using complex text–image interplay, metafictive discourse, genre-blending, and 
intertextuality. I will enlarge the analysis of emotions and from a gender 
perspective examine how a chaotic cluster of strong and primitive emotions such 
as anger, loss, despair, regret, and guilt are expressed within the iconotext. I will 
also examine the ways different kinds of memory work are used within the books’ 
universe. Finally, I will focus on the Scandinavian connection in these kinds of 
books and analyse how symbols are used differently across the full range of 
Swedish picture books about death.39 
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CHAPTER 11 
‘FUN’ AS A RESOURCE IN OLD WOMEN’S DELIBERATIONS 
ABOUT STYLE AND DRESS  
Karin Lövgren 
 
This essay deals with how old women aged between 62 and 94, during wardrobe 
interviews talked about a specific dimension of their style preferences—the notion 
of fun. The article is part of ongoing research.40 The purpose of this research is to 
explore cultural meanings of ageing. The wardrobes and their contents guided the 
interviews, with their garments as material prompts that invited talk about life 
transitions that had impacted on their choice of dress, on changes in their everyday 
lives pertaining to ageing—retiring or taking care of the grandchildren, for 
instance—and on bodily changes such as weight gain or increasing stiffness or 
immobility. Several of the women kept garment even though they no longer used 
them. Among different reasons for this, emotional ones were that the women could 
not let go of old garments associated with so many memories (see Lövgren 
forthcoming) Their sartorial biographies thus reflected their whole lives, not only 
their thoughts and experiences of ageing.41 The informants, whilst going over their 
garments, described their style. One of the self-categorizations frequently referred 
to in the interviews is the subject of the present essay: the notion of fun.42 
When describing their thinking about dress or when looking at specific items of 
clothing, several women used the word ‘fun’ to highlight what for them were 
important aspect of dress, foremost in terms of aesthetics and a specific style. My 
informants used the word fun mainly in two ways. One was to describe how it 
could be fun to take an interest in what to wear and in fashion, and the pleasure to 
be had from possessing a new garment and looking forward to wearing it. Fun in 
this sense was used to convey the sheer pleasure of aesthetics and in getting 
dressed, with the word used to convey positive emotions. However, the word 
mainly featured when different pieces of clothing were shown to me, with 
comments such as ‘This is a fun blouse’, ‘I like clothes that are fun’, or ‘Here’s a fun 
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 The research will be reported in articles focusing on different aspects of the empirical 
material. 
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 In another article wardrobe collections have been analysed; the article is to be submitted 
for review. 
42
 The women also talked of comfortable, sporty, leisurely, every day, and pedestrian when 
discussing style preferences. Comfortable is analysed in a forthcoming article (Lövgren 
forthcoming). 
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pair of shoes’. Sometimes informants just said ‘This is another fun piece of 
clothing’. At first I was surprised and a bit thrown by this phrasing. What did the 
informants mean by ‘fun’? How can this notion be understood? 
In Swedish there are two different words that translate into the English ‘fun’. One 
is roligt, which means fun in the sense of ‘enjoyable’, the other is kul, or fun as in 
‘nice’ or ‘jolly’. Kul started as slang in the early twentieth century, when it was 
considered expressively charged, youthful language. Some attribute it to the era of 
late 1960’s and to the boomer generation who were teenagers then (Brembeck 
2010). Its connotations and stylistic nuance have since evolved over time. Today 
the word is integrated in everyday Swedish, used as a positive evaluative word 
(Kotsinas 2003). My informants used both words when describing the pleasure in 
their aesthetic work on dress, but only the latter word, kul, when talking of style, as 
in ‘I love fun shoes’. Kul can be interpreted as more informal, even insubordinate, 
indicating a transgression against the norm. Both roligt and kul are emotive terms. 
Sophie Woodward (2007) found her informants had their wardrobes ordered in 
different forms, for instance according to social role, function, colour, or material, 
while some also had a special category of ‘fun garments’—clothes for going out or 
special occasions. My informants used the term more broadly, not only for clothes 
for going out. 
Laz (1998) emphasizes cultural meaning making of age, and how this cultural 
work makes age seem natural and evident. Culture is a toolbox, providing diverse 
images and resources for ‘doing age’. These, together with macro social structures, 
impact on age-consciousness, expectations, behaviour and emotions. Bodies are a 
source of age awareness, not least when getting messages on age through others. 
The interpretations of these are contextual, cultural. Laz stresses that ‘emotions 
function to transform available resources for acting one’s age into the actual 
accomplishment of age.’ (1998,103). ‘Fun’, as in pleasure associated with aesthetics 
or unique garments, is in this article understood as a strategic resource that my 
informants use to navigate acting age appropriately.  
Research on fashion, dress and age 
Until recently there was a gap in research on older people and fashion or dress 
(Twigg 2007; Twigg 2013). This has been partially rectified with research on older 
women and dress, presented in a number of different publications. The fashion 
researcher Pamela Church Gibson, in an article on the invisibility of older women 
in the fashion system, has interviewed women over 50 (2000). Several of Laura 
Hurd Clarke’s publications consider appearance and ageing: in an article co-
authored with Meridith Griffin and Katherine Maliha (2009), she addresses ageing 
informants’ perceptions of bodily change and different strategies to handle it using 
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dress; and in her book on women and ageing, Facing Age (2011), she includes a 
chapter on dress. Foremost in this field is Julia Twigg’s pioneering work Fashion 
and Age (2013). Using interviews about ageing and dress, she gives dress 
biographies of three women who make conscious efforts to defy norms of how to 
dress when one is older. The book is also based on interviews with retailers and 
producers of fashion wear, and on analyses of mediated discourses on fashion and 
age. Another example of explicit attempts to defy age norms can be found in 
Holland (2004), who interviewed older women about ageing, more particularly 
those who dress in a subcultural and alternative style. The participants in her 
study found that it was harder to transgress norms of ageing than to challenge 
gender norms, showing how age norms permeate and interrelate with gendered 
ones. 
Other important research in the field of dress and age is the work of Ingun 
Grimstad Klepp and Ardis Storm-Mathisen (2005, 2006), who found similar themes 
in their fieldwork on dress—Klepp when interviewing middle-aged women, and 
Storm-Mathisen when working amongst a group of teenagers. Their comparisons 
showed that different transitions in life were accompanied by differing norms of 
age-appropriate dress, but also by norms of body shape. What was considered 
appropriate at different stages of life differed in terms of reproductive and sexual 
roles. Another project that involved informants at different stages of life is ‘If the 
shoe fits’ (Hockey et al. 2012, 2014). Both men and women of different ages have 
participated in this study, using diaries, fieldwork, and interviews, with shoes as 
the point of entry to explore changes and life-course transitions. 
Eileen Fairhurst’s work (1998) on the concept of ‘mutton dressed as lamb’ has also 
been seminal, showing how women risk condemnation if they overstep the norms 
of appropriate dress (see also Holland 2004; Twigg 2013). In contemporary society, 
women have been positioned as interested in fashion and consumption, and as 
drawing more of their self-esteem and feelings of self-worth from appraisals of 
their appearance and looks—making them more vulnerable to bodily changes 
when ageing, not least since beauty has often been equated with youth (Clarke 
2011; Twigg 2013). Women are subordinated in a gendered hierarchizing system 
that separates the sexes—and where older women have been doubly subjected due 
to sexism and ageism (Beauvoir 1976; Clarke 2011; Sontag 1972). 
A gender perspective is important since it shows how differing norms, roles, and 
expectations are ascribed in terms of gender. Clothing is central in producing 
cultural meanings of femininity and masculinity, naturalizing a cultural order of 
separation of the sexes (Entwistle 2000: 142 ff.). Age and ageing intersect with 
gender, and also with class and ethnicity. Since dress is embodied, and ageing is an 
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embodied process (Twigg 2013), dress is a fruitful point of entry when studying 
how ageing and gender are given cultural meaning. 
My essay is based on wardrobe interviews, using garments as prompts to talk 
about transitions, continuances, and, above all, ageing. Klepp and Bjerck (2012) 
give an overview of wardrobe interviews as method. Wardrobe interviews have 
been used by Sophie Woodward in Why women wear what they wear (2007). Her 
extensive fieldwork has focused on what she calls the ‘wardrobe moment’, when 
choosing what to wear for different occasions; her informants are mainly in their 
twenties and thirties, the oldest in her late fifties. Alison Guy and Maura Banim 
(2000, 2001) have also used wardrobe interviews as a method, interviewing women 
between the ages of 21 and 54. As this brief overview shows, there has been more 
research on women than on men, especially when it comes to research on fashion 
and clothing. Several studies investigating fashion and older women, meanwhile, 
have not included the elderly. The present study has an extended age range, in 
order to investigate similarities and differences in the category of old.43 
Theoretically the study is part of a tradition focusing on social and cultural 
constructions: how the meaning of, in this case, ageing, is ascribed and described. 
The concept of doing age is used in parallel to how gender is done (West & 
Zimmerman 1987; West & Fenstermaker 1995; Calasanti & Slevin 2006). This 
theoretical concept captures that these are ongoing processes, incorporating both 
individual actors and institutions. Age is done, made relevant, in relation to norms 
and expectations of appropriate behaviour and style, but also to distributions of 
power and resources amongst different age categories (Twigg 2013). The focus on 
doing captures comparisons, contrasts, positioning, and negotiations of age 
(Lövgren 2009). Other theoretical concepts shed light on active meaning-making 
from age—Cheryl Laz’s age as accomplished (1998) and Judith Butler’s performativity 
(2006)—but I have chosen the more open doing, since this captures both individual 
and structural negotiations. The phrase may be grammatically awkward, but it is 
analytically fruitful. 
 
Method and empirical material: wardrobe interviews 
In the wardrobe interviews on which this essay is based, informants (twenty-one 
women aged 62 to 94) showed me their wardrobes, drawers, and hanging spaces. 
The interviews were guided by the contents of the women’s wardrobes, building 
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 Whilst there are difficulties with having such a wide age range amongst the informants, 
there is also the possibility to explore age categorizations. This is the topic of another 
article.  
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up sartorial biographical narratives. We talked about style; choice of dress; changes 
in taste and preference during their lifetimes; and when each garment was worn—
whether for special occasions or every day, whether for work or leisure. 
Biographical interviews were conducted with each informant. The women’s life 
histories as well as current situations were included in the empirical material. The 
interviews were loosely structured, conversational in style, and steered by the 
informants, although there was a checklist to ensure that certain topics had been 
covered. The focus was on how informants described life-course transitions and 
growing old. Dress is a fruitful starting point, because wardrobe collections contain 
both garments no longer worn, testifying to previous dimensions of self as well as 
relations, and dress that is currently favoured. Clothing items acted as prompts, 
facilitating talk of transitions and continuities, of changes in role and body. 
The women were invited to participate regardless of their perspective on fashion 
or style. Some informants declared an explicit interest in fashion as such, whereas 
most were concerned with what to wear and how to dress. For many, fashion 
became relevant mainly because it impacted on what was available to buy, or 
influenced what colours or cuts that were currently in fashion.  
The women were recruited in a variety of ways: through personal connections, 
through a pensioners’ organization and a church, through a group doing 
physiotherapy, and through a retailer that targets older consumers. The sampling 
strategy was to include informants of different ages in order to ensure that they 
were drawn from different cohorts and generations, the ambition being to 
investigate how ageing is talked about at different stages of life and to 
problematize the categorizations of old, older, and elderly. The oldest informants 
were born in the 1920s, and the youngest in the mid 1950s. The women came from 
different social backgrounds. The majority can be described as middle class. Some 
had a university education. Most had worked in occupations where a majority of 
employees were female, such as nursing, teaching, or administration. Some had 
been housewives when their children were small and had later got jobs on the 
open labour market. For several, their income had been comparatively low and 
they were now reliant on their partner’s pension. Those with a partner had greater 
purchasing power. Some had a partner, others were divorced or widowed or not 
currently in a relationship. All the informants had children and several 
grandchildren. They all described themselves as heterosexual. Most were ethnic 
Swedes, with three who had backgrounds in other European countries. Some of 
the informants were in frail health; others had ailments they attributed to ageing. 
The interviews revolved around dress and garments. These were kept in 
wardrobes often placed in the bedroom, an intimate area of their homes. Therefore 
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it was important to explain the research procedure and to make sure the 
informants had taken an informed decision to participate, and to that end they 
were given a letter to take home and read at leisure, after which they were to 
contact me if they wished to take part. Those who participated were interested in 
talking about and reflecting on themselves. Ethical rules of conduct on information 
and the right to discontinue participation were followed (Hermerén 2011). The 
informants have been anonymized and are here referred to by given-name 
pseudonyms. 
The interviews were transcribed, together with detailed field notes. These were 
then read through several times and coded (Aspers 2007, 165–93; Lewins & Silver 
2007, 81–90 on coding procedures). The codes have been formed both from 
theoretical concepts and the empirical material striving for reflexive interpretation 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg 2008, 475–554). Recurring topics and themes, together with 
specific expressions, choices of words, body language, and tone of voice, have been 
assigned different codes. Software for qualitative research, Atlas ti, was used to 
keep track of the coding. The quotes cited in the essay have been translated from 
the Swedish. 
Fun to dress up 
Some women said it was fun to have a new blouse waiting in the wardrobe, 
anticipating an occasion when they would wear it, thinking ahead of how they 
might appear to others. They savoured the moment even before it had happened, 
and talked with pride and enjoyment of getting dressed up, wearing something 
not previously seen by those they were meeting. Compliments were an important 
factor in this, a testimony to having succeeded. Getting dressed with others in 
mind was one dimension. Alice, 94, described how she enjoyed dressing up for 
lunch at the nursing home where she lives. Moving to the home had the 
unexpected benefit of her outfits becoming new once again, since she had never 
worn them before in this setting. She talked with pleasure of the compliments she 
had from both staff and fellow residents. For her, putting effort and consideration 
into her choice of dress was a strategy to deal with old age. 
Karin, 90, also talked about the importance of having something new to look 
forward to wearing: ‘Just sitting here in old clothes, day in and day out, that 
wouldn’t be much fun. No.’ For her, change and renewal combatted stagnation. 
She explained that she sometimes debated with herself when buying new 
garments ‘at my age’, but felt it important to treat herself. Doing this meant 
looking to the future, which can be interpreted as a strategy in dealing with ageing. 
Fun was here used as the equivalent of enjoyment: to take pleasure in combining 
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outfits or choosing what to wear for different occasions. This was important for 
several of the informants.44 
Fun garments 
In the following different aspects of garments that were referred to as fun will be 
examined. Colours, patterns, cut, shape, and details in design were all discussed. 
‘Fun’ was used about a diverse range of garments to explain the sense in which 
they were nice, and especially frequently about clothes in bright colours, with the 
Swedish word kul used primarily about different items of clothing or footwear. 
When fun referred to colour, it was often in contrast to neutral colours—the blues, 
beiges, but mostly the black which some of the women preferred. Colours are 
ascribed different cultural meanings, changing with societal changes, reflecting 
both gender and age in the colours and colour combinations that are considered 
appropriate (Twigg 2013, 136–9). Old age has historically been associated with 
drab, muted colours (Twigg 2007, 293). Grove-White (2001, 195) points out that 
colours, together with style and fabric have been a structuring agent reinforcing 
conventional social and gender roles.  
Black long had connotations of mourning and later became an artistic and 
fashionable colour, but now has become mainstream and prevalent (Craik 2009, 
42–7). The colour black was often discussed during the interviews. Several of the 
women struggled with black, feeling restricted in choice of colours. They were 
used to black, had worn it for decades, thought garments in black were easy to 
combine, generally appropriate, and supposedly made one look slim. Issues of 
weight gain were important to several. Several described black as a safe bet, but 
boring. The women also pointed out that black dominated in what was on sale 
thus impacting on what to choose amongst. But black was also said to make the 
complexion appear washed-out: the contrast between skin tone and black made 
one look saggy and wrinkled; black was ageing, and should be avoided when 
older according to several informants, either talking from their own experience or 
referring to the media’s style advice for the older woman. Judging from the 
interviews, black is a contested choice for older people.  
Pink used to be a colour redolent of masculinity, but in contemporary society it has 
become associated with femininity and especially girls (Ambjörnsson 2011; 
Entwistle 2000:140), and as I will come back to, girlishness is a marker indicating 
transgressions of age-appropriate dress. Red has long had cultural connotations of 
flamboyant sexuality. The use of bright red is still associated with youth, and 
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 The informants used both ’roligt’ and ’kul’ Swedish words for fun when talking of 
making aesthetic efforts. 
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wearing strong colours can be a deliberate, active protest as is the case with the 
Red Hat Society in the UK and US, where older women wear red and purple 
clothing and often elaborate hats at public occasions, defying age norms of drab 
colours for the elderly (Barrett et al. 2012; Yarnal et al. 2011). Twigg (2007, 302) 
describes how pale, drab colours and shapeless garments underwrite invisibility 
and thus point to social marginalization. Given this, there is a certain claim for 
visibility when it comes to the older women’s use of garments in bright colours. 
Bold colours call for attention, breaking a taboo against visibility of older women.  
When my informants spoke of fun and bright colours, however, it was not in terms 
of dressing up, as for the Red Hat Society’s members. It was rather about garments 
in cotton or other natural fibres, in bright, attention-grabbing patterns or bold 
stripes in contrasting colours, and, crucially, designed for everyday use. 
The expression ‘happy colours’ was much used in the informants’ narratives. This 
could be blue, for example, which was said not to make skin look as pale as black 
did. Sofia, 82, pointed out her favourite garments, dwelling on a knitted jumper in 
pastel colours that always got her many compliments. ‘Such fun colours,’ she said. 
Fun can here be understood as happy and playful. For Sofia, colourful garments 
were also a contrast to the trouser suits she had favoured when working—the 
formal wear that, on retirement, she swapped for colourful clothing. Here fun has a 
playful dimension in contrast to work, calling to mind other style categorizations 
the women used, such as comfortable and leisurely (on comfort, see Lövgren 
forthcoming). 
Twigg (2013) points out that colourful clothing is a common feature in garments 
for children and, in some cases, the older consumer. Bright colours in loose-fitting 
cuts facilitating mobility, prioritizing comfort—at both ends of the life cycle, this 
indicates play and leisure. However, it must be emphasized that the informants’ 
chosen ‘fun’ garments bore no resemblance to children’s dress; if anything, their 
age coding indicated middle-aged wearers or older.45 There are claims that bright 
colour reflect a sense of optimism and is more prevalent in prosperous times 
(Thomasson 2014) and that strong bright colours express an outgoing personality 
(Grove-White 2001). Using ‘happy’ or ‘fun’ colours can be interpreted as a modest 
opposition to being seen as ‘boring’ (a common objection to black), and as a 
strategy to draw attention, to be taken into account. 
The meaning ascribed to colours changes over time. This was evident in several 
ways in the interviews. In a longer perspective, informants used colours to explain 
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how attitudes to ageing had changed, using their mothers’ approach to this in 
contrast to their own preference for strong colours: 
Alice: My mother, she said, ‘I can’t wear red or light green because I am too old’, 
and she was 54 you know! But that was then. Times have changed since then. 
Karin: Did you ever think like that about any colours? 
Alice: Nooo, I love colours. All kinds. 
Wearing red and green, as Alice, 94, talks about, was according to her, in the 1950s 
off limits for an older woman. Another example of temporal changes in attitudes to 
colour was evident in the wardrobes of several of the women born in the 1940s. 
They had done a colour analysis, trying on shawls in different shades to determine 
whether or not cold or warm tones of different colours were most flattering. These 
style advice sessions were popular in the mid 1980s, and had made a lasting 
impression in their wardrobes as well as colour preferences.46 Yet another example 
is the informants’ references to what was in fashion that season, for several talked 
about trends as something they had to concede to, at least to some degree. One 
interpretation can be that if garments were too out of date, or in a colour currently 
not in fashion, their unfashionableness betrayed the wearer and risked her coming 
across as old. Expectations by the fashion system, and self-perceptions restricted 
the informants’ choice of colours (also see Grove-White 2001). 
Unique and different 
‘Fun’ was used as a generalizing epithet for a style preference, singling it out from 
a more pedestrian style or mass-market fashion. This can be understood in terms of 
resistance to inferred norms about how to dress when one is older. Astrid, 62, for 
instance, talked of her dress style as being different from others her age. At the 
time she was wearing an elegant tunic in bright colours and a pair of trousers by 
the Danish designer Masai, gathered in at the ankles with loose knots, a broad 
panel at the front and elastic at the back, the material a silk-like fabric. Astrid 
announced with gusto her love of fun clothes. Similarly, when Lena, 86, Astrid’s 
senior by over twenty years, talked about style, she stressed fun and difference: 
I look for slightly youngish fashion, but not that young, and perhaps a bit different. 
Like coming in one of these, with a top under is not that usual. So yes, I think I’ve 
always liked being… I haven’t changed style that much, but I think I have become 
bolder, yes, I think so. I don’t care as much what people think. So this one I haven’t 
dared to use so often in public, but really, I look good in it I think. And worn with a 
pair of white trousers, I’ve used it in late summer. This is the type I like that’s a bit 
different. […] Yes, so I’m not afraid to be a bit different. […] Not everyone in my 
age turns up in one of these, but I’m happy to [shows a tunic by the Swedish 
designer Gudrun Sjödén]. I wore this to church after the summer and I thought it 
looked good. 
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Both Astrid and Lena described their preferred style as ‘fun’. They wore clothes 
that they thought made them unique and different. The informants contrasted their 
style of dress to others of the same chronological age, emphasizing for instance that 
they dressed differently to most elderly people; what they perceived as unique, 
‘fun’ garments were a strategy. This can be interpreted in the light of Simmel’s 
theories of fashion as expressing the tension between fitting in and being a part of 
a community, driving uniformity and the contrasting desire to stand out and be 
different (Craik 2009; Crane 2000; Entwistle 2000). The informants said that it was 
important to dress correctly for the occasion, and some also expressed a wish to be 
distinctive. 
For Lena, 86, with her interest in a youngish style, there seemed to be a certain 
equivalence between youth, difference, and fun. She felt that younger consumers 
have greater freedom as regards style: an older woman has to be consciously bold 
and brave. Her narrative forms a dialogue with herself where she takes different 
sides: announcing that she looks good in the outfit, she takes pleasure in feeling 
that she dresses differently to others her age, recognizing that her style is a 
continuation of wanting to stand out, but also that, being older, she is freer and 
cares less what others think of her appearance. In spite of this she admits that she 
has not dared wear the outfit in public, which can be seen as indicative of tacit 
norms as regards age-appropriate dress. 
Fun was often used about small details. Elisabeth, 70, pointed out the smocking 
trim on a beige blouse, lovingly calling attention to the buttons, each a different 
shape. The garment was discreet, with the small details enhancing the look in a 
refined way—a ‘fun’ blouse, she said. Fun in the interviews was used referring to 
form, to how garments were cut, often with a loose fit, and sometimes with 
asymmetrical details. Comfort and style were often combined in designs that 
accommodated bodily changes such as increasing weight. The body is not exposed 
in this style of clothing; an asymmetrical cut takes attention away from the size and 
shape of its wearer; yet it is a distinct look, a design to be noticed. 
Fun can be interpreted to refer to a style that is neither formal, nor strict or elegant, 
but instead, rather casual and leisurely, perhaps even sporty. Elisabeth, 70, 
described her style as romantic and sporty, linking style and comfort, another 
important categorization used by the informants when talking about their clothing 
preferences (Lövgren forthcoming). 
I think that style is fun even though I am 70. So, well, maybe it is odd that… But 
nobody’s said you can’t wear that. So yeah, I am a little romantic I guess. […] they 
are fairly expensive, but I like Danish clothes. That’s fun fashion, I think. 
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Elisabeth’s words tail away. Left hanging in the air is a sense that perhaps she 
should not prefer this style at her age. She tentatively wonders whether it might be 
seen as violating norms of age and style. She points out that nobody has explicitly 
admonished her for wearing the style she prefers. This is how age norms were 
often referred to: as something they were conscious of, but could not quite pin 
down: a tacit presence they were aware of, and to some degree had internalized. 
The restraint with which most of the women talked about their style shows that 
there were ongoing deliberations about dress. They felt it important to dress 
correctly for the occasion—correctly in relation to how others present would be 
dressed, so that they would be visible in the desired way—while the fun came 
from a unique detail that was ‘just right’, showing the effort they had made and 
their pleasure in the aesthetics of their outfit. One interpretation of the phrase ‘a 
fun garment’ is that it is distancing, downplaying any pretentions and conveying 
the idea that style is not to be taken too seriously, and a certain distance from a 
concern with appearances is implied. Words used about style by the informants 
are unpretentious, unassuming, modest, and humble. Calling clothes fun can be 
understood as making moderate claims, much like the Swedish concept of lagom 
‘just right’. The very carefulness with which their style was described also testifies 
to the emotive character of dress—a relationship difficult to pin down in words. 
Garments ‘feel good’, ‘feel right’, ‘look nice’: vague phrases with which to 
formulate a relationship between inner feelings, occasion, and appearance. Also 
important in understanding of people’s emotional relationship with their clothes is 
the fact that this develops when using garments in different contexts. As 
Woodward points out, ‘women’s attachment to particular items is an embodied 
relationship of wearing’ (2007, 32–3). 
One interpretation of the concept ‘fun’ is that it is young, hip, trendy. The word is 
often used in this sense in fashion reports in the media. Should the fact that the 
informants use this concept be understood as their wanting to be seen as young, 
and thus as resisting ageing? This could be interpreted as making a strategic 
alliance with younger target groups, favouring fun fashion. One brand mentioned 
by several informants, the Spanish design label Desigual, describes its clothes not 
only as fun and different, but also as sexy, a concept otherwise not associated with 
the older woman, who is often constructed as being beyond sexuality and the 
erotic (Twigg 2013, 49–50). The company’s ‘For everybody’ motto can be taken as 
indicating  uni-age ambitions. It is notable that the words used by the informants 
to describe style preferences did not include sexy; instead they talked about 
‘looking nice’ or ‘feeling good’. Emphasizing ‘fun’ can in this light be understood 
as not making claims to an eroticized self (Twigg 2007, 2013). 
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Dressing one’s age 
Several informants had collections of shoes they could no longer wear—some had 
astonishing numbers of pairs—which they described as beautiful or ‘fun’. 
Increasing age had brought difficulties with their balance or their feet, leaving 
shoes too narrow or heels too high to be worn. Several talked sadly of having to 
give up wearing high-heeled shoes; this was a transition where practicality and 
comfort had to be prioritized over what they thought of as beautiful. They talked 
with pride of having been able to walk or dance in heels—a display of femininity 
in a culturally prescribed fashion (Hockey et al. 2012, 2014; Woodward 2007, 140). 
Ways to display femininity become limited as one ages, both because culturally 
normative femininity is synonymous with youth, but also because of the bodily 
limitations that come with advancing years. 
The informants often had a negative view of bodily changes that are natural and 
unavoidable, such as with age having looser skin on their arms, gaining weight, or 
changing body form. This can be described as having integrated a gaze of youth 
(Twigg 2004). Julia Twigg’s concept refers to how the older body is subject to a 
cultural gaze, embodied in media imagery (2004: 65). She points out that women’s 
signs of ageing subject them to harsher judgements since they derive social worth 
from their appearance and attractiveness, whereas men are judged by 
performance. Indeed, for men, signs of ageing can be interpreted as signs of 
maturity and authority. Women are subjected to restricting norms and regulations, 
leading them to internalize ageist views of their own bodies and themselves as 
ageing, seeing themselves as abject and in need of various strategies to hide signs 
of ageing (Clarke 2011). Older women become socially invisible. They are no 
longer reflected in media or in advertisements, except with messages about how to 
avoid signs of ageing (Lövgren 2009). Woodward (1999), like Twigg (2004), 
suggests that women become invisible as they age. The older female body is both 
invisible and no longer seen, and hypervisible—as in all that is seen are signs of 
ageing.  
My informants positioned themselves as more privileged than previous 
generations. Having more consumer power, they are able to own more garments 
than their mothers could. They are not forced to take on a style that makes them 
feel old; instead, they are free to choose clothing that is colourful and bright. They 
talked of themselves as being freer from restrictions in terms of age. Yet they also 
described how they due to age had made different alterations and adaptions, in 
terms of what they wore. The women used different strategies to handle bodily 
changes, choosing clothes that did not expose their stomachs or arms.  
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However, they found it difficult to pin down norms of age appropriateness. This 
shows the elasticity of age: feeling old can be postponed or negotiated; how 
meaning of age is displaced, called upon or denied in various ways according to 
circumstance and situation. Age is talked of in a contradictory, ambivalent fashion, 
and not just in these interviews. Several informants expressed that with age they 
were freer from others’ opinions—as Lena, 86, in the quote earlier, saying she care 
less what others thought of her style. Yet the opinion of others was referred to as a 
validation of their choice of dress. There were references to how a sister, daughter, 
or friend had approved or disapproved of their choice of clothing, to significant 
others who had encouraged them to wear certain items. Mirja, 64, was happy to 
defer to her sister’s judgement: ‘Sometimes my sister can say, “Oh nooo, you can’t 
wear that, you look like an old lady.” And then I trust her.’ My informants spoke 
of how people close to them had told them to avoid wearing certain items of 
clothing that in their opinion made them look frumpish, outdated or even ‘ancient’. 
Several of the women talked about others, using them as a tool to explain their 
feelings about style in relation to age. It seemed easier to discuss age-appropriate 
style when talking about other people, especially when describing transgressions 
or failures to live up to this evasive concept. That others are used as examples 
when talking of this can be understood in the light of the anxiety about dress that 
Entwistle discusses (2000, 145). Failure is more readily exemplified with reference 
to others. Talking about norms of how to dress when older, several remarked on 
occasions when others had, in their opinion, failed and been shown up in public. 
Unknown others were used as deterring examples when describing how to dress 
and what to avoid. The informants spoke of seeing other women who had come 
across as ‘pathetic’, ‘silly’, or ‘foolish’ by dressing in an age-inappropriate manner. 
Others were used as object lessons in how to dress and what to avoid. Mirja, 64, 
gave an example: 
In comes a woman. She’s ten times more wrinkly than I am, and her skin’s just 
sagging like this, and she’s tanned, because she’s always sunbathing, and she has 
dyed red hair, shoulder length, with curls, and a bow in her hair, and then she’s got 
on the world’s lowest-cut dress, tight-fitting, light summer blue, with flowers, short 
like this. And then I thought, ‘O my god.’ [Laughs] ‘What world is she living in, 
does she think she looks like a little doll or what?’ I mean, it was like this baby doll, 
a 70–year-old baby doll. No. 
These were style failures ascribed to a lack of synchronization between their 
chronological age, as my informants saw it, and their clothing. Colour again 
figured large in this assessment: light blue was too girly, as of all the possible 
shades of blue it was the wrong nuance. In Mirja’s eyes, the woman had denied her 
chronological age, her physical age, by dressing in a way that Mirja found more 
suitable for someone much younger. The lack of congruence between body and 
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dress is what made her look ridiculous in Mirja’s eyes. Twigg discusses moral 
ordering of dress and how it impacts on older people. There is a threat of 
dereliction and decline; of inappropriateness of dress, for instance in excessive 
exposing of the body for the older person. This is reinforced by a contemporary 
view of the body as a project in need of discipline and beauty work (Twigg 2013: 
16–17). More rarely others were talked of as role models—the sort of person who 
was slim and fit, having a bodily form that allowed them more freedom of choice 
in what to wear. Those who could afford more expensive designer garments, that 
had a better fit and were made from high-quality fabric, were spoken of with some 
envy. 
Astrid, 62, found it difficult to assess others’ ages. This can be understood as an 
indication of how difficult it is to estimate someone’s age, and that the 
interpretation differs according to one’s own age, but her remarks can also be 
interpreted as indicating the existence of a more uni-age style, open to all 
regardless of age. Age cannot readily be deduced from style of dress. However, 
Astrid also stressed the importance of looking grown-up, saying she could see 
others she thought should dress more maturely, and also saying of herself, ‘I don’t 
want to look like a little schoolgirl, with hair in pigtails. I want to look adult.’  
The informants stressed the importance of dressing one’s age; that it was essential 
to acknowledge that one is older in the sense of being grown-up or mature, of 
accepting one’s age and the stage in life one had reached and not deny it. 
Marianne, 68, for example said she thought it was important to dress according to 
her age, leaving teenagers and young adults to their own style. There is and should 
be a difference according to age, she announced. One should neither dress 
frumpishly, in a way that makes one seem older, nor should one dress as if 
denying one’s age, attempting to be seen as young. One should admit to the age 
difference, look grown up and mature and dress the part. 
In the balancing act between accepting of their age, yet not dressing older than 
necessary, my informants singled out various markers of age, ranging from girlish 
to granny-like. When comparing styles of dress, the Swedish concept of tant (little 
old lady) and tantig (frumpish) recurred as markers of ageing (Lövgren 2013). The 
women talked about wanting to avoid being seen as outdated and old-fashioned—
even though you are old, you do not have to dress like a tant, they said. When 
going through their wardrobes, some took pride in describing their garments as 
the very opposite of drab and unfashionable by referring to this concept. Others 
anxiously asked me whether I found their style tantig. Hence Kerstin, 72, ventured 
that ‘I imagine my style is not very tantig, frumpy, like several others’. […] I don’t 
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believe my clothes are frumpy, do you?’ Sofia, 82, described how she asked her 
daughters for advice about clothes: 
Sofia: When I ask my daughters for advice, they say it every time: ‘Sure, you’re an 
old lady, Mum, but you don’t have to buy little old lady clothes.’ 
Q: And what would be little old lady clothes? 
Sofia: Well, what are they? Well, I think there’s a lot of knitted pullovers and 
cardigans, in dark, drab colours, often a bit of a bodge. They think I should wear 
happy colours. 
She went to the wardrobe and pulled out a suit in brown, explaining how the 
jacket is too long and dark, and that even though it was good quality and fitted her 
well, she had not worn it much, thinking that it aged her. The age marker of the 
tant was a warning sign of social invisibility and irrelevance; what Sofia calls 
‘happy colours’ can be a means to combat the impression of being too old. 
The Swedish concept of tant has a corresponding dimension: the kulturtant, the 
cultured, museum-visiting, theatre-going woman, usually middle-aged or older. 
She is stereotypically represented in loose, flowing garments and bold bright 
colours, very much associated with the Swedish Gudrun Sjödén brand. The cliché 
of this culturally active woman has often been used in a derogatory way. Lately 
there has been a countermovement, and the concepts of tant and above all 
kulturtant have been reclaimed, the latter as an affirmative categorization rather 
than a reducing and limiting epithet. Still, the figure of the older woman, redolent 
of the abusive invective of the climacteric witch, or the description of her hair as 
‘menopausal red’, represents a figure of warning. She is taboo. Too colourful and 
visible, she takes up too much public space, demanding to be seen and taken into 
account, making herself conspicuous by her appearance. Colour and its differing 
cultural meanings are yet again relevant: here it is the colour red that is in 
question, symbolizing the woman who tries too hard to conceal and combat her 
age, and thus making her a target of ridicule. The fact that the older women’s 
choice of clothing is so open to criticism—whether rendering them visible or 
invisible—points to a gender system in which women are subordinated, and where 
older women are subject to both sexism and ageism. 
Hanne, 63, described her feeling that style of dress and age should be consistent: 
‘There are certain garments that I would think, sure that’s nice, if I were 
seventeen.’ The interviews showed that it was also important not to look older 
than necessary. Making an aesthetic effort and taking care in choosing outfits was 
proof that they were alive. Or as Alice, 94, put it, ‘Dress is more important when 
you are old than when you are young. Because you don’t have to make yourself 
older than you are.’ Against that was the fact that some informants felt uncertain 
about what to wear at their age. They felt they had little to find in high-street 
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shops, for those styles were designed for young bodies, without the elasticated 
waists and general comfort they wanted. How to look grown up and mature 
without looking old was a dilemma for several of my informants. 
Concluding remarks: doing age 
This essay considers a style categorization that my informants themselves used: the 
emic notion of ‘fun’. ‘Fun’ should here be viewed in the light of different 
negotiations of age. When describing their style and changes of style as they grew 
older, the women did not describe totally new and different style preferences. 
Instead they spoke of gradual transitions and adaptations to their physical changes 
and differing needs depending on how they spent their retirement. They spoke of 
keeping and using garments for years, sometimes even decades—something that 
testifies to style not being too closely linked to a specific age. The same is also 
indicated by the fact that some of them wore hand-me-downs from their 
daughters. This was not thought age inappropriate. Indeed, several said that 
compared to their mothers, they had more freedom to dress in any style they 
chose. 
Garments do gender and age, but the rules and norms of appropriateness are 
rarely spelled out. The informants conveyed a tacit understanding and often an 
acceptance of these implied norms of age appropriateness and the identity claims 
open to older women. For them, the norm is to put an effort into one’s style and 
appearance, yet not to respond to social ostracism by dressing in a neutral manner 
since neutral colours enforce invisibility. Bright, happy colours, on the other hand, 
risk leaving them open to criticism for seeking visibility. Failure is often how one 
realizes the boundaries. The warning figure of the stereotypical little old lady, 
dressed not to be noticed, has been discussed. Another epithet that identifies age 
norms is ‘girlish’, a phrase that the women used to describe a failure to dress 
according to one’s age. Older women run the risk of condemnation if they dress 
too young, as ‘mutton dressed as lamb’, caught in public in the act of refusing to 
acknowledge or adapt to chronology (Fairhurst 1998; Twigg 2013). To dress as a 
mature grown-up, who accepts their age, and yet to convey an interest in fashion 
and aesthetics, is a difficult balancing act. Fun, happy, colourful garments, small 
details that make the wearer feel confident at having invested in their looks, are a 
viable strategy in communicating the desired mix of maturity and vivacity, in 
claiming attention without violating any norms by demanding to be seen as a 
sexual being. By referring to ‘fun’, my informants felt allowed to communicate an 
interest in dress, to enjoy and take pleasure in aesthetics and fashion—within 
limits. They could resist incipient frumpiness and invisibility by dressing 
differently to the mainstream stereotype, yet not subversively in a subcultural 
style. Fun could allow them to combine the mature with the playful—play as in 
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leisure, ease, and comfort. When the women described their style of dress, it was 
with restraint and distance. This can be interpreted as somewhat self-depreciating, 
but also as a desire to fit in rather than to stick out. 
Fun can be interpreted as a negotiable style categorization for older women; an 
age-appropriate way of displaying their ongoing work with their clothing and 
bodies, enjoying the aesthetic dimensions of presenting themselves, while neither 
denying age nor masking it. The women used fun as a strategic resource in a 
cautious claim for visibility and uniqueness in a culture that renders ageing 
women invisible. 
 
References 
Alvesson, Mats & Kaj Sköldberg (2008) Tolkning och reflektion: vetenskapsfilosofi och 
kvalitativ metod [Interpreting and reflection: Philosophy of science 
and qualitative method]. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Ambjörnsson, Fanny (2011) Rosa: den farliga färgen [Pink: The dangerous colour]. 
Stockholm: Ordfront. 
Aspers, Patrik (2007) Etnografiska metoder: att förstå och förklara samtiden. 
[Etnographic methods: Understanding and explaining the 
contemporary]. Malmö: Liber. 
Banim, Maura & Alison Guy (2001) ‘Dis/continued selves: why do women keep 
clothes they no longer wear?’, in Alison Guy, Eileen Green & Maura 
Banim (eds.), Through the wardrobe: Women’s relationships with their 
clothes. Oxford: Berg. 
Barrett, Anne, Manacy Pai & Rebecca Redmond (2012) ‘ “It’s your badge of 
inclusion”: the Red Hat Society as a gendered subculture of aging’, 
Journal of Aging Studies, 26/4, 527–38. 
Beauvoir, Simone de (1976) Ålderdomen [Old age]. Stockholm: AWE/Geber. 
Brembeck, Helene (2010). Ju mer vi är tillsammans: om fyrtiotalisterna och maten. [The 
more we are together – on the boomers and food]. Stockholm: 
Carlsson.  
Butler, Judith (2006 [1999]) Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. 
New York: Routledge. 
Calasanti, Toni M. & Kathleen F. Slevin (2006) (eds.) Age matters: Realigning feminist 
thinking. New York: Routledge. 
Clarke, Laura Hurd, Meridith Griffin & Katerine Maliha (2009) ‘Bat wings, 
bunions, and turkey wattles: body transgressions and older 
women’s strategic clothing choices’, Ageing & Society, 29/5, 709–26. 
—— (2011) Facing Age: Women growing older in anti-aging culture. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
173 
Craik, Jennifer (2009) Fashion: the key concepts. Oxford: Berg. 
Crane, Diana (2000) Fashion and its social agendas: Class, gender, and identity in 
clothing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Entwistle, Joanne (2000) The fashioned body: Fashion, dress and modern social theory. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fairhurst, Eileen (1998) ‘ “Growing old gracefully” as opposed to “mutton dressed 
as lamb”: The social construction of recognising older women’, in 
Sarah Nettleton & Jonathan Watson (eds.) The body in everyday life. 
London: Routledge. 
Gibson, Pamela Church (2000) ‘ “No one expects me anywhere”: invisible women, 
ageing and the fashion industry’, in Stella Bruzzi & Pamela Church 
Gibson (eds.), Fashion cultures: Theories, explorations and analysis. 
London: Routledge. 
Grove-White, Annie (2001) ‘No rules, only choices? Repositioning the self within 
the fashion system in relation to expertise and meaning: a case study 
of colour and image consultancy’,  Journal of Material Culture, 6, 193-
211. 
Guy, Alison & Banim, Maura (2000) ‘Personal collections: women’s clothing use 
and identity’, Journal of Gender Studies, 9/3, 313–27. 
—— Eileen Green & Maura Banim (2001) (eds.) Through the wardrobe: Women’s 
relationships with their clothes. Oxford: Berg. 
Hermerén, Göran (2011) God forskningssed. Stockholm: Vetenskapsrådet, available 
at http://www.cm.se/webbshop_vr/pdfer/2011_01.pdf. 
Hockey, Jennifer, Rachel Dille, Victoria Robinson & Alexandra Sherlock (2012) 
‘Worn shoes: identity, memory and foowear’, Sociological Research 
Online, 18/1. 
—— et al. (2014) Ongoing research project ‘If the shoe fits: footwear, identity and 
transitions’, University of Sheffield, 
http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/iftheshoefits/homepage. 
Holland, Samantha (2004) Alternative femininities: Body, age and identity. Oxford: 
Berg. 
Klepp, Ingun Grimstad & Marie Bjerck (2012) ‘A Methodological Approach to the 
Materiality of Clothing: Wardrobe Studies’, International Journal of 
Social Research Methodology, 17/4, 373–86. 
—— & Storm-Mathisen, Ardis (2005) ‘Reading fashion as age: Teenage girls and 
grown women’s accounts of clothing as body and social status’, 
Fashion Theory, 9/3, 323–42. 
Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt (2003) ‘Språkets uppkomlingar’ [Verbal upstarts], Språkvård, 3, 
4–10 [a guide to modern Swedish usage]. 
174 
Krekula, Clary (2009) ‘Age coding – on age-based practices of distinction, 
International Journal of Ageing and Later Life, 4, 7-31. 
Laz, Cheryl (1998) ‘Act your age’, Sociological Forum, 13, 85–113. 
Lewins, Ann & Christina Silver (2007) Using software in qualitative research: A step-
by-step guide. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Lövgren, Karin (2009) ‘Se lika ung ut som du känner dig’: Kulturella föreställningar om 
ålder och åldrande i populärpress för kvinnor över 40 [‘Look as young as 
you feel’: Cultural conceptions on ageing and ageing in popular 
press targeting women over 40]. Linköping: Linköpings universitet. 
—— (2013) ‘The Swedish “tant”: a marker of female aging’, Journal of Women & 
Aging, 25/2, 119–37. 
—— (in press) ‘Comfortable and leisurely: Old women on style and dress’, Journal 
of Women & Aging. 
—— (forthcoming) ‘Old women and their wardrobe collections’. 
Storm-Mathisen, Ardis & Klepp, Ingun Grimstad (2006) ‘Young fashion and adult 
style: how teenage girls and grown women account for the impact 
of style and fashion on their personal clothing practices’, Ethnologia 
Scandinavica, 36, 91–106. 
Sontag, Susan (1972) ‘The double standard of aging’, Saturday Review, 55/39, 29–38. 
Thomasson, Henrika (2014) Notes on forecasting and meeting with trend forecaster 
Stefan Nilsson, email to author, January 2014. 
Twigg, Julia (2004) ‘The body, gender, and age: Feminist insights in social 
gerontology’, Journal of Aging Studies, 18/1, 59–73. 
—— (2007) ‘Clothing, age and the body: A critical review’, Ageing & Society, 27/2, 
285–305. 
—— (2013) Fashion and Age: Dress, the Body and Later Life. London: Bloomsbury. 
West, Candance & Don Zimmerman (1987) ‘Doing gender’, Gender & Society, 1/2, 
125–51. 
—— & Sarah Fenstermaker (1995) ‘Doing Difference’, Gender & Society, 9/1, 8–37. 
Woodward, Kathleen M. (1999) (ed.) Figuring age: Women, bodies, generations. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Woodward, Sophie (2007) Why women wear what they wear. New York: Berg. 
Yarnal, Careen, Julie Son & Toni Liechty (2011) ‘ “She was buried in her purple 
dress and her red hat and all of our members wore full ‘Red Hat 
Regalia’ to celebrate her life”: Dress, embodiment and older 
women’s leisure’, Journal of Aging Studies, 25/1, 52–61. 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
176 
CHAPTER 12 
 
EMOTIONAL ASPECTS OF GROWING OLD IN RURAL PLACES: 
PROBLEMATIZING THE USE OF DIFFERENT METHODOLOGIES 
Sara Nyhlén, Beverly Leipert, Katja Gillander Gådin 
 
The aim of this essay is to elaborate on how to capture different aspects of the 
emotional layers of growing old in rural places using different kinds of methods. It 
problematizes the use of different methods used to capture and reveal aspects of 
rurality by discussing the use of a quantitative survey, in-depth interviews, and a 
photovoice project. The studies have been conducted in Sweden and Canada. 
An ageing population is framed as a problem in many countries worldwide. An 
example from the European region is that every seventh person is older than 65, 
and the proportion is constantly increasing (WHO 2008). For Sweden, the 
corresponding figure is that over 18 per cent of the population are over 65 
(Lennartson & Heimersson 2012), although 24 per cent are older than 65 in rural 
areas compared with 15 per cent in cities (Statistics Sweden 2012). In Canada, 90 
per cent of the land mass is rural and 20 per cent of the population is rural (CIHI 
2006). The rural population is an ageing population, and rural communities are 
becoming feminized as most of the seniors living in rural areas will be women; in 
Canada by 2021 one in four seniors will live in rural settings (Health Canada 2002). 
Growing old in rural places is something that affects a significant proportion of the 
population in many countries today, and we need further research in order to 
understand how rurality, ageing, and gender are intertwined. A comparison 
between larger and smaller municipalities in Sweden shows that social inequalities 
are lower in small municipalities while gender differences are larger (Melinder 
2007); in other words, there are more traditional gender regimes in rural areas 
compared with more populated areas. 
In some rural communities in Canada, seniors comprise up to 40 per cent of the 
population (Statistics Canada 2001), as the large baby boom cohort retires to 
smaller communities or chooses to ages in place. Older women are one of the 
fastest growing categories of the female population (Ministry of Industry 2006) and 
many of them live in rural areas. Yet, little is known about the health needs and 
resources of seniors in rural areas or of how gender and rural context impact 
seniors’ health (Leipert et al. 2012b). Many challenges are faced by friends, family, 
and caregivers in rural settings as they attempt to provide care when health 
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resources are not available or are insufficient (Forbes & Hawranik 2012; Keating & 
Eales 2012), as is often the case in small isolated settings (CIHI 2006). Living in 
rural settings can be an especially emotionally laden experience for women as they 
play key roles as service providers, caregivers, and residents, often ageing alone 
and with chronic health conditions, in underserved rural communities. It has been 
claimed that there is an ‘irrevocable link among economic restructuring, local 
service capacity, and ageing as the most important policy issue’ regarding health in 
resource-dependent (mining, farming, and forestry) hinterland communities in 
Canada (Skinner et al., 477). Thus the study of ageing, emotion, and rurality is 
timely, and requires serious investigation if the health of rural seniors is to be 
effectively supported. 
We would argue that growing old in rural places is something different than 
growing old in built-up areas. Rural municipalities face particular challenges when 
it comes to providing welfare, partly due to a smaller tax base and partly due to 
the larger distances to be covered, which substantially increase the costs for 
maintaining a care system throughout a given district (Söderberg 2005). Our 
starting point here is the major changes to the structure and organization of 
eldercare that has been taken place in the past decade in Sweden and Canada. 
In Sweden and Canada, the increasing older population is often framed as a 
challenge for the whole country, but especially so for rural areas. Government 
policies have focused on the ‘burden’ that an increased proportion of older people 
in the population will place on the health services and economies of local 
municipalities. At the same time, the overall notion is that rural areas are a 
‘burden’ for the rest of the country, and in this way growing old in rural places 
puts the individual in a fragile position as a ‘double burden’. Growing old in rural 
areas might therefore be a highly emotional experience that can affect the physical, 
mental, social health, and coping abilities of rural seniors. 
The concept of ‘emotion’ involves a multifaceted process and there is no 
consensual definition of the phenomenon. While some theorists use it as a 
synonym for subjective feelings, others argue that there are more components 
inherent in the concept—appraisal, for example, or bodily symptoms, action 
tendencies, and facial and vocal expressions (Scherer 2005). Emotions are processes 
involved in social interaction and are thus not only a private concern, but are also 
properties of a dyad, a group, or a collective; in other words, emotions have to be 
taken into consideration in the work for social change as they regulate social 
interaction (Kappas 2013). In this essay, we follow Debora Thien (2012) in her 
notion that focusing on emotions ‘bring a new and meaningful way to generate 
detailed considerations of rurality and gender’ (423). Focusing on emotions can 
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give insight to rural experiences and the socio-spatial, socio-political context, and 
can illuminate the interplay of gender and rurality (Thien 2012). There are various 
definitions of emotion, and together they reveal human complexity and help us to 
reflect and affect our understanding of the context. We have elected to use a broad 
definition of emotion in accordance with Scherer (2005), seeing it as a process in 
both an individual and the social sphere (Kappas 2013). However, the main focus 
here will be on the subjective feeling component in emotion, with quantitative and 
narrative research in Sweden and photovoice research in Canada discussed for 
their utility in addressing emotions and ageing for rural seniors. The starting point 
is eldercare in rural settings in Canada and Sweden, drawing on three different 
studies of health, living conditions, and gender, and discussing the three different 
methods used—surveys, qualitative interviews, and photovoice—in relation to 
emotions and rurality, but also the different methodologies in relation to one 
another. 
Eldercare in rural places  
The traditional Swedish welfare system has moved from a discourse of planned 
economy towards a more market-oriented ideology, a shift that is perceived as a 
solution to the demands of higher productivity and efficiency (Serbant 2000). In 
some municipalities, municipal institutions have been outsourced to private 
contractors or employee cooperatives in order to increase competition and improve 
quality and efficiency while reducing costs, while the municipalities retain full 
responsibility for ensuring good elder care (Henriksen & Rosenqvist 2003). Since 
the Swedish municipalities have far-reaching autonomy, there is also a 
considerable geographical variation in public care for the elderly (Trydegård & 
Thorslund 2001). In Sweden, the county councils are responsible for organizing 
and financing health-care services, including hospitals, eldercare, and primary 
health care. Municipalities are responsible for social welfare services, including the 
care of the elderly. When it comes to Swedish eldercare, the government is the 
source of the moral regulations that apply in the shape of the Social Services Act 
(SoL) (2001, 453); it is then up to local politicians and civil servants in each 
municipality to put these rules into action, and their practical interpretation can 
differ between municipalities. Therefore, central guidelines are reworked into local 
practice. Each municipality has developed rules for case-processing, and in this 
way value judgements are generated (Hasenfeld 2010), while executive managers 
in the municipalities’ social welfare systems have to translate political goals and 
strategies into practical care for the elderly in their communities (Henriksen & 
Rosenqvist 2003). 
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Survey 
There is a feminization of ageing in rural communities in high-income countries 
such as Sweden and Canada (CIHI 2006, Keating 2008), while older women in 
general are among the poorest in society (Gunnarsson 2000) and suffer more from 
health problems compared to men (Lennartsson & Heimerson 2013). However, 
there is a lack of comprehensive epidemiological and quantitative studies focusing 
on older people and emotions in rural areas, particularly from a gender 
perspective. 
In Sweden, women and men living in rural areas have lower life expectancy rates 
and higher mortality due to injuries and ischemic heart disease (Melinder 2007). A 
comparison between mental health and different kinds of municipality groups 
show some contradictory results; men are more suicidal in smaller municipalities 
and women less suicidal compared with larger municipalities, while mental well-
being is more positive for both men and women in smaller municipalities 
compared to larger (Melinder 2007). Studies on depression, on the other hand, 
show that older women are more depressed compared to men, but the author 
concludes that there is a lack of studies of geographical and cross-cultural 
variations (Djernes 2006). 
Most epidemiological studies of health among the elderly focus on those younger 
than 85 years, but there are some exceptions, among them the National Survey on 
Living Conditions (ULF) conducted by Sweden Statistics every eight years 
(Sweden Statistics 2006). Questionnaire studies that are repeated in the same age 
groups at different times make it possible to analyse trends in the population. The 
last report from the ULF study shows that in general, even if mental health 
problems have become a major health burden in Sweden, the increase is mainly 
due to an increase in mental problems in younger age groups. Reported emotions 
such as worry, anxiety, and recurrent tiredness are even lower in the older age 
groups in 2003 than they were in 1980 (Sweden Statistics 2006), even after 
controlling for gender, class, family structure, and region. One problem with the 
reporting of health in that report is that health differences between men and 
women not are analysed, and also that health and living conditions in rural areas 
have not been in focus. However, unpublished data from the survey show that 
both men and women aged 65 or more report more general ill-health in rural areas 
(50 per cent of men and 60 per cent of women) compared to the cities (35 per cent 
and 46 per cent), indicating that where one lives also is interesting to analyse 
further in relation to health among elderly. About twice as many women as men in 
rural areas report feelings of loneliness and forlornness (12 and 5 per cent 
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respectively), and it is thus important to study this further from a gender 
perspective, particularly as feelings of loneliness are strongly related to depression 
in rural areas (Burholt & Scharf 2013). 
Quantitative studies have been criticized by feminist researchers as being male-
centered, positivistic, and patriarchal and for using a male norm not valid for 
women, but Miner-Rubino et al. (2007) argue that it is possible to use surveys also 
to achieve feminist goals, to increase knowledge about women’s and other 
marginalized groups’ lived experiences, and to be a tool in discussions with 
politicians and policymakers when arguing for social change. They claim that this 
is possible, because feminist researchers can pose questions that are a vehicle for 
showing the importance of gendered living conditions related to sexism, 
harassment, violence, poverty, and so on, and also that feminist researchers can 
interpret results from surveys based on knowledge of the gender order, and thus 
provide a basis for social change towards a more gender-equal society. 
An advantage of a statistical analysis based on a random sample is that it is 
possible to generalize the results to a larger population than the actual sample, and 
to take characteristics such as socioeconomic differences and other social variables 
into account in the same analysis. It is also possible to make gender differences in 
health and gendered living conditions visible for politicians and policymakers, and 
show diagrams and figures in a simplified and comprehensive way. These are 
important advantages for small rural communities that are often overlooked by 
politicians and policymakers. 
Quite apart from the methodological difficulties related to the question of the 
studies’ response rates, validity, and reliability, quantitative studies are unable to 
capture conditions and circumstances that are more inductive than deductive. The 
method is limited to predetermined hypotheses and may lead researchers to 
overlook important emotions and other outcomes, as well as relations to other 
phenomena. There are also difficulties with capturing the complexity of society 
and emotional nuances. Used alone, the quantitative method does not include the 
informants in policy change and has thus less focus on empowerment than 
participatory qualitative research methods. 
Qualitative informant interviews 
Conducting interviews as a way of collecting empirical material is one of the main 
methods in qualitative research. Many scholars have stressed the importance of 
talking to people as being central to social science, since it is a good way of using 
the power of language to illuminate meaning (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995; 
Legard et al. 2006). The methodology used in the study discussed here rests on the 
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interpretative tradition of policy ethnography (Rhodes 2013), focusing on the 
complexity of human sense-making, the emotions connected to growing old in 
rural places, and everyday policy-making.47 The complexities of human sense-
making are admitted in the acknowledgement of the conflicting interpretations 
among stakeholders. The method also recognizes the need to be sensitive to the 
rich, in-depth, and idiographic meanings that the participants assign to them. The 
qualitative informant interview works well in terms of stimulating people’s 
thinking patterns and narratives. The intent was to increase the understanding of 
the emotional aspects of rurality and growing old. In total, 27 qualitative informant 
interviews in three rural Swedish municipalities were conducted. The interviews 
were conducted with politicians, officials such as managers and needs assessors, 
and representatives of elderly organizations at the municipal level. The interviews 
with officials and politicians are to be regarded as elite interviews, as the 
informants hold formal positions with the expectation that they will have good 
information and an overview of the eldercare in the municipality. 
The chosen interview method resulted in deep, nuanced, rich narratives where the 
informants were given the opportunity to tell their stories in their own words, 
stressing the things that were important to them. These are event- and experience-
based narratives, created to communicate and justify their actions, in some cases as 
public officials. Rather than being representations of ‘reality’, I regard the 
narratives as created for an audience (Mattingly 1998) to give meaning to actions. 
The narratives reveal a wide range of emotions, from fear and loneliness to joy and 
pride. The method reveals the fear of growing old, losing control, or finding 
oneself alone, as well as anxiety. As an example of loneliness and anxiety is the 
narrative from an older female: 
The nights, the nights are so long and lonely. A friend called me crying and told me 
that she had called the home care during the night and she [the home carer] said: We 
will come to you…in the morning, because you see during the nights we are asleep 
(Older woman). 
But there were also feelings of joy connected to self-determination and pride in 
working with the elderly (Nyhlén & Giritli Nygren 2013; Giritli Nygren et al. 2014). 
The needs assessors often talk about feelings of insufficiency, but also pride: 
What is important is that I as a needs assessor speak on behalf of the individual. I 
don’t speak on behalf of the municipality or the relatives, I don’t speak on the behalf 
of the county council, I only speak on the behalf of the elderly, I always put my 
                                                          
47
 The study in question comes under the project ‘Tryggt boende för äldre i glesbygd: 
Boendeformer, genus och hälsa i regional politik och praktik’ [Safe living for elderly in 
rural areas: Housing health and gender in policy and practice]. 
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focus on the individual and his or her needs. I respect the individual and I look them 
in the eyes… that is my role (Needs assessor). 
The method worked nicely as a way of capturing overt emotions that the 
informants in some ways were aware of and comfortable to talk about. Two 
overarching themes appeared in the interviews: fear and safety in rural areas, and 
the desire as an elderly person to be able to decide for oneself. Safety is talked 
about as one of the advantages of rural areas and a way of promoting the rural 
areas. 
The concept of safety has been given something of a market value…if you feel 
unsecure… if you feel unsafe you are even willing to pay a price in order to feel safe 
again…and then I’m not only talking about money, but even a kind of social price… 
you have the everyday support of your fellow human beings. (Politician) 
At the same time there is a fragility about life in the rural areas that creates issues 
of insecurity when the areas are sparsely populated and the distances are large. 
and then you have these so-called safety alarms, but if there is a power cut or if your 
phone dies then the alarm won’t work, so where’s the safety in that? (Older woman) 
In this way, the method reveals information based on the informants’ own 
perspectives instead of focusing on categories and dimensions determined by the 
researchers. The method allowed the interviewer to follow the informants’ 
narratives and to clarify things by asking follow-up questions. The ambition is 
therefore not to gain repeatability or generalizations in a positivistic sense; the 
value of the results is rather judged in terms of the extent to which it allows others 
to understand the phenomenon (Schram & Caterino 2006). However, the method 
lacks the opportunity to make more general statements or generalizable 
assumptions about a larger population than the actual sample, especially about the 
interplay of emotions and the experience of growing old in rural areas. This may 
prove to be important, since the experience of growing old in rural places may well 
turn out to be a highly emotional experience, but it is not possible to answer 
questions about how common these feelings are using a qualitative narrative 
method. 
Photovoice 
Photovoice is an innovative, participatory, qualitative research method that was 
originally designed for research with women in rural China (Wang et al. 1996). It 
provides study participants with the opportunity to take photographs and record 
in logbooks to reveal information relevant to themselves, their communities, and 
the study’s purpose. Photovoice photographs can facilitate discussion, visually 
document situations that are otherwise difficult to describe (such as rural 
isolation), and promote empathy and understanding (‘A picture is worth a 
thousand words’) that foster social change (Leipert 2013; Leipert et al. 2011; Wang 
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& Burris 1997). As a result, emotional and contextual understanding by both 
participants and researchers, as well as by those using the research, such as 
policymakers and practitioners, can be fostered using this research method. 
Because of its philosophical roots in feminist inquiry, Freire’s critical consciousness 
work, and participatory action (Wang & Burris 1997), photovoice effectively 
facilitates an understanding of gendered experiences and perceptions of context, 
such as those related to rural life, from participants’ perspectives. Spatial, social, 
and political contexts are revealed in photos that include various individuals, their 
locations, and their interactions with others as well as the rural space. For example, 
photovoice research has explored the significance of curling for rural women in 
Canada (Leipert et al. 2011), a topic about which little is known and involving a 
leisure activity—curling—that is key to the emotional, social, and physical health 
and quality of life in small-town Canada (Morrow & Wamsley 2013). 
In addition, photovoice can help to reveal assumptions, beliefs, and values that can 
advance an understanding of needs, resources, and change. In a study about health 
promotion and rural older women (Leipert 2013), photos by the study participants, 
all older rural women, revealed important information about not only health needs 
and issues in a rural setting, but also about resilience and hardiness in coping with 
these needs. The women were prompted by these photos to cry, laugh, sigh, and 
express other feelings as they explained the photos’ significance. These emotions 
enhanced an understanding of the meaning and importance of the various people 
(family, friends, care providers), buildings and institutions (churches, long-term 
care facilities), personal and public settings (homes, gardens), and other elements 
in their lives as ageing women in rural contexts. 
Evidently, the taking and discussing of photos presents information that 
supplements the narrative and statistical data, and also reveals new information 
that cannot easily or accurately be retrieved or represented by these other methods. 
In addition, the presence and depth of emotional understanding can be charted 
more clearly with photovoice research, as noted by informants’ responses to 
photos, whether eye contact, nods, facial expressions, or other non-verbal 
emotional indicators. These emotional indicators may both confirm or deny verbal 
and photographic evidence, thereby enhancing the soundness of understanding 
and capturing the diversity of various rural experiences and interpretations. As a 
result, photovoice research can help describe the rich and diverse nature of ageing 
in rural environments, and the emotions involved in living and ageing there. 
In addition, by discussing participants’ photos in a group setting, photovoice 
enhances the rural participants’ understanding of this type of research. This can 
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help with changes to local policy and practice, as local people initiate and sustain 
resources in their communities. For example, photos can draw attention to 
problematic ageing situations—infrastructure problems such as broken pavements 
and the absence of ramps, for example—and prompt accurate, context-based action 
to address them. The logbooks, meanwhile, facilitate inclusivity and confidentiality 
for rural participants who wish to provide private information rather than verbal 
expressions in rural group situations where everyone is acquainted. In conclusion, 
photovoice can provide an opportunity for therapeutic interaction as participants 
share photos, speak, and are heard—opportunities that are rare for rural women in 
general (Leipert et al. 2012a) and older women in particular. Emotionally, such 
experiences can be very empowering, not only for the research participants, but for 
the rural communities too. 
Recommendations regarding photovoice 
In order to obtain accurate interpretations of emotional knowledge, or indeed any 
type of knowledge, using photovoice, it is important that each photo be discussed, 
rather than only one or two as is usual in a photovoice group situation. This may 
require longer or more group sessions and/or individual interviews with each 
participant to allow time for a discussion of all photos. In addition, participants’ 
titling of each photo can enhance accuracy and clarity by designating meaning. As 
literacy rates can be lower among older rural residents compared to their urban 
counterparts (CIHI 2006), repeated, in-depth explanations of the content and 
process of recording logbooks or using a camera use may be required. The usual 
ethical requirement that study participants must obtain the signatures of those 
whose photos they take may pose particular issues for older participants, as they 
may feel uncomfortable explaining the study to others and asking for their 
signatures; however, the importance of capturing rural social involvement in the 
photos cannot be overestimated, as it is often social support (in other words, 
people) that is key to emotional health and ageing in rural settings, and thus the 
inclusion of people in the photos must be encouraged. It is also important to 
provide sufficient time and care during group and individual interviews for 
emotions about the photos to be expressed and explored, so that this rich source of 
information, virtually unique to the photovoice experience, can be sufficiently 
appreciated and captured. Indeed, emotional responses are as important as 
behavioural responses in determining what is needed, why, when, where, and 
how, and whether resources that are or could be put in place will be accepted, 
available, and used—important information for practitioners and policymakers in 
rural settings (Kulig & Williams 2012; Leipert et al. 2012a; Thien 2012). 
Morse (2012) has stated that the qualitative researcher provides ‘a different kind of 
evidence—one that illustrates … and emotionally arouses and provides instant 
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comprehension … a common-sense type of information that removes the necessity 
for extensive and costly data collection’ often required by quantitative research 
(68). In addition, she claims that the emotional and comprehensible nature of 
qualitative research helps to humanize health care, thereby providing ‘a moral 
dimension, sensitizing us to significant issues’, and helps us to ‘advocate for the 
vulnerable, communicating their concerns’, ‘critique health science’, ‘identify and 
document … actions of care’, and provide ‘a moral commentary on removing 
inhumane practices and creating humanizing change’ (68). Photovoice, with its 
combined use of photos, interviews, and recorded perspectives provided by the 
participants themselves, has all these requisites, and, moreover, in ways that are 
quite different from quantitative methods. As such, photovoice commands both a 
unique and a supplemental position in other research, such as in quantitative 
approaches—positions that can significantly advance understanding, practices, 
and policies regarding such things as ageing and emotions in rural contexts. 
Conclusions 
This essay has shown that different methodologies can capture different aspects of 
the potentially highly emotional experience of growing old in rural areas. The 
emotional experience of being a double ‘burden’—not only growing old, but also 
living in a rural area—needs to be elaborated in different ways using different 
methodologies. 
As knowledge about emotions among the rural elderly from a gender perspective 
is scarce, there could be advantages to using a mixed method approach when 
remedying this. It is possible to use quantitative and qualitative methods in 
parallel, posing different questions to get a fuller understanding of the 
phenomenon, but also focusing on a broad research question that encourages 
answers that use different methods and epistemological perspectives (Stewart & 
Cole 2007). 
 
This chapter shows that all the different methods have their advantages and 
drawbacks when exploring emotions and ageing in rural settings. The quantitative 
method can generate important knowledge at the population level about the 
association between emotions and rurality, and at the same time takes several 
other factors into account in its statistical analyses. The quantitative method makes 
it possible to analyse the relation between factors such as gender and rurality, 
which indicates that living places and spaces do matter for the reporting of health. 
We would argue there is a need for further analyses, focusing on gender, health, 
and location. In this way, the quantitative method may be used to increase 
knowledge about women’s experiences and ultimately result in social change. 
However, being limited to the use of predetermined hypotheses may result in 
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overlooking important experiences and emotions. The point here is that 
quantitative methods may advantageously be used with qualitative methodologies 
such as interviews and photovoice in the exploration of emotions and their 
significance for health in rural settings. 
In studying the emotions connected to growing old in rural places, the language 
used in the interviews proved to be a fruitful source of information. This research 
approach made it possible to capture the complexity and conflicting emotions. At 
the same time the interviews only captured emotions that the participants were 
aware of and in some sense comfortable to talk about, and a number of different 
emotions came into play. One advantage with the method is how the personal 
encounter between the interviewer and the informants sometimes revealed the 
emotional layers in the experience of both growing old and rurality. The method 
gave the opportunity to elaborate and discuss emotions and ambivalences, and 
provided the interviewer with the opportunity to ask follow-up questions and to 
discuss the narratives and the emotions revealed in them. The limitations of the 
method are the inability to make generalizable statements and the tendency only to 
reveal those emotions that the informants are aware of and choose to talk about. 
These disadvantages can be offset by using photovoice. 
Photovoice has a unique ability to capture and reveal aspects of rurality and their 
implications for ageing and emotion in rural settings. Of the three methodologies 
discussed in this essay, photovoice is the only one to originate in studies with a 
specific focus on rurality. Photos taken by participants can be used to spark a 
discussion of the obvious, as well as more tangential and sometimes more sensitive 
information. The photographs can reveal emotional layers of rurality that the 
participants sometimes are not aware of or able to talk about, and in this way it is 
possible to gain knowledge about rurality that may be important to social change. 
However, in order to facilitate a clear and accurate understanding of the meanings 
intended in the photos, it is important that all the photos be discussed. This can be 
time-consuming, but equally can result in rich, nuanced understanding of the 
participants’ emotions regarding health in rural settings. 
Clearly, the use of multiple research methods deepens and extends understanding 
of ageing and emotions in rural contexts. In order to increase our knowledge of the 
interplay of emotions, rurality, and gender, we would stress the importance of 
using different kinds of methods. 
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CHAPTER 13 
THE NORMALITY OF EMOTIONS? 
A discussion on the normality of emotions among professors Gabriele Griffin 
(University of York), Ann Cvetkovich (University of Texas, Austin), Patricia Clough 
(CUNY Graduate Center, Queens College, US) 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Well, I’ve got some questions that I would like to raise, but I’m 
hoping that this is going to be more of a conversation, because I’m sure for all of 
us, this has raised a lot of issues, and you in the workshop may well also have 
questions. I want to start by following up on the last panel [‘Growing Old in Rural 
Places, Emotional Narratives’], and the question of emotions raised there. Because 
part of what I was thinking about was also a question that was raised from the 
floor: what does this do to the researcher and the question of closure when you 
encounter vulnerable subjects? Who are vulnerable because of structural issues, 
that you may well feel completely unable to deal with? And I would like to link 
that question to an earlier one: how can we deal with difference in an ethnical 
manner? Take it away girls! 
 
Patricia Clough: Six years ago I went back into psychoanalysis—note the word, 
back into—so I had been in some kind of therapy all my life. I wanted to return to 
the place where I grew up in my psyche and actually. 
   I grew up in a place called Corona in New York, which is a very famous place. It 
has been written about because of black and white politics and it is now the place 
of 16 or 17 different ethnic groups of colour, speaking many different languages. 
At the same time that I went back into analysis I started to walk in Corona and 
continued for six years. During that time I did different kinds of things: I went to 
church groups and met kids, I talked to people, I brought students with me who 
were photographers.  But I had no plan to do research and I especially did not 
want to produce ethnography about populations in Corona.  
   Then little by little a young woman joined me and she wanted to learn about 
video. So we were videoing and taking photographs, and we started interviewing 
people, and interviewing groups of young people, and it was great. We would 
walk together, she and I and then more people joined us so eventually there were 
about six of us, Chinese, Dominican, Columbian, Dominican, African American 
and Korean young adults. We would start to walk together and we started to 
develop a method. But I was thinking always, unlike in the therapeutic situation, 
we were walking side by side. I said that I wanted to do a book project about my 
life, so they were going to help me write about my life, of long ago, in that 
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community where they now live. And little by little we thought, why just my life? 
Why not our lives? It was like an interacting autobiography, but I didn’t want to 
write. So we decided to put in a proposal to a remix festival where you remix 
sounds or images. 
   Well, we got accepted and I remember getting together in the room saying: well, 
can anybody do anything? We had someone who could sing, quite fantastically it 
turned out, and someone who wanted to try dancing, and we had some video and 
we had these photographs from our walks, so we put together a piece called 
Ecstatic Corona. To make a short story out of your question about vulnerable 
subjects, because they all were, I think we did produce a piece that was just 
phenomenal. I mean, I don’t know how we did it—but we did and it is about 
vulnerability for sure but really just about our amazing relationship to each other!  
   A year after that first performance there was another call from the remix festival, 
and we all said, do we want to do it again? So we put in a proposal. And in about a 
month we put the second piece together—and something happened to all of us. I 
mean, we really were in ecstasy. That second piece was much more about all of us 
moving back even more from it being about my life. So one of my answers to your 
question regarding vulnerable subjects is: to move with them as if they will be with 
you for the rest of your life. 
   I do performance pieces of my own, and they do the music and images for it, so 
we are in some kind of a thing that we can’t separate, and I know that’s not 
possible for every project, but I like the idea of never ending the relationship with 
them. I was thinking this morning about the feeling of poverty that all of us in the 
group share. I grew up in that poor neighbourhood with a sense of emotional 
poverty. They knew my history, so little by little, while walking Corona, they 
started sharing their own stories. It was really amazing to me.     
  They did not know each other; they only knew me, so slowly they had to build 
their relationships with each other as well. I would be there, but not there. I heard 
lately that they go out sometimes by themselves, which I like. So what I am trying 
to say here is to make a point about the non-endingness of the relationships we 
might make in what we think of as research. I don’t always think of the word 
ethical, but I feel the project is so collaborative that our lives don’t separate so 
easily from each other anymore. That’s how I feel about it; it’s kind of ethics about 
it in that way. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: Because I want to respond to what Patricia has just said, I am 
going to say something completely different than I had planned, which is what I 
love about the live encounter! I recently wrote an article – for the collection Oral 
History in the Visual Arts – called ‘The craft of conversation: oral history and lesbian 
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feminist art practice,’48 which is about interviews with Allyson Mitchell and Sheila 
Pepe, the artists who were featured in my book Depression: A Public Feeling.49 When 
I interviewed them for the project, I didn’t record the conversations, I just took 
notes on my computer while we talked, which seemed counter to the usual 
protocols for oral history research. 
   I’ve always struggled with how to use interview transcripts because there can be 
so much material and it can be so rich. When I start to break down the transcript 
into segments in order to analyse it, I feel like I’m doing violence to the liveness of 
the encounter. Performance studies have helped me think about the interview as a 
conversation. And it’s very much like the ‘walking beside’ role that you were 
talking about, Patricia. I’ve come to consider conversation to be a research practice, 
including the conversations we have been having here at the workshop.   
   In order to write about my conversations with my artist friends, I used a method 
borrowed from a wonderful anthology called Bodies of Evidence about interview 
methods in LGBTQ studies – where oral history has been a central research 
practice.50 Each contributor started with a segment from an interview they had 
done and they wrote about the surrounding contexts that are not present in the 
transcript, including what they were thinking during the interview process. This 
method acknowledges the complexity of the interview, and by extension the 
conversation, as a social relation that produces knowledge. For my written essay, 
rather than trying to capture the full force of the conversation that informed it, I 
focused on keywords and phrases that evoked my sense of the affective dynamic 
of the conversation: in Allyson’s case it was the ‘whirlpool’ of the ‘craft closet,’ and 
in Sheila’s case it was the ‘magic of installation.’ Although those phrases might 
have popped out in reading the transcript, I chose them based on my affective 
memory of the energy of the conversation and the collective thinking it produced.  
   Gabriele’s question brings up for me the way that the normalization of affect can 
be thought about through queer theory. I’ve also been thinking here about 
normalization in terms of cultural assimilation. Feminism has helped show how 
being ‘a good girl’ is part of the normalization process for women, especially, those 
like me, who are white, raised middle class, and/or from Anglo-European nations 
(such as Canada, where I am from). Gender is part of neo-liberalism because all the 
ways in which one is taught to be a good girl are very convenient for establishing 
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the norms that will make capitalism run better. These are processes of racialization 
as well, which is why decolonizing our autobiographies is central to the project of 
exploring ‘Normalization and the Neo-liberal Welfare State.’ 
 
Patricia Clough: Yes, I do agree. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: At lunch, I was also talking to Annelie Bränström Öhman about 
class because I’m really interested in the modes of assimilation around class (and 
also race) that might be specific to Sweden and that are connected to gendered 
forms of normalization. I’ve been inspired by José Esteban Muñoz’s work on 
ethnicity as an affect or feeling rather than an identity. Borrowing from queer 
notions of non-normative affect, he talks about ethnicity as something that 
manifests as “a certain ethics of the self that is utilized and deployed by people of 
color and other minoritarian subjects who don’t feel quite right within the 
protocols of normative affect and comportment’.51 
   How do we acknowledge and work from that sense of not feeling quite right, in 
which affect is a sign of both assimilation or normalization and something that 
escapes it? Such as approach is necessary for alternatives to the neoliberal 
management of identity and difference that go beyond the embrace of 
multicultural diversity. We don’t quite know what that feels like in both ordinary 
encounters and collective ones. As it happens, I’m also trying to work this out in a 
writing project that resembles Patricia’s Ecstatic Corona in its auto ethnographic 
exploration of locations and its use of experimental forms of writing. 
 
Patricia Clouch: I wanted say one thing quickly about emotions in this group, 
should I wait and you ask another question or—? 
 
Gabriele Griffin: No, go ahead. 
 
Patricia Clough: I’m not sure about your setting, but in New York City some 
groups are constantly policed, stopped and searched, so their top emotions are 
rage, and ‘I’d like to fucking kill you’. So performance can be just great for 
illustrating these experiences, because the performance comes from that. We write 
together and there are a lot of the emotions like anger that get expressed in the 
performance before we can get to the sadness underneath – but we do get there 
and that process is really great. In the second performance we had only very few 
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expressions of anger and more about loneliness, sadness and despair—darker 
feelings. The main character became a girl, named Mercy, who was 
institutionalized—and we were talking to her throughout the piece as she goes 
mad. It was really a beautiful piece. 
   I am also a psychotherapist and I wonder if we can move that rage around in 
communities; it would be so great. For me, in the second performance to see us go 
from rage to sort of identifying with this girl Mercy as emotions soften. I still can 
cry just thinking about it and I am trying to say this happens during the 
performance. It has its own efficacy. It’s not just that you prepare for it, then you 
have it, and after it you are like another person. We like doing them because things 
happen, the movement of emotion through performance, and we are talking music 
and dance and words— 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Can I ask something there, because, in a sense, performance in a 
way always strikes me as extraordinary and maybe that’s quite wrong. What I am 
thinking about in relation to this question of normalization is how that relates to 
another word that has come up a lot here at the workshop in the last couple of 
days. And this is the everyday: everyday racism, everyday this, and every day 
that… So how do you see the relation between everyday racism and 
normalization? And not just racism. You can take any of the other everydaynesses 
that we condense in research events, in an interesting but also quite problematic 
way sometimes. How do you think about that relation? 
 
Ann Cvetkovich. I don’t associate performance with the extraordinary because I’m 
so interested in its ordinary dimensions. My early work on sensationalism in Mixed 
Feelings explored genres such as melodrama, sentimentality, and the gothic that 
still pervade contemporary culture, including documentary forms that often 
disavow the sensational. Sensationalism happens when an inchoate set of forces 
assemble around something that we could name as an event.52 How is it that 
ordinary affects converge to produce something sensational, including events? 
And what happens if we try to unpack the event as something that is ordinary? I’m 
not against using the categories of the sensational or the extraordinary, but I 
always want to think about them in relation to the ordinary. I’m interested in 
unpacking autobiography or unpacking place in order to notice the ordinariness of 
processes of assimilation or normalization that produce conventional forms of 
behaviour or performance. How do we develop the tools to observe this process at 
work? Psychoanalysis is one way of doing this, but there are other forms of 
                                                          
52 See Katie Stewart and Lauren Berlant on the event: Stewart, K. (2007). Ordinary Affects. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press and Berlant, L. (2010). Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
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politicized analysis that ask ‘What was that event that seemed like it was nothing?’ 
You can get melodramatic about it – trying to see where damage occurred – but 
you also end up noticing that something like damage is happening all the time.  
 
Patricia Clough: Trauma. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: —but it doesn’t have to take the form of trauma— 
 
Patricia Clough: Yes, right— 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: —it’s also what we call the ordinary or everyday. For example, I 
try to teach the concept of gender identity in my classes by asking my students to 
notice when it was that they were told what it means to be a girl -- or a boy. Can 
they learn to notice the process of normalization at work in their own early 
histories? And can they imagine alternatives? I think that is some of the work those 
of you studying children’s books are doing as well. We want to ask what it would 
look like to raise queer children – that is, to embrace diversity, difference, the non-
normal, the queer in all of its complexity – and its ordinariness. That’s an 
interesting project – the actual practice of raising queer children.53 
 
Patricia Clough: Like Eve Sedgwick suggested? 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: Yes, yes. 
 
Patricia Clough: I would like to do some politics on your question, and so I was 
thinking about the granular, or as you remembered kindly about what I was 
saying, what did you call it—? 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Rescaling. 
 
Patricia Clough. The rescaling—thank you—the rescaling of the focus of 
governance, the creation of precociousness, how some of the things we want to 
bring up here already have been brought up by governance in relationship with 
capital. And they are all interested in the event as well. So how do you work doing 
some things that seem to you to be extraordinary, that have become ordinary but 
not in the nice sense you Ann were saying, but in the sense that we have become 
already ‘captured’, or ‘simulated’ as you were saying. So the young adults I am 
with can say ‘I’m Chinese’, or ‘I’m queer’, or ‘I’m Columbian’. It’s an identity 
                                                          
53 Sedgwick, E.K. (1991). ‘How to bring your kids up gay.’ Social Text 29: 18-27. 
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politics that they know all about. And they know what I think about that. We talk 
about stuff that they know and I know so there is no presumption that they don’t 
know what academics know. It’s very interesting to hear them know about things 
that social scientists don’t know that they know. Am I making sense? So I’m not 
sure what is ordinary any more, and what’s event, and what’ simulation and who 
has or doesn’t have access to any of it? Anyway, I think it’s a great question you’ve 
raised, Gabriele.  
 
Gabriele Griffin: Do other people in the room have queries about this, about the 
everyday, and normalization, and their interrelation? 
 
Patricia Clough: And then maybe we should ask if for some people there really is a 
meaningful every day.  
 
Gabriele Griffin: Or maybe there is a different meaningful everyday? 
 
Patricia Clough: —They may rather live the population description of them, they 
become these populations. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: But do they? Think about the guy who talked about potatoes54. 
 
Patricia Clough: Well, but every time they are stopped and frisked they know that 
they are some population. And that’s part of their everyday in a way. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Yes— 
 
Patricia Clough: —I don’t know what I am trying to say so— 
 
Gabriele Griffin: What do people think? 
 
Ulrika Schmauch55: I’m not sure.  
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Gabriele Griffin: I’ll tell you why I asked the question. I was struck by the relation 
between everydayness and invisibility that was being articulated in different ways, 
in different papers, during this workshop. For example, things in the workplace, 
emotional experiences, and so on—that is everyday, but in a sense hidden. There is 
almost like a parallel discourse that goes on about normalization, so from my point 
of view it doesn’t quite capture what this other thing is, that nonetheless, however, 
I think we are after. 
 
Patricia Clough: Invisible. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: That invisible everyday thing which is exactly your granular, 
but— 
 
Bob Pease56: It seems to me that some of the things that are everyday invisible are 
invisible to some of us, but they are very, very visible and clear to others. 
 
Patricia Clough: That’s what I was trying to say, thank you. [Laughter] 
 
Bob Pease: I think that everyday sexism is invisible, on the whole, to men when 
men engage in sexist practices that are normalized. But my sense is that women 
pick this everyday sexism up all the time. Women have a sensibility to that 
everyday sexism, in ways that men don’t. And even when we talk about the 
invisibility of privilege or the invisibility of whiteness, if you don’t have privilege it 
is not invisible. When you don’t have privilege, you have to negotiate your life 
around it. You deal with it all the time. So I think it’s interesting, this question of 
invisibility. 
 
Patricia Clough: Definitely. But what I was trying to say is that stop and frisk is 
not invisible to these kids. But as you go back into the community, and if you’ve 
never been stopped and frisked, and I have not been, that’s like finding something 
that was invisible to you, but it’s not to them. This is such an old anthropological 
question: how to be with people who to some extent don’t share some experiences 
that really mark them. Some we do anyway, and so what’s the finding? And how 
do you do the ethics of walking beside, instead of looking at? How do you uncover 
something that you know as a social scientist, and now you have found it in the 
real—? 
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Bob Pease: But I wonder about this issue of ‘walking beside’. Because if you are 
embedded in unequal structural relations how can you walk beside those with less 
power equally? Can you really walk beside? 
 
Patricia Clough: Physically— 
 
Bob Pease: Is ‘walking beside’ a way of avoiding the discomfort of our position of 
privilege and power? Are we wanting to form some kind of connection or relations 
of solidarity with those who are marginal? The idea of walking beside presumes 
some sort of equality in structural relation that just isn’t there. I wonder whether 
walking beside captures the relations of solidary we are aiming to achieve? 
 
Patricia Clough: Well, I think it captures it exactly; I mean, we certainly were 
opening up psychically to each other, so there were things that we all have 
experienced in childhood, me included. That was one of the basis of our 
connections: that we knew there were certain things we all had experienced. But 
walking beside also did suggest we couldn’t just be face to face, that there were 
these differences that were just going to live on as differences; they weren’t going 
to be renegotiated; I wasn’t going to become one of them, or them me. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: I think that’s very interesting, a metaphor in a way: the things 
we cannot face. I was struck in the photovoice discussion when you were asking 
about the method, about the way in which the optic can become the thing you 
concentrate on, to discuss the thing you cannot face. To me that was also very 
interesting. In relation to something else, which is a relation of that to the 
everyday, and the registers of emotions which are something we have talked about 
here as well. There were a number of speakers here at the workshop who talked 
about the things they say they haven’t discussed elsewhere, which tells us very 
clearly about normativity around the say-able, around the communicable. And that 
goes for a whole range of emotions, so this raises an interesting question for me 
about norms, emotions, what we cannot face, what we cannot say, and how we 
process things to say them in certain ways we do. 
 
Patricia Clough: Totally I love that. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: I guess I was hearing “walking beside” a little differently -- as an 
alternative to a more conventional therapeutic relationship, and, specifically, talk 
therapy. Although maybe it’s not an alternative to psychoanalysis, where one 
doesn’t actually sit face to face with the therapist, but it’s also very different to be 
able to move through space with someone and to have more embodied relation to 
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them. My oral history work has led me think about these issues. Although I 
haven’t done training as a therapist, I feel that I get to have something like a 
therapeutic relationship with people I’m interviewing and also to transform what 
therapy can look like. In the craft of conversation, I’m often working side by side 
with people who are more like me than different. But I also like to mix it up in 
order to socialize the encounter with the self -- across generations, across race -- 
rather than letting it remain a solo process. 
 
Patricia Clough: Yes, yes. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: —and the work of decolonizing the self is a project that looks 
very different depending on one’s social location. In many ways, I can only speak 
for what it’s like to be a white person trying to learn to have a different relation to 
my own history, but that also entails having a different relation to other people, 
including people of colour. And sometimes this affective work happens in a 
register that resembles that of listening to sounds rather than words. Asking how 
something feels can be like tuning in to frequencies, and there are sometimes secret 
or subterranean forms of communication between brown people or people who 
share a minoritarian culture.57 As a white person, I ask: ‘What does it mean to try to 
tune in to that frequency?’ This can be very difficult work, because you might not 
be invited— 
 
Patricia Clough: Not you. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: Well, you might be eavesdropping, or illicitly forging a bond. 
And what is it like to have access? Our academic landscape has become much 
more diverse over the course of my lifetime in both the US, where I live and work, 
and Canada, where I was born and raised and continue to visit. (And there are 
significant variations between the two, as there are also with Sweden.) What does 
it mean right now to be a white person in the diversifying academy, including 
being able to take advantage of the opportunity to listen in on conversations that 
are not always meant for you? In Canada, the protocols for white people and 
indigenous people doing work together can be quite stringent. It is worth paying 
attention to whether one is invited or not as part of the work of decolonizing 
methods and decolonizing history.58 
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Patricia Clough: Totally so— and there are two things I want to say. Primarily it is 
very important that the performance has music and singing and dance, because 
there are all kinds of ways besides words that things get done in those 
performances, and preparing for them and in doing them. It’s just spaces that are 
out of everybody’s, each one of our control; there is something that happens all 
over the place—all around us. The second thing I wanted to comment on is our 
possibility to face things. I must say, even as a therapist, that there are some things 
that one can’t face. I mean, after a hundred years of trying to face things I still can’t, 
so sometimes when I think ‘why can’t I just face that?’ So I think there is a way we 
don’t know ourselves, never mind the other. So there should be respect for these 
breakdowns, and performances of these breakdowns whatever that might mean, 
instead of the assumption ‘Yes, I did understand’. No way! 
   And in some ways I mean walking beside as to let be a rhythm of knowing and 
not knowing, communicating and failing. I think you put it very well, the 
questions are hard and part of what it is to ask about the learning process now in 
our classrooms, for sure in the United States. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Can I shift to methods? Because I think one of the really 
interesting things about this workshop has been this sort of emergence of 
experimental methodology. And I want to ask you about the relation between that 
and, if you like, a neo-liberal sensibility, because it seems to me to have been an 
interesting rise, or concomitant rise, of neo-liberalism and experimental methods. 
But I want to know what you think— 
 
Patricia Clough: I think it’s concomitant, as much as it may be edgy for all of us … 
It’s part of the transformation. I mean from my point of view I don’t know how the 
academic world is surviving. But it isn’t actually, without images and sound, and 
the digital is allowing for all of these kinds of expressions that are going to become 
required. So I feel like we are in a transitional moment, where some of us are doing 
this, that go ‘wow’ when, in fact, there is no student any more that is going to 
present without an interesting PowerPoint. Not an ordinary one, but an interesting 
one. Even more and more dissertations will become digitally enhanced. I have just 
read a dissertation, 190 pages of really experimental writing on a subject that I 
can’t imagine would have gotten through once—and now it has. And digital has 
made this possible because it has made experimentation with writing possible.  
   So I don’t know … And all of this stuff about how much we are inside neo-
liberalism or can be never outside of it, or whether experiment is ever from the 
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outside? Or if it’s just cutting or shifting … It’s behind your question, are we, like, 
ahead of the times? Or part of the times? Or in the times—? 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Yeah. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich. Well, experimental method, including making more room for 
feelings, can definitely be a case of what Lauren Berlant calls cruel optimism.59 
Anders [Johansson] was asking me last night if I am continuing to explore the 
mood of political depression or if I am pursuing other affective moods, including 
happier ones? My current project on the sovereignty of the senses arises from the 
desire to continue to figure out how to survive in the face of political depression – 
including living with it. And I continue to use personal and experimental methods, 
however contaminated, to do that work. Quoting from Audre Lorde, I make the 
point that that there are no new ideas, only new ways of making them felt. That’s 
why I emphasize common sense because the work of antiracism and anti-
capitalism is at some level just that.60 [Laughter] 
 
Gabriele Griffin: But it’s also a very interesting materialization of emotion, 
knitting things, producing images, and so on. If you look through what people are 
doing, then they are materializing emotion in interesting ways. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich: Yes, I would say people have manifested this knowledge in 
multiple ways and for a long time. So what does it mean to bring it into the 
academy? As always there is plenty of room for domestication – or normalization – 
of alternative practices. Is education ultimately always a neo-liberal disciplinary 
apparatus of the state? How far does a radical critique of school need to go? I think 
you can go pretty far actually. I’ve learned a lot about indigenous education in 
Canada from family members who work in that field, and some of the most radical 
work on rethinking school is happening there, as well as in New 
Zealand/Aotearoa. Indigenous languages and practices are being revived, and 
people are developing new kinds of curriculum, including alternative forms of 
pedagogy that take place outside of conventional classrooms and buildings. 
Conventional classrooms in which students learn native languages can stand 
alongside conversations with elders about plants and land that take place outdoors 
and in site-specific locations.61  
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Patricia Clough: So I thought you said this morning, after that interesting moment, 
when Angelica Sjöstedt Landén62 brought up the initiative… the— 
 
Gabriele Griffin: The Utopia—?63 
 
Patricia Clough: The Utopia moment, which was like… it was you know, a 
shocking kind of juxtaposition. And I wanted to say to you, ‘Wow, that was an 
interesting moment and I want to hold it to my heart’. Maybe we should go back to 
thinking about really trusting our feelings? I do think there is something really, 
really important about feelings and emotions in our lives, and I do think that neo-
liberalism is way on top of it. I mean, they’ve got it all. But still I think—and that’s 
why I love when you said that about Utopia—that there is much to be gained by 
trying to understand feelings and emotions in relationship to our work, and 
relationship to teaching, and relationship to school. And I just do, I just think that 
from knowing so much, how difficult emotions are to know, and how blinding 
they can be, and how they can make us so hateful towards others and how they 
can be displaced onto others. I also think it is our responsibility to notice the 
speeds of co-optation and to learn how to be— to dodge a little, and to see that and 
to play with that, and not get too content with thinking you are edgy. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Okay. Ulrika? 
 
Ulrika Schmauch: I’m thinking about neo-liberalism and experimental methods, 
and some of us were talking about it during lunch. Who has actually got the 
possibility to be experimental? We were for example talking about positions, and a 
lot of us in this room and in academia don’t have permanent positions. And I can 
just speak for myself, that now that I have a permanent position, I can do kind of 
experimental work and I can talk about my feelings if I want to. But before that, I 
needed to be a good academic and publish. Well, I didn’t publish, but I was 
supposed to publish. Now I teach full-time and I think it would be very difficult 
for me to have the time ‘to walk side by side’. And I think it would be very difficult 
for me to have funding to have the time to do that. 
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Patricia Clough: I had no funding and I was teacher full-time when I was doing 
the walking. It just seemed like a necessity to me at the time. 
 
Ulrika Schmauch: Yes, but who has that necessity? I could probably spend it in 
some way— 
 
Patricia Clough: I do think your question is worth thinking about. 
 
Ulrika Schmauch: Yeah, and because I think with this, I don’t remember who said 
it before, that we are talking about emotions, but we have stopped talking about 
experiences and about experiences of oppression and marginalization. We are 
talking more about how it feels to need this? In a sense. And it’s… it’s itching— 
 
Patricia Clough: I love that you said that, because I would have said the same 
thing. I got tenure without writing, because I couldn’t write the way I was told to. I 
just couldn’t. It wasn’t until after tenure that I found a way to write differently. No 
one would get tenure any more on my record. You wouldn’t be able to get it 
anywhere in the United States, but I lived in the last moments of some other 
regime. So I love that you said ‘I didn’t publish’, because I think I find students 
who are really fragile, and should not be doing this kind of work, who say to me 
that they can do something else. So they are lucky they find someone like me, or 
Ann, to support them. 
   I’m not trying to get away from your political question, a masochism, can I do 
that and get tenure? And the answer is no. Can I do that before tenure? I doubt it. 
When did you start doing it? Did you do it after tenure? Yes, and you know… so 
all that’s true, it’s all true, and I’m still in an environment where my work is 
suspicious to my colleagues, and that students who work with me can have a real 
problem in my department. So for all the neo-liberalism, in the academy it is still 
troublesome to work like this, but I do. So yeah—it is a great question about who 
gets the right to do this or how do we get to do it? But I don’t know, I think you can 
find ways to do it. 
 
Ulrika Schmauch: Because I was commenting on a text couple of months ago, and 
she is writing about the middle class in the academy. And the people she 
interviewed were talking about these seemingly religious and spiritual moments 
where they sort of knew what the student was going to say before he said it 
because they were so connected. And we were talking about that you can have 
these kinds of… yeah, they were really clever these guys, or thought they were, but 
we were talking about that it’s allowed to say those things about spirituality and 
feeling, and so on, if you are in a very secure position. And I think that if you go 
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into academe and ‘Feeling Like a Fraud’64, you probably wouldn’t say it, you 
would probably at times feel very spiritual, but you would probably shut up.  
 
Ann Cvetkovich: Well, I guess that’s what we are trying to track, right? I get asked 
the question about experimental method as privilege a lot, and each time it comes 
up, I try to take it as symptomatic, as a sign that this work seems to strike a chord 
for some people. It’s like a little door opens for them but it also feels like it can get 
shut very quickly. That’s why I said earlier that my work was not experimental, 
but in fact quite simple or common-sensical. I like having my workshop on 
experimental writing programmed alongside the panel about rural women’s health 
today.65 That project seems to engage in quite conventional or straightforward 
forms of social science research that traffics in population demographics and 
statistics. But something as simple and yet elegant as asking women about their 
feelings can be included in the list of research questions. I don’t think that’s 
experimental, although it may be radical. And, of course, it can also be recuperated 
in all kinds of different ways.  
   My answer would be somewhat similar to what Patricia has said— that I have 
come to somewhat unorthodox projects because it was the only way I could write 
or do the work. And it’s true that I am able to do that because I have a lot of 
privilege and come from an elite education. But that doesn’t mean the work is easy 
or that I’m not amazed to be able to do it – and to be sitting here today! 
   We were talking about performance in the everyday and about raising queer 
children. I’m trying to teach my students to look at their own stories and see how 
they were normed into gender. They can’t do that. They just can’t do it. So that 
means we have some work to do, because it’s not a complicated practice, and yet it 
is because the resistance to that knowledge is tremendous. It’s another form of 
normalization that is killing people. My students, who are ordinary queer or LGBT 
young people, are all concerned about queer bullying, for example, because they 
sense that it applies to them even if they didn’t experience its most extreme forms. 
We did some work on disability, and many of them came out as having mental 
health issues. Does that correlate with queerness? I think it probably does. And it 
meant that some of them had a hard time doing the reading or even just making it 
to the class. So what tools can I give them? Sometimes I was unable to do more 
than ask them to think about a couple of questions. And again, there is nothing 
experimental about that. That’s just trying to give people some survival skills.   
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Patricia Clough: No, it’s like in Beverly Leipert’s expression during the workshop 
on raising the unconscious, not conscious-raising. But sometimes the depths have 
to be raised to remember how you were socialized into something, because it’s all 
that conscious. 
 
Gabriele Griffin: Yeah, Beverly raised her hand. So Beverly, do you want to make 
a comment? 
 
Beverly Leipert66: Well, just sitting and listening, I think a lot of issues have been 
raised and I’ve been making some notes: What is science? What counts as science? 
What counts as knowledge that has implications for method? I think it was Sara 
Harding that spoke: Whose science? Whose knowledge? So who does the science? 
Who owns the data? If you are doing research with Aboriginal people in Canada, 
they control the data. They will tell you that right up front: ‘You can’t publish 
without our permission. You can’t present any of this data unless we give you the 
permission to do that.’ This is partly because of their history. They have been 
researched to death, and they want control for this now. What questions are asked? 
And where this data is going to go? It’s about power. Is it women interviewing 
men? Men interviewing women? Who is asking the questions? What we are talking 
about is actually very, very complex, and I don’t think that there is any one answer 
to any of it. It depends on who? What? When? Why? Of what we are doing in 
terms of the research. 
   I think we unpack that in the different ways, and locations of where we are in 
terms of our careers, in terms of our age, in terms of our view of the world. It’s 
very complex, either our privilege or not, our past experience or not; I just think it’s 
muddy. 
 
Patricia Clough: It’s a struggle over science. 
 
Beverly Leipert: It’s muddy, and I think that’s just the way it is. I think that’s 
partly because in the academy we have such struggles because it isn’t black and 
white, or it shouldn’t be. Sometimes it’s officially imposed on us as researchers by 
the system—this is how many articles. Sometimes it isn’t said how many articles 
you need to have published in order to get, for example, a tenure promotion. And 
we know that for women it tends to be many more than for men. So I think it’s 
complex, and it’s muddy, and these are things we have to think about when we do 
research. Who’s doing this? What group? Who owns the data? What power do I 
have? How do we equalize or try to equalize power? All those things. What kind 
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of trust do I have with those folks? Have I worked with him before? How 
comfortable do they feel with me? And me with them? All of those things, it’s just, 
it’s very— 
 
Gabriele Griffin: As a final, concluding remark in the discussion, we are 
suggesting seeing complexity as resource. 
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